The audit expectation gap in Eritrea by Tekleab, Ermias Estifanos
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 










THE AUDIT EXPECTATION GAP IN 
ERITREA 
PREPARED BY: 
ERMIAS ESTIFANOS TEKLEAB 
Thesis presented in fulfillment of 
the requirement for the degree of 
Master of Commerce in Accounting 
to the Department of Accounting 











"There's a wide expectation gap between the 
assurance that investors believe an audit 
provides, and the assurance that even the best 
audit can reasonably provide." 
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The Audit expectation gap 
Abstract 
The public's expectations of auditors are usually not met by the actual 
performance of auditors. This is presumed to be caused by the difference in 
perception between what the public expects and the auditors deliver. This is 
termed the "expectation gap in auditing". Due to the widespread concern raised 
by the public, a number of researchers have studied the problem in various 
countries, among others: USA, Britain, South Africa, Finland, Spain, Singapore, 
New Zealand and Australia. All the studies undertaken indicate the existence of 
an expectation gap in these countries. Although many researchers and 
professional bodies have suggested how to close or narrow the gap, the problem 
is likely to remain unresolved due to spectacular corporate collapses such as 
Enron. 
The aim of this research study is to investigate the existence and the nature of 
the audit expectation gap in Eritrea, to analyze its constituent parts and to 
identify the factors which contribute to the gap, to compare the findings to the 
research findings of similar studies and, finally, to recommend possible 
solutions to narrow the expectation gap in Eritrea. A survey was conducted via 
structured interviews (through questionnaire) and unstructured interviews to 
examine the perceptions of auditors, directors, managers, accountants, internal 
auditors, shareholders, bank loan officers and tax inspectors of the Inland 
Revenue Department. 
Overall, the findings of this research suggest that there is a wide audit 
expectation gap on issues concerning the auditor's responsibility for fraud 
detection and the reporting of fraud and other illegal acts to authorities, going 
concern problems, and for examining the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
company's management. Auditors independence was also an important point of 
concern. Moreover, inadequate regulations by the regulatory body with regard 











The Audit expectation gap 
The most dissatisfied group, of all the interest groups, were users. This can be 
due partly to the dissatisfaction of the tax auditors with respect to the audit of 
small and medium sized companies. Moreover, there seems also to exist a lack 
of knowledge among users and management about the nature and limitations of 
the audit function. With respect to auditors, lack of knowledge also exists with 
regard to auditors' legal responsibilities. Moreover, auditors considered many of 
the suggested duties as the existing duty of an auditor. Hence the "knowledge 
gap" also exists among auditors. 
Overall, this research report indicates evidence of the existence of the audit 
expectation gap, and also provides a comprehensive approach to narrow the gap 
in Eritrea. If the recommendations are implemented, this may give the public 
confidence and trust in [mancial reporting in Eritrea. The directions that future 
research may take are also discussed. 
Keywords: 
- Audit expectation gap, Fraud, Going concern, Audit independence, 
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The Audit Expectation Gap in Eritrea 
Chapter one - Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
PublicI expectations of external auditors are usually not met by the 
actual performance of auditors. This is due to the difference in 
perception between what the public expects and the auditors deliver (see 
amongst others: Porter, 1993; Humphrey et al., 1993; Gloeck and De 
Jager, 1993; and Vittanen and Troberg, 1999). This is termed "the 
expectation gap in auditing". The audit expectation gap has a long and 
persistent history, but it is only since the 1970s that it has been given 
much attention. Due to the widespread concern raised by the public, 
members of the US Congress, financial writers, members of leading 
accounting firms, and regulatory agencies such as The Securities and 
Exchanges Commission in the USA, a number of researchers have 
studied the problem in various countries, among others: USA, Britain, 
South Africa, Finland, Spain, Singapore, New Zealand and Australia (see 
summary of previous research in chapter two). All of the studies 
undertaken indicated the existence of an expectation gap in those 
countries. Even though most researchers suggested how to close or 
narrow the gap, the problem still remains unresolved due to spectacular 
corporate collapses such as Enron. 
The objective of this research project is to investigate the existence and 
nature of the audit expectation gap in Eritrea, to compare the findings to 
those studies made in countries which adopt the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC) standards and/or developing countries 
1 Public or Society - is defined in the same way as defined by Porter (1993) and used by Viitanen and Troberg 
(1999), which is the population at large inclusive of auditees and users of financial statements but exclusive 
of auditors. 
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as Eritrea is a developing country which adopts IFAC standards, and 
finally to recommend possible solutions to narrow the expectation gap in 
Eritrea. Moreover, a review of the previous literature will be made in 
order to present the definition and structure of the audit expectation gap, 
factors contributing to the gap, approaches to narrow the gap 
(recommendations made by researchers and professional bodies) and 
previous research. In the literature review, mainly IFAC standards are 
presented as Eritrea is a member of IFAC. However, the US expectation 
gap standards issued by AICPA (1988) are also considered as they are 
specific standards issued to narrow the expectation gap. These standards 
are incorporated in IFAC standards and any changes to these standards 
are also discussed. 
This research seeks to make a constructive contribution to improve the 
status of the auditing profession in Eritrea and to provide information to 
the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) , which sets 
International Standards of Auditing (ISAs), as Eritrea is one of the 
countries which adopts ISAs. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Eritrea, a new nation in the horn of Africa (refer to Chapter three for a 
history and economy of Eritrea), gained its liberation in May 1991 from 
Ethiopia. Ethiopia was one of the socialist countries at that time, and all 
public enterprises in Eritrea were owned by the government of Ethiopia. 
As a result, the only user of the audit report was the government itself. 
Therefore, the auditors were perceived as government watchdogs and 
fraud investigators. Since the independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia, the 
government of Eritrea has sold many state owned enterprises to private 
investors and several new investors are emerging in the country. 
Moreover, new private audit firms have been established and are 
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providing services to the public. From the above facts, it would not be 
surprising if the publics' perception of the role and responsibility of the 
auditor were to differ from what the auditors deliver. 
At present, the users of the audit report in Eritrea are not only the 
government but also include: investors, financial institutions including 
banks and insurance corporations, management, non-profit 
organizations such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
international lending institutions such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Inland Revenue Department 
(IRD), other creditors and suppliers. The financial statements are used 
for: investment decisions, to evaluate the credit worthiness of companies, 
to lend money, to extend commercial credit, to collect taxes, and to 
determine the current values of the companies. However, it is not known 
whether the perception of the public as to the role and responsibility of 
the auditor has changed or not. 
The expectation gap IS a phenomenon which is international in scope. 
Dissatisfaction with the work of the auditor is evidently growing world 
wide because of some spectacular and well-publicized corporate 
collapses, such as Enron (see chapter two). The problem of the audit 
expectation gap is likely to be even worse for developing countries such 
as Eritrea as most of the public are less financially knowledgeable (see 
chapter three). Research has shown that less financially knowledgeable 
users place more responsibility on auditors (see Epstein and Geiger, 
1994 and Bailey et. al' 1983). This implies that a larger audit expectation 
gap may be evident in less educated users. Moreover, the aUditing 
profession in Eritrea is characterized by a shortage of qualified 
accountants and auditors, and a lack of resources (see chapter three). 
This may result in inadequate regulation of the audit firms, the problem 
of audit independence and audit communication, poor quality of the 
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audits and hence a deterioration of the pubic confidence in financial 
reporting. Thus far no empirical investigation has been undertaken in 
Eritrea regarding the audit expectation gap and the aUditing profession 
in Eritrea has not as yet considered the problems which could arise from 
this. 
1.3 Research limitations 
In classifying the suggested duties of an auditor (see chapter four and 
five) into the three categories of an audit expectation performance gap 
("deficient performance gap", "deficient standards gap" and 
"reasonableness gap") the Porter (1993) classification was mainly used. 
However, as Porter (1993) pointed out, the classification of some of the 
duties into one category or the other is not an exact science and there 
exist arguments both in favor of and against this. Another limitation of 
this research project is that so far no research has been conducted on 
the issue of the audit expectation gap in Eritrea. Therefore, the literature 
review focuses on the studies made in other countries. 
Auditing is an essential element of the system of Corporate Governance 
(EU's Green Paper, 1996 as cited in Viitanen and Troberg, 1999: 117). 
Corporate Governance is "concerned with the auditor's traditional 
responsibility in terms of reporting in the financial statements and the 
public's perceptions as to how well this responsibility has been 
discharged" (Everingham, 2003). Several recommendations are contained 
in the South African report on Corporate Governance (see King II Report, 
2002) regarding the responsibility of auditors to find and disclose 
financial irregularities (see chapter two - 2.7 Corporate Governance 
p.57). However, Eritrea has only a few large companies at present. As a 
result, it does not have a Code for Corporate Governance. Therefore, this 
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study will not include the analysis of the duties of an auditor in relation 
to Corporate Governance. 
1.4 Significance of the study 
The study of the audit expectation gap is believed to be of significance for 
the following reasons. First, knowledge of the perceptions of the public in 
Eritrea as to the role and responsibility of the auditor can assist the 
aUditing profession in Eritrea to identify and implement ways and means 
to close or narrow the expectation gap, if the gap is significant and needs 
to be closed. Closing the expectation gap in Eritrea may help to restore 
the public confidence and trust in financial reporting, to give assurance 
to the government that taxes are correctly computed, and to give 
creditors confidence in the sustainability of the organizations. Second, 
the study can be helpful to the International Federation of Accountants, 
which sets International Standards of Auditing (ISA's), as Eritrea is one 
of the countries which adopts ISA's. Third, it can serve as an input to 
literature for academic use. Finally, the study can be a base on which 
other interested researchers can build studies in the area of auditing in 
Eritrea and in other countries. 
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Chapter two - Literature review 
The objective of the literature review is to examine the theoretical 
perspectives of the audit expectation gap within the context of the 
international development of the auditing profession. This review 
presents current views regarding (a) the definition and constituent parts 
of the audit expectation gap, (b) the historical development of the audit 
expectation gap, (c) the factors which contribute to the gap and (d) the 
existing duties of an auditor. It proceeds to analyse the audit expectation 
gap from practical based research studies of the auditing environment in 
order to present the evidence of the existence of an audit expectation gap 
in various countries. The various approaches that have been suggested 
by researchers and professional bodies to narrow the gap are identified 
and categorized. Finally, conclusions will be drawn based on the analysis 
of the issues, which have been a major focus of the debate of the 
expectation gap. Its possible implications for the auditing profession in 
Eritrea will be discussed later in this chapter. 
2.1 Definition and structure of audit expectations gap 
According to Koh and Woo (1998: 147) the term "expectation gap" was 
seemingly first applied to aUditing by Liggio (1974). Liggio defined the 
expectation gap as the difference between the levels of expected 
performance "as envisioned by the independent accountant and by 
the users of financial statements" (Liggio, 1974:27). Since then a 
variety of definitions have been provided by different authors and 
researchers. The definition was extended by the Cohen Commission 
(Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, 1978:XI). The commission 
was charged to 'consider whether a gap may exist between what the 
public expects or needs and what auditors can and should reasonably 
be expected to accomplish'. 
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Porter (1993), in an empirical study of the audit expectation performance 
gap in New Zealand, claimed that the definitions given by Liggo (1974) 
and the Cohen commission (1978) were too narrow in failing to recognize 
that auditors may not accomplish 'expected performance' (see Liggo, 
1974) or what they 'can and should reasonably expect to accomplish 
(see Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, 1978). Porter added that 
the definitions do not allow for sub-standard performance. She suggested 
that the gap which gives rise to criticism of auditors is that between what 
society expects from auditors and what it perceives it receives from them. 
It is therefore proposed that the gap, more appropriately entitled 'the 
audit expectation- performance gap', be defined as the gap between 
society's expectations of auditors and auditors' performance, as perceived 
by society. Given this definition, Porter suggested that the gap has two 
major components. These are the Reasonableness gap and the 
Performance gap (Porter 1993:51): 
• Reasonableness gap: "the gap between what society expects 
auditors to achieve and what the auditors can reasonably be 
expected to accomplish". 
• Performance gap: "the gap between what society can reasonably 
expect auditors to accomplish and what auditors are perceived to 
achieve". 
The Performance gap was further sub divided in to a deficient standards 
and deficient performance gap (Porter 1993:51): 
• Deficient standards:" a gap between the duties which can 
reasonably be expected of auditors and auditors' existing duties as 
defined by the law and professional promulgations". 
• Deficient performance: "a gap between the expected standard of 
performance of auditors' existing duties and auditors' perceived 
performance, as expected and perceived by society". 
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Figure 2.1: Structure ofthe audit expectation - performance gap 
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The overall expectation-performance gap was analysed into three 
constituent parts. These are: 'Deficient Performance', 'Deficient 
Standards' and 'Reasonableness gap' as depicted in Figure 2.1 
(reproduced from Porter, 1993:50). 
2.2 The history of the audit expectations gap 
As previously mentioned, Liggio (1974) was seemingly the first to apply 
the phrase "expectations gap" to aUditing. The Cohen commission on 
auditors' responsibility was set up by AICPA in 1974 with the specific 
task of making recommendations on the appropriate responsibilities of 
auditors, owing to growing public concern about the criticism of the 
quality of auditors' performance. In doing so, the Commission's terms of 
reference stated that it was to consider whether a gap exists between 
what the public expects or needs and what auditors can and should 
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reasonably expect to accomplish (Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities, 1978). 
This was followed in 1976 by the setting up of the House Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Commerce Committee, 
which was also concerned with standards of corporate accountability. In 
Canada, similar concerns led the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (CICA), in 1977, to establish a group called the special 
committee to examine the role of the auditor. This became known as the 
Adams Committee and reported in 1978, soon after the Cohen 
Commission. Similar concerns about the role and accountability of 
auditors were concurrently being expressed in the United Kingdom (UK) 
(Humphrey, 1997: 9). 
From the latter half of the eighties, the phenomenon gained greater 
publicity, especially after various influential commissions investigated 
the role of the auditor. In the USA owing to the concern raised by 
members of congress, the financial press, judges and members of leading 
accounting firms, the AICPA's Auditing Standards Board (ASB) 
responded in 1985 and tackled questions such as: should auditors 
accept additional responsibility for uncovering fraud and illegal acts? 
Have auditors taken enough responsibility for evaluating going concern? 
In 1987, the ASB issued nine new standards as an attempt to reduce the 
gap (Guy and Sullivan, 1988:36). Since then several research studies 
have been conducted to find out the effectiveness of these standards (see 
among others: Robson, 1988 and Guy and Sullivan, 1988). 
In Canada, the 1988 Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICAl 
MacDonald Commission studied the public's expectations of audits and 
identified a perception that auditors were not independent of 
management in making their determinations. It concluded that the 
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public is largely ignorant of the extent of the responsibilities entrusted to 
auditors and that some of the most knowledgeable segments of the 
public feel that their expectations are not being fulfilled. 
"In the UK, the Auditing Research Foundation (1989) identified the 
expectation gap as one of the priority areas for investigation. Moreover, in 
1991, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland established an 
independent commission to study the expectations gap. The commission 
presented its final report in 1992 and concluded that there was evidence 
of an expectation gap which should be addressed as a matter of priority" 
(Pierce and Kilcommins, 1995-96:3}. 
In the period that followed, several studies were made of the further 
evolution of this expectation gap. Gramling et al (1996) stressed that the 
American studies were not comprehensive. Lowe and Pany (1993) 
compared the view of a number of members of the jury with the views of 
a number of auditors. In Australia, Monroe and Woodliff (1994), found 
that an expectation gap exists between auditors and various user groups 
with regard to the messages communicated through the audit report. 
A more comprehensive analysis of the differences between the views of 
various categories of users of financial information and the view of the 
auditors themselves was made by Humphrey et al (1993). This British 
study included a survey of several groups involved in the reporting 
process. This investigation identified a substantial expectations gap, with 
regard, among other issues, to fraud detection, the liability of the 
auditors vis-a.-vis third parties, the independence of auditors and the 
extent to which auditors deal with risks and uncertainties. 
Concurrent with the America and British investigation, a comparable 
survey was conducted in New Zealand (Porter 1993). It concerns a survey 
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asking the respondents about their knowledge of and their views on the 
duties of an auditor. 
In South Africa, Gloeck and De Jager's (1993), research report on the 
expectation gap in South Africa provides useful evidence on what is an 
international phenomenon. They found many areas in which an audit 
expectation gap exists between auditors and non auditors. These 
includes, among others, the independence of auditors, the role of 
auditors with respect particularly to fraud and going concern issues, the 
compulsory audit of small owner manager companies and partners 
contributions towards total audit time. 
Furthermore, since the end of nineties, a variety of studies on the audit 
expectation gap have continuously indicated the existence of the gap (see 
2.5 Previous Research p.29). 
2.3 Factors that contribute to the audit expectations gap, and 
existing auditor's duties 
Factors which contribute to the audit expectation gap, as identified in 
the academic and professional literature by all the studies reviewed in 
this research project (see previous research later in the chapter) are 
presented in this section. The existing auditor's duties according to the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), which are related to the 
factors that contribute to the gap, will be discussed. IFAC standards are 
mainly presented as Eritrea adopts IFAC standards. Recent 
developments in the US expectation gap standards, which were issued by 
AICPA and incorporated in the IFAC standards (see US expectation gap 
standards later in this chapter), are also presented as they were 
specifically issued to narrow the audit expectation gap. Even though 
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South Africa is a developing African country and the presentation of 
SAICA standards, which are related to the factors which contribute to the 
gap, is justifiable, its standards are similar to IFAC standards, as South 
Africa adopts IF AC standards. Moreover, SEC rules, especially in relation 
to auditor's independence, are presented as major recent changes in the 
auditor independence standards came from it. 
Seven factors, which contribute to the audit expectation gap, were 
identified by the researchers and professional bodies and are presented 
below. First, a review of the history in relation to these factors well be 
provided and thereafter the recent issues will be discussed. 
1. Fraud detection responsibility 
2. Warning of Company failure - going concern 
3. Discovering and disclosing illegal acts 
4. Audit independence - provision of other services 
5. Reporting matters of concern to regulatory authorities 
6. Guaranteeing the accuracy of a company's financial statements 
7. Judging the efficiency and adequacy of corporate operations and 
management. 
Although several studies indicate that the audit report and self-
regulation process of the audit profession contribute materially to 
enlarging the audit expectation gap (see, among others: CICA 1988; 
Humphrey et al. 1992; Sikka et al. 1992; Minter and Bourne, 1994; 
Innes et al. 1997; Humphrey 1997), they are excluded for purposes of 
this study. The reason is that, in Eritrea, the auditing profession is 
regulated by the auditor general (see chapter three). Therefore, there is 
no self-regulation process at present. With regard to the audit report, 
several studies have indicated that the replacement of the short form 
report by the long form report has significantly reduced the expectation 
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gap (See: Innes et al., 1997; Gay and Schelluch, 1993; Nair and 
Rittenberg, 1987). However, for further evidence in Eritrea, future 
research into the expanded audit report is required. 
2 .3.1 Auditor's Fraud Detection Responsibilities 
According to Porter (1993), the role of auditors in detecting fraud is a 
controversial issue. Not only do opinions vary widely among auditors, it 
is also the issue which contributes to the audit expectation gap in all the 
countries reviewed (see summary of previous research - table 2.3 pAl). 
According to Troberg and Viitanen (1999) the prevention as well as the 
detection of fraud was regarded as the primary audit objective until 
about the 1930s. Between the 1930s and 1960s the importance of fraud 
detection as an audit objective was steadily eroded. This was reflected in 
several professional promulgations, which initially focused on the 
limitations of auditors in detecting fraud (Troberg and Viitanen, 1999: 
38). The promulgations de-emphasized auditor's responsibilities in this 
regard and pointed out that prevention and detection of corporate fraud 
is the responsibility of management and is best prevented and detected 
by a good system of internal control. "If an auditor were to discover 
defalcation and similar irregularities, he would have to extend his work 
to a point where its cost would be prohibitive" (AICPA, 1951:13- as cited 
in Troberg and Viitanen, 1999). 
Other writers, however, attribute a much more proactive and self-
interested motive for the audit profession down-playing the auditors' 
responsibility in detecting fraud. Brow (1962) suggests that the 
profession down-played the auditors' responsibility for detecting fraud as 
a defensive move, following the huge McKesson and Robbins fraud (1938) 
which auditors failed to uncover. This seems to lend support to 
Willingham's (1975: 19, as cited in Humphrey, 1997: 15) contention that" 
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perhaps the discussion of the auditor's responsibility for the detection of 
fraud has not yet been diminished because it was a stated audit objective 
for over 400 years and was removed as an objective by the profession 
rather than by a change in the demand of clients of accounting firms. A 
solicitous consuming public could reinstate it." 
By the 1960s, the profession's denial of responsibility for detecting fraud 
was subject to criticism. Morison (1970: 414) brought attention to the 
fact that neither the press nor the general public shared the view 
expressed in accounting literature that if an audit was not intended to 
uncover fraud, the public would consider it to be of little use. In the light 
of widespread criticism, professional promulgations were amended to 
acknowledge that auditors have a responsibility to be aware that fraud 
may exist and that, if it is sufficiently material, it may affect their opinion 
on the financial statements (Morison, 1970). 
By the 1980s the profession had continued to move in the direction of 
recognizing increased responsibility for detecting fraud. According to 
Troberg and Viitanen (1999: 38), the general position of the auditing 
profession today is that the auditors should plan their audits so that 
they have a reasonable expectation of detecting material misstatements 
in financial information which result from fraud. The primary 
responsibility for preventing and detecting fraud, however, rests with 
management. Despite the growing criticism of auditors by politicians, the 
courts, financial journalists and the public, for failing to uncover even 
major frauds in companies, auditors remained reluctant to acknowledge 
responsibility to do so until the beginning of the 1990s. 
Porter (1991:12) states that the then current auditing standards also fall 
short of what the public can reasonably expect of auditors, even though 
the profession was taking steps to narrow the gap. An example of this is 
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the AICPA's release of SAS 53 The auditor's responsibility to detect and 
report errors and irregularities (See 'US expectation gap standards' later 
in this chapter) and SAS 82, Consideration of fraud in a financial 
statement audit, which provides expanded operational guidance on the 
auditor's consideration of material fraud in conducting a financial 
statement audit. SAS 82, which supersedes SAS 53, The auditor's 
responsibility to detect and report errors and irregularities, was issued in 
December 1997. SAS 82 clarified, but did not increase, the auditor's 
responsibility to detect fraud. That responsibility is still framed by the 
key concepts of materiality and reasonable assurance. (AICPA, 1997). 
History has shown that the auditors' responsibility to detect and report 
fraud is a controversial issue and one which is not easy to resolve. It 
requires greater realism about what auditors should be expected to 
detect, and greater commitment by the profession to meeting society's 
realistic expectations. Despite the changes to auditors' duties, corporate 
fraud continues to be a major and apparently escalating social and 
economic problem, and it is clear that auditors' duties still fall short of 
society's expectations. (Porter, 1997:45). 
According to ISA 240, The auditor's responsibility to consider fraud and 
error in audit of financial statements, (IF AC, 2001) "the auditor is not and 
cannot be held responsible for the prevention of fraud and error. The fact 
that an annual audit is carried out may, however, act as a deterrent. The 
responsibility for the prevention and detection of fraud and error rests 
with management through the implementation and continued operation 
of adequate accounting and internal control systems. Such systems 
reduce, but do not eliminate the possibility of fraud and errOL" 
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The AICPA's Auditing Standards Board has issued a proposed SAS, 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. The proposed SAS 
would supersede SAS 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit, AU Section 316. This proposed Statement does not change the 
auditor's responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain 
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of 
material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud. However, the 
proposed Statement does establish standards and provide guidance to 
auditors in fulfilling that responsibility, as it relates to fraud (AICPA, 
2001). 
Porter (1993) is of the opinion that given the cost-benefit constraints and 
the ability of perpetrators to cover their traces, the detection of fraud 
goes beyond what auditors can reasonably be expected to accomplish. 
Furthermore, Viitanen and Troberg (1999) state that the assertion that 
auditors should detect all corporate fraud (even petty theft by employees) 
suggests that at least some part of the gap could be attributed to the 
reasonableness component. 
2.3.2 Warning of a company failure - Going concern 
Many studies indicate that the public expect auditors to give early 
warning regarding the failure of a company (see among others - Porter, 
1993; Humphrey et. al, 1993; Viitanen and Troberg, 1999). According to 
Tweedie (1987:19), in discussing the functioning of the audit report as an 
early warning alarm system, it is difficult for a non-financially 
knowledgeable person to understand how a company can suffer serious 
financial difficulties, or even collapse, shortly after having received an 
unqualified opinion. One of the problems in Eritrea is also lack of 
financial knowledge (see chapter one and three). 
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The CICA's (1988) study found that a significant proportion of the public 
believes that an unqualified audit opinion IS issued only in 
circumstances where the company is not presently experiencing financial 
problems. Viitanen and Troberg (1999) state that, in general, auditors do 
not appear to meet this expectation. In practice, auditors are faced with a 
dilemma. If they have unresolved doubts about a company's future, they 
are required to state the position candidly, but simultaneously they are 
conscious that if they do so, this may generate a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
If doubts are expressed about the company's financial stability, 
management's plans to resolve the problems at hand may never be put 
into effect and the company's life may be terminated prematurely (Porter 
1991:8). 
IFAC, AICPA and SAICA have adopted similar views regarding the going 
concern assumption. In an attempt to reduce the gap, the AICPA issued 
SAS 59, The auditor's consideration of an entity's ability to continue as a 
going concern (See 2.4 US expectation gap standards p.25) and SAS 77 as 
an amendment to SAS 59. The amendment to SAS 59 does require the 
auditor to document the conditions or events that led him or her to 
believe that there is substantial doubt about an entity's ability to 
continue as a going concern, the work performed in connection with the 
auditor's evaluation of management's plans, the auditor's conclusion as 
to whether there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to 
continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of time, and the 
consideration and effect of that conclusion on the financial statements, 
disclosures, and the audit report. These amendments are responsive to 
the recommendations of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness (AICPA, 
2001:6). According to Viitanen and Troberg (1999), this has served to 
narrow any portion of the gap deriving from deficient standards. Further 
they conclude that, while appreciating the dilemma which auditors face 
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in practice, it appears that this Issue arises primarily from deficient 
perfonnance. 
According to IFAC standard ISA 570 (2001), "If, In the auditor's 
judgment, sufficient appropriate audit evidence has been obtained to 
support the going concern assumption, the auditor would not modify the 
auditor's report. If, in the auditor's judgment, the going concern 
assumption is appropriate because of mitigating factors, in particular 
management's plans for future action, the auditor would consider 
whether such plans or other factors need to be disclosed in the financial 
statements. If adequate disclosure is not made, the auditor should 
express a qualified or adverse opinion, as appropriate." SAAS 570 of the 
South African Auditing Standards is also consistent in all material 
respects with the IFAC standard (SAICA, 2002: 12). 
2.3.3 Auditor independence 
The Metcalf Report (1978) noted a fundamental problem in respect of 
independence, which is the auditor's single most valuable attribute. 
Independence was also one of the major concerns of the Cohen 
Commission (1978). In terms of the expectations gap, the concern has 
been that auditors have not been operating in a sufficiently independent 
fashion. Both the Cohen and Metcalf Commissions (1978), for example, 
were worried that competitive pressures were affecting audit qUality. The 
pressure to acquire or maintain audit clients was seen to be such for 
Metcalf to conclude that 'accounting firms have often cut costs to the 
point where the integrity of the audit is impaired' (Metcalf Committee, 
1978:93). Similar concerns were expressed by the Dingell investigation in 
the mid-1980s- as cited in Humphrey (1997:19): "The system begins with 
the corporate managers and directors, whose actions are to be audited, 
going out and choosing the auditor. They hire the independent audit 
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firm, determine the fees to be paid and have the power to fire the auditor 
for any reason. The independent audit firm often provides tax and 
management consulting services to the same corporation it audits. Can 
we really expect an audit firm to remain independent when its fees, 
perhaps substantial consulting fees, are directly related to pleasing the 
corporate managers being audited?" 
Over the last thirty years, a number of recommendations have been put 
forward (including peer reView systems, the development and 
strengthening of audit committees, the rotation of auditors, the 
prohibition on auditors performing non-audit services for a company 
they also audit, the declaration in the company's financial statements of 
non-audit fees paid to the auditor, etc.) as a way of bolstering audit 
independence (see also later in this chapter the new IF AC independence 
standards, SEC rules - Sarbanes Oxley Act, and King II of South Africa 
with respect to audit independence). However, Humphrey (1997) stressed 
that doubts still remain that commercial pressure and the 
disproportionate power of company management vis-a-vis the auditor are 
hindering in some way the quality of audit work (see CICA 1988, 
Cadbury Committee, 1992 and the Accounting Standards Boards in the 
UK, 1990). 
The auditor must be independent in both fact and appearance. Viitanen 
and Troberg (1999) stated that the question is about the potential 
interference of the consulting services with the auditor's role as an 
auditor. An audit and consulting role may raise doubts not only about 
the auditor's independence in appearance but also about the auditor's 
independence in fact. Many accounting firms contend, quite correctly, 
that it is generally not the same persons within the firm who provide 
both the auditing service and the accounting and financial services, but 
separate persons within the firm, and thus that independence in fact 
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prevails. Many interest groups, however, may not be capable of making 
this distinction, the only association made is that one accounting firm 
has performed both the audit and the other services, and thus the 
problem of independence in appearance remains (see Jenkins and 
Krawezyk, 1999). In addition, independence in fact may also be 
questioned. For example, if persons from the same accounting firm have 
been assisting the client in planning and developing the internal control 
system of the client, one has to question whether the auditor can In 
his/her audit remain totally neutral when evaluating the system in 
which his/her own employer has been instrumental. (Viitanen and 
Troberg, 1999: 141). 
Jenkins and Krawezyk (1999:73) noted that in recent years public 
accounting firms have expanded their practices to include a wide array of 
non-audit services. This expansion of services has led some to question 
whether and to what extent the provision of these non-audit services 
influence the public perception of auditor independence. Thus, the 
profession in the US is undergoing a fundamental reconsideration of its 
strategy and the independence of auditors is the key issue driving the 
change. For the past two decades, the accounting firms that dominate 
the profession in the US have been pursuing a "get big" strategy. They 
have moved into a wide range of consulting and advisory services, 
leveraging their reputation to carve a place in new markets in corporate 
finance, IT, human resources, and legal services. The accounting 
profession has finally recognized the inherent conflict of interest in 
performing both the consulting and audit work for an audit client. The 
collapse of Enron has been a major blow to the profession. The aUditing 
firm, Arthur Andersen, was both the accountant and the consultant. 
Enron paid Andersen $25 million dollars for its audit in one year and 
$27 million for consulting work and other services (Cleary, 2002). "Enron 
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never reported even a bad quarter before collapsing" (Will, 2002 as cited 
in Cleary, 2002). The SEC sees the formal separation of conSUlting from 
audit services to be a step in the right direction, but this is still a long 
way from a guarantee of auditor independence (Parker, 2001 :50-51). (See 
later in this chapter for the prohibition of non-audit services by SEC 
2003 and IFAC 2001). 
IFAC has also turned its attention to the question of running an 
independent audit practice as an integral part of a 'full-service' firm. To 
continue to meet emerging community expectations and to take account 
of changing business practices and technology, in November 2001 IFAC 
released revised standards on assurance engagements. The IFAC ethics 
committee focused on the issue of auditor independence. It is a move to 
wards a conceptual framework requiring the identification and evaluation 
of threats to independence and the application of safeguards to reduce it 
to an acceptable level (IFAC, 2001). 
2.3.4 Discovering and disclosing illegal acts 
Viitanen and Troberg (1999:39-40) noted that the auditor's role in 
discovering and reporting illegal acts by company officials is also 
misunderstood by the pUblic. Further, they stated that the public 
consider that auditors have a duty to discover and disclose 
management's failure to comply with law and regulation, and other 
management actions of which society disapproves for moral, public 
policy, or other reasons. But the auditing profession has been reluctant 
to undertake such responsibility. 
According to IFAC standard (ISA 250, 2001) "When planning and 
performing audit procedures and in evaluating and reporting the results 
thereof, the auditor should recognize that non-compliance by the entity 
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with laws and regulations may materially affect the financial statements. 
However, an audit cannot be expected to detect non-compliance with all 
laws and regulations. Detection of non-compliance, regardless of 
materiality, requires consideration of the implications for the integrity of 
management or employees and the possible effect on other aspects of the 
audit." SAAS 250 of SAICA is also similar to this IFAC standard, ISA 250. 
Despite the profession'S acknowledgment of such standards, the public 
expects auditors to accept a broader responsibility. The expectation gap 
appears to result primarily from the public holding unrealistic 
expectations of auditors and/or from their expectations being ill defined 
and this thus seems to represent the reasonableness component of the 
expectation gap. But it is also reasonable to expect auditors to detect 
illegal acts which fall within their specialist area, namely, those which 
are directly reflected in a company's accounts. Thus, a portion of the 
expectation gap relating to illegal acts is seen to arise from deficient 
standards (Porter 1991 as cited in Viitanen and Troberg, 1999:40-41). 
2.3.5 Reporting matters of concern to regulatory authorities 
The public have called on auditors to accept a duty to report to a 
regulatory authority in cases where corporate fraud or illegal acts are 
involved (Vii tan en and Troberg, 1999:41). Porter (1991) finds the public's 
expectations not too unreasonable given the present socio-economic 
environment. Therefore, the gap in relation to this issue is derived 
primarily from deficient standards. However, it seems that the key issue 
is not the reluctance of the auditing profession to take responsibility, but 
the perceived exposure to the risk of litigation, if they fail to report as 
expected of them by the pUblic. 
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According to IFAC standard ISA 240 (2001) the auditor's duty of 
confidentiality means they will not normally report possible fraud or 
illegal acts to anyone outside the client organization other than to the 
extent that it affects the audit opinion. However, m certain 
circumstances, the duty of confidentiality is overridden by statute, the 
law or by courts of law and professional obligations. For example, in 
South Africa, Section 20 (5) of the Public Accountants' and Auditors' Act 
creates a legal duty which overrides the auditor's ethical duty of 
confidentiality (see PAAB, 2004). The auditor may need to seek legal 
advice in such circumstances, giving due consideration to the auditor's 
responsibility to the public interest. 
2.3.6 Guaranteeing the accuracy of a company's financial 
statements 
In reviewing the studies of the audit expectation gap, the audit report 
has frequently been viewed by the users of the financial statements as a 
certification and a guarantee of accuracy of the audited financial 
statements (see Lee, 1970 and Humphrey, 1997). That is, many users 
consider that an unqualified audit report signifies that the auditor 
guarantees that the audited financial statements are completely accurate 
and/ or that the company is financially secure. Viitanen and Troberg 
(1999) state that the auditors' views tend to be that the auditor's opinion 
helps to establish the credibility of financial information. This is, however 
far from guaranteeing its accuracy. According to Porter (1991:6), the 
public's expectations seem to go beyond what auditors can reasonably be 
expected to accomplish thus this issue appears to be associated 
principally with the reasonableness gap component in the Porter 
framework. Humphrey (1997: 14) also suggests that the usual response 
to such findings among the auditing profession is to stress the general 
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lack of understanding of the audit function and to highlight the 
unreasonable nature of such expectations. 
2.3.7 Judging the efficiency and adequacy of corporate 
operations and management. 
Considerable support has been found for the VIew that the audit is 
designed to give assurance on the efficiency of management and the 
financial soundness of the company. That is, the users of audited 
accounts continually perceived a broader audit function than that 
performed, or perceived as a legitimate function, by auditors (see Beck, 
1973 and Humphrey et al, 1993). Therefore, this expectation is 
unreasonable and is associated with the reasonableness gap component 
of the audit expectation-performance gap. 
2. 4 The US Expectation Gap Standards 
In response to the concerns raised by financial writers, members of 
Congress, judges and members of leading accounting firms, the AICPA 
Auditing Standard Board approved the issuance of nine new statements 
on auditing standards (SASs 53-61), the so called expectation gap 
standards, in 1988 (Guy and Sullivan, 1988:36). The questions raised 
were whether auditors should accept additional responsibility for 
uncovering fraud and illegal acts and whether auditors have taken 
enough responsibility for evaluating the going concern assumption. 
According to Guy and Sullivan (1988:36-37) the public and financial 
statement users believe that: a) auditors should assume more 
responsibility for the detection and reporting of fraud and illegal acts, b) 
communicate to financial statement users more useful information about 
the nature and results of the audit process - including early warning 
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about the possibility of business failure and c) communicate more clearly 
with audit committees and others interested in, or responsible for, 
reliable financial reporting. They added that the public expectations vis-
a-vis financial statements actually go beyond the role of auditors and 
their audit opinions, and it is the responsibility of management to 
prepare the financial statements. 
These nine statements on aUditing standards, the so-called expectation 
gap standards, issued by AICPA in 1988 are considered hereafter. These 
standards were issued by AICPA specifically to narrow the expectation 
gap in the US .. It is clear that many changes have been made to these 
standards since 1988 and are incorporated in IFAC standards. However, 
the aim of this section is to give the historical overview of these 
standards. Any changes to these standards are presented when 
considering each of the factors which contribute to the expectation gap 
(see 2.3 - Factors that contribute to the audit expectation gap and 
existing auditor's duties). 
According to SAS 53, The auditor's responsibility to detect and report 
errors and irregularities (AICPA 1988, Para. 5), "the auditor should assess 
the risk that errors and irregularities may cause the financial statements 
to contain a material misstatement. Based on that assessment, the 
auditor should design the audit to provide reasonable assurance of 
detecting errors and irregularities that are material to the financial 
statements." This standard increases responsibilities by obliging the 
auditor to design the audit to provide reasonable assurance of detecting 
errors and irregularities. The standard recognizes that some irregularities 
like forgery and collusion may preclude even a properly designed and 
executed audit from detecting a material irregularity (Troberg and 
Viitanen, 1999: 30). It also requires the auditor to make sure that the 
audit committee or its equivalent IS informed about all but 
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inconsequential irregularities (Guy and Sullivan, 1988:38). SAS No. 54 
establishes the same responsibility for violations of laws or governmental 
regulations that have a direct and material effect on line amounts in 
financial statements as that stated above for material errors and 
irregularities. However, the auditor considers how such illegal acts relate 
to financial statement assertions and audit objectives rather than 
considering their legality per se. (AICPA, 1988 Para. 5). The auditor is 
responsible to react to violations of indirect laws and regulations when 
information comes to the auditor's attention which could have a material 
effect on financial statements through a contingent liability. In such 
cases the auditor is obliged to apply audit procedures to ascertain 
specifically whether an illegal act has occurred (Guy and Sullivan, 
1988:38). 
SAS 55, Consideration of the internal control structure in a financial 
statement audit, was issued to broaden the auditor's responsibility to 
consider internal control when planning an audit. The standard requires 
the auditor to obtain an understanding of each of the three control 
elements, namely; control environment, accounting system and control 
procedures, in order to plan the audit sufficiently (AICPA 1988, Para. 5). 
SAS 56, Analytical procedure, requires the use of analytical procedures in 
the planning and the final review stages of all audits and gives fresh 
guidance on designing, applying and evaluating analytical procedures as 
substantive tests (Guy and Sullivan, 1988:30). SAS 57, Auditing 
accounting estimates, provides guidance on obtaining and evaluating 
evidence to support significant accounting evidence which in turn 
supports significant accounting estimates such as allowances for loan 
losses, warranty expenses, net realizable value of inventories and losses 
on purchase commitments (AICPA 1988, Para. 2, 16). 
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SAS 58, Report on audited financial statements, reVIses the auditor's 
standard report, replacing the standard jargon with clearer descriptions 
of the auditor's responsibility, the work the auditor does and the 
assurance the auditor gives. In the introductory paragraph of the report 
management's responsibilities for the financial statements are 
differentiated from the auditor's responsibility to express an opinion on 
the financial statements. In the second, or scope paragraph, an explicit 
acknowledgement should be provided that an audit provides reasonable 
assurance within the context of materiality - that the financial 
statements are free of material misstatement. In addition, there should 
be a brief explanation of what an audit entails (Guy and Sullivan, 
1988:30). 
According to SAS 59, The auditor's consideration of an entity's ability to 
continue as a going concern (the most controversial of all the expectation 
gap standards), the auditor should consider whether the aggregate 
results of all audit procedures performed during planning, performance 
and evaluation indicate that there could be substantial doubt about the 
entity's ability to continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of 
time, not to exceed one year beyond the date of the audited financial 
statements. That is, it obligates the auditor, in every audit, to evaluate 
whether there is substantial doubt about the client's ability to continue 
as a going concern. If there is such doubt, the auditor should, as a 
minimum, include an explanatory paragraph in the audit report. 
Nevertheless, SAS no. 59 states that the auditor is not responsible for 
predicting the future and that the absence of a reference to substantial 
doubt in an auditor's report can not be construed as providing assurance 
as to an entity's continued existence (AICPA, 1988, Para. 2-4). 
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SAS no. 60, Communication of internal control structure related matters 
noted in an audit, requires auditors to inform management and the board 
of directors or its audit committee about any material weaknesses in 
internal accounting control procedures uncovered by the audit (AICPA 
1988, Para. 2). It broadens the responsibility of an auditor by requiring 
the auditor to report significant deficiencies in the control environment, 
accounting system and control procedures (Guy and Sullivan, 1988:44). 
SAS no. 61, Communication with audit committees, places responsibility 
on the auditor to make sure that certain matters are communicated to 
those with responsibility for oversight of the financial reporting process. 
It applies to entities that have an audit committee and to all SEC 
engagements. The auditor should ensure that those with oversight 
responsibility know, among others, about the auditor's responsibility in 
an audit and the nature of the assurance provided, the initial selection of 
and changes in significant accounting policies or their application, the 
process that management uses in formulating sensitive accounting 
estimates and the basis for the auditor's conclusions about the 
reasonableness of those estimates, any audit adjustments, whether 
recorded or not, that could have a significant effect on the financial 
statements, and any disagreement or serious difficulties encountered 
with management in performing the audit (AICPA, 1988, Para. 6-14). 
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2.5. Previous Research 
The objective of this section is to present the evidence of the existence of 
the audit expectation gap in various countries and to show that the audit 
expectation gap problem is an international phenomenon. Previous 
research in developing countries and/or countries, which adopt IFAC 
standards, including Finland, Singapore and South Africa among others, 
\\ill be summarized. In addition, some of the studies undertaken in 
developed countries will be presented to indicate that the problem is 
international in scope. 
2.5.1. Porter study (1993) 
Porter conducted an empirical study of the audit expectation-
performance gap in New Zealand in 1989. The questionnaire was sent to 
1698 survey participants who comprised 16 interest groups that formed 
four broad groups: auditors (200), auditees (400), audit beneficiaries 
from financial community (351) and audit beneficialry from non-financial 
community (747 participants, including 500 members of the general 
public) (Porter, 1993:52). The overall usable response rate was 69%. The 
results of the Porter survey show that all but five of the 30 suggested 
duties of auditors (see Appendix 7 p.192) listed in the questionnaire were 
found to contribute to the audit expectation gap. An estimate of the 
relative contribution of each duty to its respective component of the audit 
expectation performance gap (See Appendix 8 p.193) may be derived from 
the proportion of the societal group whose expectations are not being 
fulfilled with respect to the particular duty. Porter (1993) took this 
process a step further. If a measure of unfulfilled expectations associated 
with the duties contributing to a particular component of the audit 
expectation gap is added, a measure of society's unfulfilled expectations 
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attaching to the component of the overall gap between society's 
expectations of auditors and auditors' perceived performance may be 
calculated (see Appendix 8 p.193). Calculated in this way, the largest 
part of the expectation gap, that is, 50% was attributable to deficient 
standards, 34% resulted from unreasonable expectations and only 16% 
was derived from perceived deficient performance (Porter 1993). The 
duties contributing most to the gap are presented in table 2.1 on page 
31. 
As can be seen in table 2.1 and Appendix 8, the duties are classified in 
either one of the three categories by Porter (1993). Troberg and Viitanen 
(1999: 67-68) stated that to be too categorical on the audit expectation 
gap issue is dangerous, as some of the duties are likely to correlate with 
one another. Moreover, the auditing requirements placed on the auditor 
may be interpreted by the respondents as similar or close to one another. 
Therefore, table 2.1 and Appendix 8 provide a rough picture of an actual 
situation. But despite their arguments, Troberg and Viitanen (1999) used 
the same classification as Porter (1993) in their analysis of the 
expectation gap (see table 2.2). One of the reasons for this could be for 
the purpose of comparison. 
To summarlze, the results of the survey show that the duties which 
contribute most to the expectation gap in New Zealand are: 
- Disclose and report to regulatory authority deliberate distortion of 
financial information. 
- Disclose in the audit report theft of corporate assets by non-managerial 
employees. 
-Detecting and reporting illegal acts and going-concern reporting. 
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Table 2.1: Duties contributing most to the expectation gap (Porter] 993). 
I Duties! DS2 Dp2 I UE2 
(50%)3 (16%)3 (34%)3 
% 4 %4 
Report to regulatory authority deliberate distortion of financial 15 
information 
• Examine and report on the company's internal control 14 
Report to regulatory authority misappropriation of company assets 14 
by company directors/ senior management 
! Report to a regulatory authority theft of corporate assets by non-
i managerial employees 
i Disclo: the audit report theft of corporate assets by non-
managerial employees 
Guarantee the auditee company is solvent 
Detect illegal acts by company officials which do not directly affect 
the company's account 
• Express an opinion in the audit report about the company's 21 
continued existence 
Disclose in the audit report deliberate distortion of financial 16 
information 
Disclose in the audit report misappropriation of company assets 14 
by company directors/ senior management 
Disclose in the audit report any illegal act which directly affects 14 
the company's accounts 
I 
!The result of the Porter survey shows that out of 35 eXistmg and suggested duties of an 
auditor, 30 duties were found to contribute to the audit expectation gap (see Appendix 7). 
Table 2.1 shows only the duties which contribute most to the audit expectation gap in New 
Zealand. 
2 (DP) Deficient performance, (OS) Deficient standards and (UE) Unreasonable expectation. 
3 Relative contribution of the relevant components to the overall audit expectation-
performance gap. 
4 The percentage of the the non-auditor group whose expectations with respect to the duty are 
not being fulfilled. 
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2.5.2. Gloeck and De Jager survey (1993) 
In the Republic of South Africa Gloeck and Jager (1993) conducted 
research on the expectation gap in South Africa. The research provides 
useful evidence on the existence of an audit expectation gap in South 
Africa. The survey's respondents were divided into two groups: 
'financially knowledgeable persons' and 'members in public practice'. Out 
of 11792 questionnaires sent out to financially knowledgeable persons 
and 4303 to members in public practice, 4470 (38%) and 1374 (32%) 
replies were analyzed respectively (Gloeck and De Jager, 1993:33). 
The results of their survey show that users of the reporting process 
expressed senous reservations regarding the independence and 
objectivity of auditors in South Africa. Moreover, large differences in 
perceptions were identified with regard to the auditor's responsibility to 
detect fraud and to look for signs of fraud, and the auditor's conduct 
with regard to going concern problems. Gloeck and De Jager (1993) 
concluded that the exact role of the auditor is no longer clear to the 
public in South Africa. 
With regards to the difference between what users expect of auditors, 
and what can be reasonably expected of auditors, two factors, which 
contribute greatly to the expectation gap, were identified in the study. 
Firstly, there are cases where user and auditor require a particular 
situation to obtain, but statutory and professional rules forbid the 
auditor to act, as circumstances require. These relate to a) aUditing of 
small owner-managed companies and b) the auditor's right to report to 
regulators in certain circumstances. Gloeck and De Jager (1993) 
recommended that the auditors' professional code of conduct should be 
amended with regard to confidentiality in order to allow fulfilment of the 
requirements of both auditor and user. 
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Secondly, there are cases where auditors and users agree that there has 
been a deviation from standards (deficient performance). Auditors and 
users agree that the requirements regarding independence are not met in 
South Africa. The following five factors which have the greatest negative 
influence on auditors' independence were identified by auditors: financial 
dependence on one client; pressure on auditing fees, established auditor-
client relationships, competition between auditing firms and providing 
"other services" to audit clients (Gloeck and De Jager, 1993). 
To summarize, Gloeck and De Jager (1993) found many areas, in which 
an audit expectation gap exists between auditors and non-auditors. 
These include, among others: the independence of auditors, the role of 
auditors, in particular with regard to fraud and going concern issues, the 
compulsory audit of small owner-manager companies and partner's 
contribution towards total audit time. 
2.5.3. Humphrey, Moizer and Turley study (1993) 
In the UK, Humphrey et al. (1993) examined the expectation gap by 
ascertaining the perceptions of individuals of audit expectations issues 
through the use of a questionnaire survey comprising a series of mini-
cases. Out of the 2445 questionnaires mailed to respondents, the overall 
usable response rate was 38.2%. The issues investigated include the 
following: 
- What is and should be the role of the auditor? 
What should be the prohibitions and regulations placed on audit firms? 
- What decisions could auditors be expected to make? 
The respondents included chartered accountants in public practice, 
corporate finance directors, investment analysts, bank lending officers 
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and financial journalists. The survey revealed a significant difference 
between auditors and the respondents (representing some of the main 
participants in the company financial reporting process) in their views on 
the nature of auditing. The critical components of the expectation gap 
were found to include the auditors' fraud detection role, the extent of 
auditors' responsibilities to third parties, the strength of, and continuing 
threats to, auditors' independence, and aspects of the conduct of audit 
work (e.g. auditor's ability to cope with risk and uncertainty). 
2.5.4. Best, Buckby, and Tan study (1996) 
Best et aI. (1996) conducted research in Singapore and found that an 
expectation gap exists, particularly in relation to the level and nature of 
auditor's responsibilities. The expectation gap was found to be 
particularly wide on the issues of the auditor's responsibilities for fraud 
prevention and detection, and the auditor's responsibility for maintaining 
accounting records and exercising judgments in the selection of audit 
procedures. To a lesser extent, an expectation gap was also found 
concerning the auditor's responsibilities for the soundness of internal 
controls, the degree to which financial statements give a true and fair 
view, auditor agreement with accounting policies used in the financial 
statements and the usefulness of audited financial statements in 
monitoring the performance of the entity. 
2.5.5. Viitanen and Troberg survey (1999) 
During 1997 Troberg and Viitanen conducted an empirical study of the 
audit expectation gap in Finland. The perceptions of auditors, financial 
directors, business lawyers, bank loan officers, shareholders (owners) 
and financial analysts regarding auditors' duties and performance of 










The Audit Expectation Gap in Eritrea 
these duties were examined. Out of 782 questionnaires sent out, the 
overall usable response rate was 30%. 
In analyzing the audit expectation-performance gap, Troberg and 
Viitanen used the Porter (1993) classification. That is, 35 duties were 
identified as the existing and suggested duties of an auditor in Finland, 
and these duties were classified in one of the three categories of the audit 
expectation-performance gap. 
The results of their survey show that, calculated in the same way as 
Porter (1993), 39% of the expectation gap results from society holding 
unreasonable expectations of auditors, 31 % is attributable to deficient 
standards and 30% derives from perceived deficient performance 
(Troberg and Viitanen, 1999:69). The duties contributing most to the gap 
are presented in table 2.2 (page 36). 
Troberg and Viitanen (1999) noted that the general trend to demand 
more from the auditors has to be dealt with in concurrence with the 
auditor's legal liability and the cost-benefit issue, which includes finding 
parties willing to pay for any additional services. They added that, of all 
interest groups, the bank loan officer group was the least satisfied. 
Because bank loan officers are major users of auditors' work, it seems 
that it would be beneficial to both auditors and bank loan officers to 
direct educational efforts to the bank loan officer group in order to 
reduce the expectation gap. 
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Table 2.2: Duties contributing most to audit expectation gap (Troberg and Viitanen, 1999) 
Duties' DS2 Dp2 UE2 
(30%)3 {31%)3 (39%)3 
%4 %4 
The auditor should detect and report material fraud committed in 34 
the audited company 
i The auditor should report to an appropriate authority deliberate 20 
distortion of financial information 
The auditor should report to an appropriate authority fraud 16 
committed in the audited company 
The auditor should detect and report illegal acts by company 11 
employees which do directly affect the company's book-keeping 
The auditor should, when necessary, correct the financial 10 
statement 
i The auditor should examine and report whether the company's 10 
continued existence is in doubt 
The auditor should detect and report theft/ misappropriation of 
corporate assets by non-managerial employees. 
The auditor should examine and report whether the company is 
managed effectively and efficiently. 
The auditor should report on the future prospects of company 
I The results of Troberg and Viitanen (1999) survey shows that 27 of the suggested 
duties (out of 35) were found to contribute to the audit expectation gap. Table 2.2 shows 
only the duties which contribute most to the audit expectation gap in Finland. 
2 (DP) Deficient performance, (DS) Deficient standards and (UE) Unreasonable 
expectation. 
3Relative contribution of the relevant component to the overall audit expectation-performance 
gap. 
4 The percentage of the non-auditor group whose expectations with respect to the duty are 
not being fulfilled. 
To summarize, the results of the study show that the factors which 
contribute extensively to the expectation gap in Finland are: the auditor's 
responsibility with regard to fraud detection and reporting, detecting and 
reporting illegal acts by employees which affect the company's accounts, 
going-concern reporting, and correcting the financial statements when 
necessary (Troberg and Viitanen, 1999: 150). Finally, they concluded that 
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their results support the view that an expectation gap does exist In 
Finland. 
2.5.6. Other Studies 
In the US, Baron et al. (1977) examined the extent of auditors' fraud 
detection responsibilities with respect to material errors, irregularities 
and illegal acts. They attempted to establish whether there are any 
differences In the perceptions regarding auditor and financially 
knowledgeable users of the accounting reports (financial analysts, bank 
loan officers and corporate financial managers). They found that auditors 
and financially knowledgeable users of accounting reports have 
significantly different beliefs and preferences regarding the extent of 
auditors' responsibilities for detecting and disclosing irregularities and 
illegal acts. In particular, users held auditors more responsible for 
detecting and disclosing irregularities and illegal acts than the auditors 
believed themselves to be (Koh and Woo, 1998: 148). 
In Singapore, Low et al. (1988) examined the extent of the expectation 
gap between auditors and financial analysts on the objectives of a 
company audit. Participants were provided with a list of 13 potential 
objectives. Significant differences were found in the areas of fraud 
prevention, guaranteeing the accuracy of financial information, effective 
utilization by the company of government grants, levies and subsidies, 
and management (Best et al., 1996: 137). Financial analysts perceived an 
audit as setting a seal on the accuracy of the financial accounts of the 
company. Further, their perceptions of fraud prevention and detection 
responsibilities of auditors are more demanding than those that the 
auditors themselves believed they should possess. 
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Epstein and Geiger (1994) conducted a survey of investors in the US to 
gather information on various aspects of financial reporting issues, in 
particular on the level of assurance they believed auditors should provide 
with respect to error and fraud. The survey results suggest that investors 
seek a very high level of financial statement assurance and there is an 
expectation gap between auditors and investors as to the level of 
assurance an auditor provides. 
In Singapore, Schelluch (1996), found that the expectation gap detected 
in prior research studies dealing with auditor responsibilities appeared to 
be reduced over time with the introduction of the long-form audit report. 
Differences in beliefs between auditors and users appeared to be reduced 
in areas specifically addressed in the wording of the expanded report. 
However, the expectation gap continued to exist after the introduction of 
long-form audit report in relation to the financial statement reliability. 
The study also appeared to indicate that users were generally unhappy 
with the role played by the auditing profession particUlarly with respect 
to auditor independence and the level of value added to the financial 
statements from the auditing process. 
Beelde et al. (1997) examined the extent of the expectation gap between 
auditors, bankers and managers in Belgium. Significant differences were 
found in the areas of auditor's responsibilities in the case of fraud. In 
addition to fraud, the independence of the auditor was also an important 
point of concern. In this respect, a highly significant difference was 
noted between the answers given by auditors and other groups to the 
question which asked to what extent they agree with the proposition that 
an auditor's mandate can be renewed only a restricted number of times. 
This proposition was radically rejected by the group of auditors, while it 
is clear that managers are not advocates of it either, although bankers 
take a quite neutral standpoint. 
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In the UK, Dewing and Russell (2001) state that the expectation gap has 
several dimensions: auditor independence, auditors' responsibilities, 
audit quality and auditors' liability. Views about it were explored by 
conducting a survey with officers of trade and professional associations, 
individual fund managers, bankers, credit analysts, and others who had 
experience of both the public and private sectors. The survey revealed 
that those holding an accounting qualification were more likely to believe 
that the answer to " are auditors sufficiently independent of management 
to conduct audit objectively" is 'yes'. The provision of non-audit services 
was a key issue. Interviewees from the fund management industry 
expressed concern about auditors providing non-audit services, and 
especially about the dangers of 'low-balling'. Furthermore, the survey 
revealed that those with an accounting qualification believed auditors' 
current responsibilities for detecting and reporting fraud, for the going 
concern opinion, and for reporting to shareholders should not be 
widened. Those without an accounting qualification were in favor of 
widening auditors' responsibilities for fraud and for going concern, but 
not for reporting to a wider group of stakeholders. Bankers were content 
that the auditors' primary duty should be to shareholders. With regards 
to auditors' independence, the results show that those with an 
accounting qualification were less convinced than others of the need for 
an independent body to monitor audit quality; both groups agreed that 
discipline should be the responsibility of an independent body. Finally, 
the respondents agreed that the liability threat was not enough, in itself, 
to ensure the audit qUality. However, moves to restrict auditors' liability 
were welcomed by those with an accounting qualification; others were 
strongly against reform. 
Jenkins and Krawezyk (2001) examined how the provision of non-audit 
services affects financial statement users' perceptions of auditor 
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independence in USA. Three non-audit services that were examined are 
under consideration by Independence Standard Board (ISB): 
appraisal/valuation, legal consulting, and outsourced internal auditing 
services. Interestingly, only one of these services, legal consulting, evoked 
a negative perception of auditor independence from the financial 
statement users, while the other two serVIces failed to produce any 
significant response. Moreover, the negative perception for legal 
consulting services was held only by CPA firm professionals and not by 
members of the general public. Three commonly provided non-audit 
services were also examined: bookkeeping, general consulting, and tax 
return preparation services. Bookkeeping services evoked negative 
perceptions of auditor independence from the financial statement users, 
while the other two serVIces favourably influenced participants' 
perceptions. Finally, their findings suggest that an expectation gap may 
exist between members of the accounting profession and the general 
public with respect to their perceptions of the influence of non-audit 
services on auditor independence. And they concluded that such findings 
might reflect the profession's current prohibition against many types of 
legal advisory services and the prohibition of auditors acting in a 
managerial capacity (see IFAC, 2002 and SEC, 2003). 
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Table 2.3: Summary of previous research 
----------
Authors, year and 
Duties or factors which contribute most to the audit expectation gap 
country (listed by Fraud Going Independence Report to Disclosing Guaranteeing Conduct 
countries). Detection concern of auditor*** regulatory irregularities the accuracy of of audit 
responsibility authority and illegal acts financial work* 
information 
----------
Porter (1993), E E NA E E E NA 
New Zealand 
Gloeck and ~a~:r:s E E E E NA NA NA 
(1993), Soutl1.1\Lrica 
-----------
Humphrey et al. E E E NA NA NA E 
(1993) UK 
----------
Dewing and Russell E E E NA NA NA NA 
(2001), UK 
Low etal. (1988), E NA NA NA NA E NA 
Sin~~ore 
Best et al. (1996), E NA NA NA NA NS E 
Sin~~ore 
Beelde et al. (1997), E E E NA NA NS NA 
Belgium 
Troberg and Viitanen E E E E E E NA 
(1999), Finland 
Baron et al (1977),USA E NA NA NA E NA NA 
Jenkins and Krawezyk NA NA E NA NA NA NA 
(2001), USA 
E = Duties which contribute to the audit expectation gap. 













* * = Others include: compulsory audit of small owner-managed companies (S), responsibility for the soundness of the internal control (I) 
*** = Most of the independence issues are related to provision of non-audit services. 
NA = Not asked NS = Asked but not statistically significant. 
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2.6 Approaches to narrow the audit expectation gap 
2.6.1 Introduction 
In an attempt to narrow the audit expectation gap, various 
recommendations have been suggested by researchers, authoritative 
commissions/ committees and professional bodies for the last two 
decades (see, among others: Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities, 1978; Metcalf Committee, 1978; Adams Committee, 
1978; Treadway Commission, 1987; Macdonald Commission, 1988). 
The areas of major concern common to most were: fraud detection 
responsibility, going concern reporting, the audit report and auditor 
independence. As a result many changes have been made to expand 
the role and the responsibilities of an auditor (See US expectation gap 
standards, 1988). However, there are various recommendations which 
have been suggested but have not yet been implemented by some 
countries owing to various reasons, such as the economic condition of 
the countries and differences in regulations. Particular approaches to 
narrow the gap have been identified and can be categorized into the 
following aspects. 
2.6.2 Expansion of auditors responsibility with regards to fraud 
To ensure and improve the effectiveness of the independent public 
accountant, the Treadway Commission (1987) in the US published its 
recommendations on the subject of fraudulent financial reporting. 
One of its recommendations concerns changing auditing standards 
with regard to fraud in order to provide reasonable assurance 
concerning the detection of fraud. The international auditing standard 
ISA 240 and the AICPA's SAS 82 were issued to provide guidance to 
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auditors in fulfilling that responsibility. Further, the Commission 
recommended that the independent public accountant should be 
required to review quarterly financial data before its release to improve 
the likelihood of timely detection of fraudulent financial reporting 
(Treadway Commission, 1987:23). Various professional bodies and 
researchers have also supported this suggestion (see O'Malley, 1993, 
and Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, 1994). As a 
result, IFAC (2003) has established a committee with the objective of 
establishing standards and providing guidance for auditors who 
review interim financial information issued by their audit clients. The 
final ISA, review of interim financial information performed by the 
auditor of the entity, was issued in February 2004. 
The recommendation made by Treadway Commission (1987) and 
various researchers and professional bodies regarding the audit of 
interim financial statements in order to improve the likelihood of 
timely detection of fraudulent financial reporting has only been 
implemented only in few countries due to the cost involved in the 
audit of interim financial statements. For example, in South Africa, it 
is not required that interim reports be audited, although King II 
(2002: 134) recommends that, as a minimum, the audit committee 
should request that an independent review of the interim report is 
performed if the auditors have qualified or disclaimed their opinion, or 
produced an adverse opinion, in the last issued annual financial 
statements. Whereas in the US, under the SEC's rules, interim 
financial statements must be reviewed by independent auditors prior 
to filing in accordance with the procedure set forth in SAS 71 (SEC, 
2000). 
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Humphrey et aI, (1993) suggest other ways to close the expectation 
gap. They state that it is no good expecting the public to abandon 
their expectation of auditors as fraud detectives through education, or 
modifying the length of the audit report, or pretending that highly 
publicized audit failures are exceptions. Instead, they offer three 
suggestions: setting up an independent office for auditing to enhance 
auditor independence by overseeing the appointment of auditors of 
large companies and to regulate audit fees; extending auditors' 
responsibilities by statute so that they clearly include responsibility to 
shareholders, creditors and potential shareholders; and clarifying that 
auditors have a duty to detect fraud (Koh and Woo, 1998). 
O'Malley (1993) agrees with the suggestion of imposing additional 
responsibilities on auditors, especially with regard to detecting fraud. 
He proposes four additional responsibilities which the profession 
might consider: management and auditor evaluation of internal 
control systems, compliance reporting, direct reporting by auditors to 
regulators, and auditor association with interim financial information. 
But, he argued that any expansion of auditors' responsibilities will not 
be feasible as long as the liability system operates as a risk transfer 
mechanism, with auditors as the prime transferees. Lochner (1993) 
also believes that it is not fair to expect auditors to assume more 
responsibilities without sufficient insurance provided to them against 
possible litigation (Koh and Woo, 1998). 
In a research study on financial reporting and auditing undertaken 
jointly by the Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants 
and The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia in 1994, the 
working party reviewed the recommendations of previous studies in 
other countries and offered possible solutions to close the expectation 
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gap. These include: the management of reporting entities should be 
required to report on the effectiveness of internal control over financial 
reporting and auditors should report on this assertion; a review 
partner should be appointed for the audit of all reporting entities and 
he/she should countersign the audit report; and all reporting entities 
should be required to produce audited half-yearly and quarterly 
financial reports. 
Ronan (1994) concludes that company stakeholders and Government 
authorities are growing increasingly impatient with the detrimental 
effects of corporate fraud. He argues that the company auditor should 
not be expected to detect corporate fraud, but proposes instead that 
public liability companies should be required to have a special audit 
carried out with the sole purpose of detecting and reporting on the 
presence or absence of fraudulent activity. The 'special auditors' 
would have their fees paid through a Government fund financed 
through the corporate taxation system. Thus the special auditors' 
independence would be transparent to all the stakeholders, including 
management. He adds that the special auditor should undergo 
extensive training in the detection of fraud with emphasis on 
computer fraud, and should report to the shareholders and 
government. Finally, the report to the government should be available 
for public inspection (Ronan, 1994:9-10). 
2.6.3 Enhancement of auditor independence 
Several researchers, authoritative commissions/committees and 
professional bodies have suggested how "other services" can be offered 
without impairing independence (see Metcalf Committee, 1978; Gloeck 
and De Jager, 1993; IFAC, 2001; SEC, 2003; draft Accountancy 
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Professions' Bill in South Africa, 2003). According to the Metcalf 
Committee (1978) the best policy in this area is to require that 
independent auditors of publicly owned corporations perform only 
services directly related to accounting as non-accounting services are 
incompatible with the public responsibilities of independent auditors, 
and should not be offered by the auditors. Gloeck and De Jager (1993) 
also suggest that the only solution to offer "other services" without 
negatively influencing the auditor's independence (as perceived by the 
user) is to place a ban on performing other services for the same audit 
client. But Gelfond (2000) argues that an unduly broad blanket 
prohibition on consulting might impact on the expertise audit firms 
can provide to clients. However, he feels that proper disclosure of all 
non-audit fees and services should be made, including tax services, 
and all fees should be addressed in relationship to the audit fees. 
As a result of the above suggestions and to meet emerging community 
expectations and to take account of changing business practices and 
technology, the International Federation of Accountants released 
revised standards in November 2001 on assurance engagements. The 
IFAC revised (2001-2002) revised Independence Standard on 
Assurance Engagements recognizes that the provision of certain non-
assurance services is incompatible with independence in mind or 
appearance. The Code prohibits a firm from providing: 
1. Bookkeeping or other services related to the audit client's 
accounting records or financial statements of the audit client, 
except in emergency situations. 
2. Appraisal or valuation services which involves matters that are 
material to the financial statements and involving a significant 
degree of subjectivity. 
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3. Management decision-making functions (refer IFAC code 8.156). 
4. Expert services which involve making of management decisions 
on behalf of an audit client. 
5. Broker-dealer, investment adviser or investment banking 
servIces. 
6. Legal services to an audit client that is a listed entity where the 
results of the service will be material to the financial 
statements. 
In the US, the independence provisions of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
2002 and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC 2001) rules 
have prohibited the provision of specified non-audit services to an 
audit client. Six of the prohibited non-audit services are those 
prohibited by IFAC code. The following non-audit services are 
prohibited only by SEC in US. 
1. Financial Information Systems Design and Implementation 
2. Internal Audit Outsourcing 
3. Tax Services, unless the service has been pre-approved by the 
issuer's audit committee. 
IFAC believes it is unnecessary to further extend the list of non-audit 
servIces that are prohibited to audit clients regardless of 
circumstances. The IFAC code currently permits the provision of the 
above three non-audit services, if any threat created may be reduced 
to an acceptable level, and where specified safeguards are in place. 
Both the IFAC code and the SEC rules permit the provision of non-
audit services which are not included in the nine categories of 
prohibited non-audit services, such as consulting services, as long as 
the auditor does not (1) audit his/her own work, (2) perform 
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management functions, or (3) act as an advocate for the client. (SEC, 
2003 and IFAC, 2003). 
In South Africa, as opposed to the SEC and IFAC, the ministerial 
panel for the review of the draft Accounting Professions' Bill (2003) 
stated that it is not practical to statutorily limit the non-audit services 
performed by the auditor to an entity. It suggests that the nature and 
extent of such services is a matter which specifically requires 
consideration and pre-approval of the audit committee. The audit 
committees will comprise exclusively of independent non-executive 
directors, and will be mandatory for all listed and other relevant 
entities in South Africa. 
One method of ensuring that the auditor does not lose his/her 
independence because a large percentage of his/her income is derived 
from one client, is to stipulate a maximum percentage of total income 
which the auditor may derive from one single client or group of related 
clients (see ICAI, 1992: 117; IFAC, 2000; SEC, 2000; APB, 2003; AC 
CA, 2004). However, this may be a dangerous regulation, in that it will 
further reduce the number of firms which will then be able to audit 
large group public companies and, in so doing, further strengthen the 
monopolistic powers of large firms (O'Connor, 1992: 17). According to 
IF AC (2001), the significance of the threat should be evaluated and, if 
the threat is other than clearly insignificant, safeguards should be 
considered and applied as necessary to reduce the threat to an 
acceptable level. Such safeguards might include: policies and 
procedures to monitor and implement quality control of assurance 
engagements and involving an additional professional accountant who 
is not a member of the assurance team, to review the work done or 
otherwise advise as necessary. 
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Another way in which to strengthen the auditor's independence is the 
mandatory rotation of audit firms (see Gaston, 1987; Gloeck and De 
jager, 1993). However, many researchers and professional bodies do 
not support audit firm rotation. The dangers arising from this are 
illuminated by McHugh, et al. (1992:11 - as cited in Gloeck and De 
Jager, 1993): "rotation would permit extensive monopolistic collusive 
behaviour between such firms". The AICPA (2004) stated that there is 
no empirical evidence to support the perceived benefit of mandatory 
audit firm rotation. Based on the international trends and the study 
made by the United States General Accounting Office (GOA), Sehoole 
(2004) stated that audit firm rotation would decrease the number of 
firms and the market share of public company audits would become 
more concentrated in a small number of accounting firms for 
countries with emerging economy, such as South Africa. 
In response to the corporate collapses such as Enron, in US the SEC 
(Jan. 28, 2003) adopted rules to effectuate the statutory requirement 
of audit partner rotation found in Sec. 203 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
This should not be confused with audit firm rotation. The rules specify 
that certain other significant audit parterres will be subject to a seven-
year rotation requirement with a two year "timeout" period. The IFAC 
(2003) commentary on a proposed revised rule by the SEC (2003) to 
rotate the whole engagement team, including those in remote 
subsidiaries, stated that such extension is both unnecessary and 
possibly impractical. The reason is that, the requirement to rotate all 
partners over five years may threaten audit quality as there will be 
little time for incoming partners to acquire sufficient in-depth 
knowledge of clients' businesses. Moreover, it is not practical in 
countries where there may be few partners with sufficient 
understanding of the particular industry involved, nor for small sized 
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audit firms. This could reduce the number of audit firms and IFAC 
believes that it will reduce audit quality (IFAC, 2003). The IFAC Code 
recognizes that using the same lead engagement partner on an audit 
over a prolonged period may create a familiarity threat. Therefore, the 
Code requires the rotation of the lead engagement partner after a pre-
defined period, normally no more than seven years (IFAC, 2003). 
In South Africa, the ministerial panel for the reVIew of the draft 
Accounting Professions' Bill (2003) stated that it is not efficient to 
introduce statutory term limits for auditors or statutory auditor 
rotation due to resource constraints in South Africa and other 
problems, which make it unlikely that such legislation would achieve 
its desired objective. It suggested that the most appropriate manner to 
deal with this issue is for the matter to be covered by the audit 
committee. It added that the consideration of the independence of 
auditors by an audit committee should particularly cover matters 
pertaining to the continued relationship with an existing audit firm 
and, importantly, the length of time for which a particular audit 
partner or audit team may conduct the audit of an entity. 
2.6.4 Education 
According to Koh and Woo (1998) some researchers have supported 
the belief that the knowledge of the users influences the size of the 
expectation gap. Hence, some researchers advocated education in 
narrowing the expectation gap. Bailey et aI, (1983) found that more 
knowledgeable users placed less responsibility on auditors than less 
knowledgeable users in the US, implying that a larger gap exists 
between auditors and less sophisticated users. Similarly, Epstein and 
Geiger (1994) found that more educated investors (with respect to 
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accounting, finance and investment analysis knowledge) are less likely 
to demand higher auditor assurance. Hence, they propose that one 
way to narrow the expectation gap is through increased public 
awareness of the nature and limitations of an audit. They add that, to 
increase users' knowledge and awareness, it is important to 
communicate the merits and limitations of an audit at every available 
opportunity chance. Further they note that the fundamental role of an 
audit in society must be re-examined by both the audit profession and 
financial users and all must agree to close the gap (Koh and Woo, 
1998). 
Monroe and Woodliff (1993) made a similar study in Australia and 
have the same view. They recommend that professional bodies should 
consider an active education program to increase users' knowledge 
about auditors' duties and responsibilities and the audit report in 
order to reduce the gap. 
Porter (1993) points out that many expectations of users are 
unreasonable and therefore cannot be met by any expansion of 
regulations. Pierce and Kilcommins (1996), in their study of the audit 
expectations gap and the role of auditing education, also agree with 
this statement and conclude that audit education may have a wider 
role to play in addressing the expectations gap than that in relation to 
the misunderstanding gap. Further, audit education provides a basis 
for a more accurate and critical evaluation of those regulations, and 
confers on the user better understanding of the credibility of financial 
information. In this respect audit education can be viewed as having a 
positive and worthwhile contribution to make as part of a series of 
measures to address the audit expectations gap. 
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2.6.5 Communicating the auditor's role 
The Treadway Commission (1987) also recommends better 
communication about the role of independent public accountants. The 
commission suggests that the standard audit report should describe 
the extent to which the independent public accountant has reviewed 
and evaluated the system of internal accounting control. According to 
the Commission, these steps will promote a better appreciation of an 
audit and its purpose and limitation and underscore management's 
primary responsible for financial reporting. (Treadway Commission, 
1987:23). 
In the USA, Nair and Rittenberg (1987) conclude that users' 
perceptions about the relative responsibilities of management and 
auditors are changed with the introduction of an expanded audit 
report. Miller et ai. (1990) report that bankers found expanded audit 
reports to be more useful and understandable than the short form 
reports. In general, these studies provide evidence that an expanded 
audit report gives a fuller understanding of the scope, nature and 
significance of the audit and influences the reader's perceptions 
concerning the audit and the auditor's role. This implies that the 
expanded audit report has reduced the audit expectation gap to some 
degree (Koh and Woo, 1998). 
Humphrey et al. (1992: 137) examme the accounting profession's 
response to the expectation gap and identify two main strategies of 
response namely "a defensive approach focusing on education and 
reassurance of the public, and a constructive approach, seeking to 
convey a willingness to change audit activities to meet public 
concern", In terms of this analysis, the expanded audit report can be 
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seen, and was seen by the APB itself, as a short-term "solution" 
responding to the immediate pressures on a newly formed board. 
In Australia, Gay and Schelluch (1993) found that audit reports based 
on the revised Statement of Auditing Practice (AUP 3) have 
significantly increased users' understanding of the audit process, 
auditor's role, nature and limitations of financial reports and, to a 
lesser extent, the directors' responsibility for material errors and the 
basis of forming an audit opinion. Monroe and Woodliff (1994) also 
studied the impact of the wording changes in the revised AUP 3 on the 
expectation gap. Their findings confirm the existence of an expectation 
gap between auditors and various user groups related to the use of 
the earlier form of the report. However, the modified wording in 
revised AUP 3 has a significant impact on beliefs about the nature of 
an audit and the auditors' and management's responsibilities. The 
researchers suggest that wording changes in the audit report that 
address the specific areas of the expectation gap should be considered 
in closing the gap (Koh and Woo, 1998). 
In the UK, Innes et al. (1997) found that the expansion of the audit 
report serves to improve the users' perceptions of the audit process 
and of the audit report in terms of its ability to communicate the 
purpose of the audit. This is likely to lead to enhanced reputation and 
status for the auditing profession. At the same time, expansion of the 
report also serves to increase users' perceptions of their ability to hold 
the auditor accountable. These arguments are consistent with those of 
Hooks (1992: 128), who hypothesized that the profession acts to create 
an appearance of concern for a wider public interest without requiring 
much change by the largest public audit firms. 
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Butler et al. (2000) suggest that one approach to close the 
"expectation gap" between auditors and non-auditors' understanding 
of auditors' responsibility to detect fraud is to modify audit 
communications to more clearly reflect auditors' ability to provide 
assurance about fraud. Their results identify specific shortcomings in 
the communications from audit standard setters which affect both 
auditors and non-auditors' understanding of auditing terms. This may 
allow policy makers to avoid terms that are likely to mislead non-
auditors. The term "irregularity" was not understood by the investor 
group, and SAS 82's replacement of "irregularity" with the term fraud 
is consistent with Butler et aI's results. 
2.6.6 Statutory solutions and greater external controls 
G loeck and De Jager ( 1993), in their reVIew of vanous research 
studies, state that reducing the expectation gap comes about through 
increased regulation by an independent regulatory body. They add 
that such an independent body should not be governmentally or state 
based, but must be composed of members of the profession, investors, 
user groups and other users of the reporting process. An apt name for 
this body would be "auditing body". The essence must be improved 
professional responsibility through "openness" and "protection of own 
interests" must not be a factor (Gloeck and De Jager, 1993). Based on 
the recommendations made by researchers and professional bodies, 
various countries are establishing independent bodies to regulate the 
auditing profession. For example, m South Africa the Public 
Accountants' and Auditors' Board, an independent body, will be 
replaced by an independent auditors board since it has a much 
influence over the accounting profession and there is a need for wider 
public involvement in the regulatory body. This is owing to corporate 










The Audit Expectation Gap in Eritrea 
collapses and scandals which have focused attention on auditors and 
the disciplinary process relating to errant auditors (Draft Accounting 
Profession's Bill, 2003). 
The study undertaken by Dewing and Russel (2001) in the UK 
regarding the need for an independent body to monitor audit quality 
and the disciplining of auditors over audit failures, indicates that 
views varied considerably. At one extreme was the position that any 
profession worthy of the name should be capable of regulating its own 
members, whilst the other extreme was the view that the profession 
should be regulated by a strong, independent, public body. This result 
shows that there was a significant degree of support for establishing 
an independent regulatory body. 
Pressure to introduce laws to investigate the problem of self-regulation 
is increasing (see Gloeck and De Jager 1993). This is due to the 
perception that the profession's own bodies do not have the capacity 
to correcty apply self-regulation. The existence of such a body is also 
seen as a move to gain greater acknowledgement of the commercial 
and practical realities of a market in which the provision of auditing 
services is controlled by a small group of large auditing firms (ICAEW, 
1992). 
2.6.7 Summary 
In an attempt to narrow the gap, vanous approaches have been 
examined and suggested by researchers and professional bodies. 
These include, among others: 
- An expanded audit report;. 
- Enhancement of auditor independence; 
Education; . 
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- Expansion of auditor's responsibility - specially with regard to 
detecting fraud; and 
Statutory solutions and greater external control. 
The areas of major concern common to most were: fraud detection 
responsibility, going concern reporting, messages communicated 
through the audit report and auditor independence. As a result, many 
changes have been made to expand the role and the responsibilities of 
an auditor. 
The recommendations with regard to fraud and going concern 
reporting suggest that the auditor should playa more active role than 
was the case before. As a result, various standards have been issued 
by professional bodies regarding fraud and going concern to meet the 
needs of society. In addition, it was suggested that the independent 
public accountant should be required to review interim financial data 
before its release to improve the likelihood of timely detection of 
fraudulent financial reporting. 
The recommendations put forward by various researchers and other 
bodies with regard to auditor independence focus on placing some 
restriction on the provision of non-audit services, the rotation of 
partners and the formation of audit committees, which is now an 
important part of good corporate governance. The IFAC code and SEC 
rules have been amended recently to deal with the prohibition of non-
audit services and partner rotation, although there are some 
discrepancies between them. The six non-audit services which are 
prohibited by IFAC and SEC are the provision of: bookkeeping related 
services, appraisal or valuation services, management decision 
functions, expert services which involve management decisions, 
broker-dealers and investment advice, and legal services to an audit 
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client. The three non-audit services are prohibited only by the SEC 
are: financial information system design and implementation, internal 
audit outsourcing, and tax services unless the service pre-approved by 
audit committee. 
Finally, the suggestion made by many researchers and professional 
bodies with regard to the audit report was the expansion of the audit 
report to improve users' perceptions of the nature, scope and 
significance of the audit. Various researchers found that the expanded 
audit report has reduced the audit expectation gap m one way or 
another (in Eritrea an expanded audit report is used). 
2.7 Corporate Governance 
Corporate Governance is an issue which received increased global 
attention during the 1990s (see King Report I and II 1994 and 2002 in 
South Africa). "Corporate Governance in South Africa is concerned 
with holding the balance between economic and social goals and 
between individual and communal goals ... the aim is to align as nearly 
as possible the interest of individuals, corporations and society." 
(Cadbury 1999 as cited in the King Report II on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa, 2002). Corporate Governance in South 
Africa has shifted the focus from profit driven reporting to integrated 
sustainability reporting, implying the achievement of balanced and 
integrated economic, social and environmental performance the so 
called triple bottom line (King II, 2002). Clear guidelines are set out 
according to which companies should disclose their economic, social 
and environmental issues (see GRI, 2002 and King, II 2002). 
Chambers (2002: 138) states that the high quality of an audit is an 
essential part of effective Corporate Governance. It is an essential 
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control in the process of disclosure to stakeholders. He adds that high 
priority should be given to the audit committee's review of the audit, 
as part of a system of continuous improvement in the audit process 
and in developing the auditors' relationship with the company. Where 
it is proposed to put the audit out to tender, a high priority should 
also be given to the appointment process (Chambers, 2002: 161). 
The Turnbull Report (1999) states that most of the complications, 
liabilities, exposures to ethical dilemmas, embarrassment and 
perceptions by the public that company directors may not be acting 
with the highest probity could be avoided by introducing good 
Corporate Governance. This approach would provide far greater 
protection for directors, auditors, shareholders and investors. But 
recent corporate collapses again raise questions about the behaviour 
of directors and auditors and their respective roles in company 
failures (see Sexton, 2001). The collapse of Enron, with $62.8 billion 
in assets, is a good example. It became the largest bankruptcy case in 
US history (AI CPA, 2003). The question is "who is to be blamed?" 
Loubser (2002) stated that Enron is a company in which just about 
every rule of corporate governance had been broken. She adds that 
the external auditors are accused of being party to large-scale 
deception and fraud. As previously discussed in chapter one, 
corporate governance does not yet apply in terms of any code in 
Eritrea. 
2.8 Conclusion 
The concept of an audit expectation gap suggests that the public 
expects auditors to act in ways which are different from what auditors 
themselves would do. Based on the literature review, it can be 
concluded that evidence of the existence of an audit expectation gap in 
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various countries is substantial. Furthermore, users generally have a 
higher expectation than most auditors would consider reasonable. 
Therefore, it is likely that the audit expectation gap will continue to be 
a major concern for many years to come, despite the efforts made by 
the profession to reduce that gap. Misconceptions and differences in 
expectations will persist and will grow to the detriment of the 
profession's standing with the public, unless effective and timely 
solutions are implemented. 
The existence of the audit expectation gap in various countries, where 
the expectation gap has been studied, has important implications for 
Eritrea. It can be concluded that the problem of the audit expectation 
gap is likely to be even worse in developing countries such as Eritrea, 
as most of its public and users are less financially knowledgeable. 
Studies in various countries indicate that more knowledgeable users 
placed less responsibility on auditors than less knowledgeable users. 
The public in Eritrea has less knowledge of the auditor's role (see 
chapter three - Accounting and its environment in Eritrea). Therefore, 
the main focus of this research project is on the public perception of 
the auditor's duties and responsibilities. Moreover, other factors that 
contribute to the audit expectation gap (see 2.5 Previous Research p. 
29), which are related to the specific problems in Eritrea (see chapter 
one - 1.2 Statement of Problem p.2) will be considered. 
Perera (1980:37) states that the particular social environmental, 
under which accounting is done, has a direct bearing on the manner 
in which accounting performs its function. Therefore, the next chapter 
will be devoted to the discussion of accounting and its environment in 
Eritrea, and the Eritrean situation in relation to the Accounting and 
Auditing profession will be discussed thoroughly. 
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Chapter three - Accounting and its Environment in Eritrea, 
and auditor's duties 
3.1 Introduction 
According to Perera (1980:40) "accounting is a product of its 
environment, and a particular environment is unique to its time and 
locality." Accountants, in keeping their records, have to look to the 
environment for what property rights society protects, what 
organizations and institutions are used to carry on economic 
exchange and what legal and political procedures and instruments are 
involved in the economic transactions (Perera, 1980:44). Therefore, 
the environment that is described here is that of the total socio-
political conditions and the economy of a country. 
Accounting is influenced by varied factors which generally could be 
said to emanate from political factors, economIC conditions, 
environmental and social issues and accounting theories (see figure 
3.1). 
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3.2 Socio-Political Conditions and the Economy of Eritrea 
As can be seen from figure 2.1, accounting and auditing are affected 
by the economic, social and environmental and political situations in 
the country. For this reason it is important to present the socio-
political conditions and the economy of Eritrea to give readers general 
information regarding those issues in Eritrea. 
3.2.1 History and economy of Eritrea 
Eritrea, a new nation in the horn of Africa, gained its liberation in May 
1991 after a long and bitter struggle of 30 years of war with Ethiopia. 
It was a colony of Italy, Britain and later Ethiopia from 1885 to 1991. 
Independence was overwhelmingly approved in a 1993 referendum 
monitored by the United Nations and the country became an 
independent state in May 1993. It is strategically located in the north-
eastern part of Africa, with the Red sea on its east coast, Sudan to the 
west and north, and Ethiopia to the south (see table 3.1 p.65 for the 
general information and economic overview of Eritrea). 
Historically, Eritrea has been a nation of skilled people with a wealth 
of experience in entrepreneurship, commerce, and international trade. 
According to a World Bank Report (1996), at the end of the 1930s, 
some 730 companies producing industrial goods existed in Eritrea. In 
addition some 2200 trading companies were active. During this 
period, Eritrea also became a successful exporting nation. At the time 
of the Second World War, when imports from Europe to the East 
African markets were disrupted, Eritrean industries stepped in to 
supply these markets (Eritrea: option and strategy for growth, 1996). 
From the 1950s, the economy entered into a phase of long-term 
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decline. In 1974, when the military regIme m Ethiopia adopted a 
command economy, most private sector assets including land, 
housing and industries in Eritrea were nationalized. 
Even though Eritrea was one of the most industrialized African 
countries in the 1950s, successive colonial rule and neglect, the thirty 
years protracted war of liberation and periodic droughts have resulted 
in a severe destruction of the infrastructure, development institutions 
and productive capacity. Consequently, at the time of liberation, a 
devastated infrastructure, weak institutions, and limited and 
technologically backward sectors characterized the economy 
(International Monetary Fund, 1998: 4). 
Given all these misfortunes, Eritrea had to initiate its development 
efforts from scratch with meagre domestic resources and little external 
assistance. In spite of all the development endeavours, moving the 
economy towards its optimal growth path will still be a challenging 
task. There are still major bottlenecks that must be dealt with, which 
hinder the flow of domestic (private) and foreign investment and 
jeopardize development efforts. Among these obstructions, the most 
crucial ones, according to the Government of Eritrea (1998:8), are: 
-Shortage of adequate and productive human capital (this problem will 
be solved soon with the completion of the Human Resource 
Development program, which has been training 600 postgraduate 
students in various fields since 2001, in several South African 
Universities); 
- The financial and foreign exchange gap; 
- Inadequate physical and social infrastructure; 
- Lack of institutional capacity and social capital and information; and 
Technological constraints. 
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Moreover, the damage to Eritrea's economy caused by the two year 
large-scale border-war with Ethiopia (1998-2000) has been immense. 
It has drained enormous financial and human resources, which could 
otherwise have been used for productive purposes. Moreover, it also 
halted all development activities and projects and investment 
initiatives from all sources, especially foreign direct investment. It has 
almost undone all the economic achievements of the first five years 
since independence. Worse of all; it left the country with a heavy 
burden of demobilizing and reintegrating the huge army into the 
economy. Alleviating all of these constraints will enable the economy 
to grow at a faster rate towards realizing its full potentiaL 
Eritrea is a low-income African country, with a small open economy 
(see table 3.1, p.65 for the economic overview). The economy of Eritrea 
is largely based on subsistence agriculture, with 80% of the 
population involved in farming. Industrialization is still in its infancy. 
Although there is potential to extract petroleum from the Red Sea, the 
economic viability of these reserves has yet to be firmly established. 
Fish is, so far, one of the richest known natural resources, and the 
country's coastal waters are believed to be among the most potentially 
productive fishing grounds in the Red Sea (Eritrea: option and 
strategy for growth, 1996). 
Despite a war that has brought foreign investment to a standstill, the 
International Monetary Fund (2001) predicts that Eritrea's economy 
will grow at a far better pace than most other African countries. 
Economists say Eritrea has virtually no government corruption or 
crime. Emmanuel Ablo (2001), the World Bank's representative In 
Eritrea, states "unlike other countries in Africa, no one in this 
government is using the war for personal profit. This is a unique 
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phenomenon". John Weakliam (2001) states that Eritreans abroad are 
sending their money home about 400 million dollar a year making 
this the country's main source of foreign investment. It is an infusion 
of cash that experts say has made Eritrea self-reliant and kept Africa's 
youngest country going when much of its business has ground to a 
halt because of people being sent off to the warfront. 
The Eritrean Government is currently engaged in creating a modern, 
technologically advanced and internationally competitive economy 
where private enterprises are the driving economic force. Besides, it 
has been committed to a free market economic system and has 
announced plans to reduce its holdings in some 40 public enterprises 
(African Market Research, 2001). It has established an agency with 
the objective of the orderly transfer of ownership and management of 
the public enterprises from the Government to the private sector. 
In the long term, Eritrea may benefit from the development of offshore 
oil, offshore fishing, and tourism. Moreover, Eritrea's economic future 
depends on its ability to master fundamental social and economic 
problems, for example by reducing illiteracy, promoting job creation, 
expanding technical training, attracting investment, and streamlining 
the bureaucracy (Geography IQ, 2003). 
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Table 3.1: General information and Economic overview of Eritrea (CIA world fact book, 2003) 
1. Population 4,362,254 (July 2003 est.) 
2 Area 121,320 sq km 
3. Currency Nakfa 
4. GOP (ppp) $3.3 billion (2002 est.) based on purchasing power parity 
5 GOP real growth rate 7% (2001 est.) and 2% (2002 est.) 
6. GOP by sector Agriculture 17%, Industry 29% and services 54% (2001 est.) 
5. GOP - Per capita $740 (2002 est.) based on purchasing power parity 
6. Industries Food processing, beverages, clothing and textiles 
7. Agriculture Sorghum, lentils, vegetables, corn, cotton, tobacco, coffee, 
sisal; livestock; goats; fish 
8. Financial institutions Banks and Insurance 
8. Resources Gold, potash, zinc, copper, salt, possibly oil and natural gas 
9. Exports and Imports $34.8 million and $470.5 million respectively (2000) 
10. Oebt external $311 million (2000 est.) 
11. Inflation rate 15% (2001est.) 
12. HN/AIDS - adult 2.8% (2001 est.) 
prevalence rate 
13. Communications Telephone main line and cellular, radio, TV, postal 
Internet services. 
14. Languages -National languages are Tigrinya and Arabic (there are 
nine languages in Eritrea). 
-Medium of instruction at schools and university is 
English 
3.2.2 Environmental issues 
According to the World Bank Report (Eritrea: option and strategy for 
growth, 1996), the sustainable utilization of the natural resource base 
and the protection and conservation of the environment are central to 
Eritrea's future development. At present, the main environmental 
issues of concern relate to the degradation of its land, forest and water 
resources. Pressures on the urban environment in the form of 
overcrowding, poor sanitation and inadequate water supply are 
already being felt m Eritrea's mam cities and towns. Other 
environmental problems such as industrial pollution and the 
degradation of the coastal areas and marine resources are not 
significant (Eritrea: option and strategy for growth, 1996). 
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3.2.3 Social issues 
Eritrea has inherited an egalitarian system, with most of its people 
owning some asset or a plot of land. A major strength of the society is 
its well-developed family and community solidarity which have played 
an important role in mitigating the consequence of war and droughts. 
According to the World Bank Report (Eritrea: option and strategy for 
growth, 1996), the following would be needed to ensure that the poor 
participate in the growth process: 
(a) Well functioning factor markets, particularly labour 
markets, are crucial in helping the poor to benefit from 
the growth process. In the past, because of restrictive 
labour policies, the labour markets, both rural and 
urban, were characterized by reduced labour mobility, 
and skill shortages coexisting with high unemployment. 
The recent reforms by the Government have helped to 
provide a more enabling environment for labour. 
Reducing the distortions and rigidities in labour markets 
is the most efficient means for increasing the poor's 
productive assets. 
(b) A broad-based pattern of public expenditure in basic 
education, health, and nutrition would be important in 
ensuring that the poor both contribute to and benefit 
from growth. 
(c) The Government has created the framework for the 
removal of traditional economic and social constraints on 
women. This includes: re-education, provision of 
incentives and to widen economic opportunities for 
women. 
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(d) Finally, economic progress in Eritrea will be set against 
the background of a major effort to reintegrate tens of 
thousands of returning refugees from Sudan and other 
countries. This will require continued support from 
community services. These efforts will go hand in hand 
with programs to reintegrate thousands of ex-fighters 
into productive activities in civil society. 
3.2.4 Political System 
After independence from Ethiopia on 24 May 1993, the new 
government of Eritrea faced formidable challenges. Beginning with no 
constitution, no judicial system, and an education system in disarray, 
it has been forced to build the institutions of government from 
scratch. A new constitution was promulgated in 1997. The present 
government includes legislative, executive, and judicial bodies 
(Geography IQ, 2003). 
For the first decade of Eritrea's existence, the government was a 
synthesis of the national liberation movement, the EPLF, and newly 
elected or appointed officials from the general population. During the 
transition to constitutional government, the National Assembly was 
composed of the elected central council of People's Front for 
Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) and representatives elected by the six 
regional assemblies and the Diaspora (Ministry of Information, 
2002:57). At present the National Assembly is the highest legal power 
in the government. The legislature sets the internal and external 
policies of the government, regulates implementation of those policies, 
approves the budget, and elects the president of the country 
(Geography IQ, 2003). The president, Isayas Afwerki, was elected by 










The Audit Expectation Gap in Eritrea 
this Assembly. The president selects members of the cabinet and the 
six Regional Governors, subject to approval by the national Assembly. 
The president also appoints the Auditor-General, the Governor of the 
National Bank, Justices of the Supreme Court, and other 
commissioners, judges, ambassadors and officials as needed, also 
with the approval of the National Assembly. The cabinet is the 
country's executive branch. It is composed of 17 ministries and 
chaired by the president. It implements policies, regulations, and laws 
and is accountable to the National Assembly (Ministry of Information, 
2002:57-58). 
The judiciary operates independently of both legislative and executive 
bodies, with a court system that extends from each village through 
district, provincial, and national levels (Geography IQ, 2003). 
After widespread public consultation, a new law was passed in 2002 
that defined the procedures for elections and established a 
commission to organize them. The first national elections were held 
within the framework defined by the Constitution. This marked the 
end of the post liberation transition (Ministry of Information, 2002:57). 
3.3 Accounting education in Eritrea 
According to Perera (1980), accounting practice is largely a product of 
the education and training given to accountants. Accounting 
education in Eritrea starts at the comprehensive secondary schools 
and vocational schools which expose students to the elementary 
concepts of bookkeeping. Training accountants has also been effective 
since the end of the 1960's under the ambit of the established 
Department of Accounting in the University of Asmara with an 
increased demand and supply from year to year due to the emergence 
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of governmental ministries, public firms and private compames that 
required accountants who can process information to facilitate 
decision making. The Department of Accounting has offered a 
Bachelor's degree in accounting since 1969. Moreover, the department 
offers a diploma program in accounting (Haile, 1987: 172-174). In 
addition to the University of Asmara, the Business College, which was 
established by the Ministry of Education in 1997, also offers a 
diploma program in accounting and banking. 
In the University of Asmara, Department of Accounting, American 
textbooks are used and, according to Haile (1987: 184), the syllabus is 
similar to some colleges of the USA. The department offers a four-year 
degree program. During the first year students take only common 
(general) courses, and the department offers accounting courses 
starting from the second year. 
Given that many Eritrean students have been training in several 
South African universities for postgraduate studies, it is important to 
compare the accounting program of the University of Asmara (Eritrea) 
with South African universities in order to improve the accounting 
education in Eritrea. If we compare the program of the Department of 
Accounting of the University of Asmara with the professional syllabus 
of South Africa, the focus of the Asmara University seems to be on 
general business rather than on the profession of accountancy. It can 
be concluded that accounting students in Eritrea are over loaded with 
many common and minor courses which are not related to 
accounting. Although this has some advantage if students want to do 
their postgraduate studies in other fields, such as management and 
economics, it also hinders specialization leading the graduates to end 
up as "Jacks of all trades and masters of none "(Haile, 1987). 
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Another problem in accounting education in Eritrea is that there is no 
taxation course. With regard to the contents of the accounting courses 
it is almost the same as South African universities, except in some 
courses. For example, in South Africa Universities, in financial 
accounting, the focus is on different disclosure requirements, group 
statements and deferred tax. This is not the case at the University of 
Asmara. This may be due to the difference in the level of the economic 
development of the two countries. So far 62 Eritreans are training for 
postgraduate studies in accounting in different universities of South 
Africa and this can help in the future to improve financial reporting in 
Eritrea. 
In South Africa, once the students finish their studies at the 
university, they are required to complete a further six month 
specialization course and take two professional examinations, while 
doing traineeship for three years to gain experience of practical 
accounting and finally becoming Chartered accountants. In Eritrea, in 
1997, a Committee was established with the objective of establishing 
the Eritrean Institute of Certified Public Accountants (EICPA). So far 
the institution has not yet been established (refer to 3.4.4 
Accountancy profession in Eritrea p.7S). Therefore, once the students 
finish their B.A degree, they become accountants in different 
industries. Even though a limited number of students have attempted 
to take the ACCA examinations via correspondence, overall it has been 
unsuccessful. To conclude, the above mentioned problems in 
accounting education in Eritrea may contribute to the lack of financial 
knowledge of the auditors as well as the public in general (see chapter 
one 1.2 Statement of Problem p.2). Moreover, the accountancy 
profession should consider the relevance of good financial reporting 
for investors, especially foreign investors, lenders as well as donors. 
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And this can be achieved mainly by producing professional qualified 
accountants. 
3.4 The Eritrean Institutional framework 
3.4.1 The state 
In Eritrea the state plays a vital role in the economy. With no 
significant private sector, the State took several initiatives and 
invested in strategic sectors in order to accelerate economic recovery 
and long-term growth. The government has formulated and 
implemented policies and strategies that promote an outward 
oriented, private sector led market economy (Macro Policy 1994). 
Actions have been taken to rehabilitate, upgrade and expand social 
and economic infrastructures, improve the capacity of government 
and development institutions and restore the productive capacity of 
the economy in all sectors (Ministry of Finance, 2000: 1). 
The social market economy in Eritrea is both 'social' and 'market', 
which is similar to Germany (see Flower and Ebbers, 2002: 161). As 
Flower and Ebbers (2002: 161) state, it is 'social' because it is 
managed for the benefit of the society as a whole and not of any 
privileged group. It is 'market' because the economy is based on the 
principles of free enterprise and not on state direction. 
In the field of accountancy, the government has already drafted 
several laws (see 3.4.4 Accountancy profession in Eritrea p.75). 
3.4.1.1 Public sector 
Accounting for the public sector in Eritrea is different for Ministries 
(governmental agencies which depend on governmental budget) and 
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government owned public enterprises. The Ministries report on a 
standard reporting form prepared by the Ministry of Finance. Annual 
budget single entry recording is in use. The cash basis of accounting 
is the most common method used by the public sector in many 
countries in the world. However, the reform of the public accounting 
system to the accrual basis of accounting is now an international 
trend. Countries are now recognizing that there is a need for 
financially viable reporting, and independence (and globalization) of 
the public sector standard-setters (Adams, 2003). As a result, the 
IFAC has issued International Pubic Sector Accounting Standards 
(IPSAS). To date 20 IPSASs using the accrual basis have been issued 
and only one financial reporting standard on the cash basis of 
accounting has been released (see IFAC, 2002). It is crucial also for 
Eritrea to follow the accrual basis of accounting in order to assure the 
disclosure of information and the transparency of its affairs. Based on 
an interview with the auditor general of Eritrea (Ato Birhane 
Habtemariam, January 2004), it is evident that eventually Eritrea will 
also move to the accrual basis of accounting to account for Ministries 
(see above) depending on capacity and resources. 
The objectives of accounting in the public sector (Ministries) in Eritrea 
are to: 
-Provide a summary of revenue and expenditures; 
-Enable detailed comparisons of spending to be made with the budget; 
-Allow the identification of spending to ensure compliance with the 
law and other legal authorities (Parliamentary approvals); and 
-Provide the basis for the next budget. 
Eritrea follows an audit approach which focuses on legal compliance 
rather than fair presentation. The auditors of the public sector in 
Eritrea report to the Government. 
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Government owned enterprises, such as Telecommunications, Water, 
Electricity and Postal services, housing and commercial banks and 
other manufacturing enterprises have their own autonomy (law and 
guidance). Their accounting system is based on the accrual basis 
which is similar to the private sector. Hence, they prepare their 
financial statements in accordance with International Accounting 
Standards. Auditing is also the same as for the private sector, which is 
based on International Standards on aUditing. 
3.4.2 Companies Act in Eritrea 
Eritrea, a young and small nation, is in the process of developing its 
Commercial Laws and Codes. The Commercial Code 1960, inherited 
from the Ethiopians, was adopted as the Commercial Code of Eritrea 
for the transitional period until it can be replaced by the Eritrean 
Code. This Code is still in force. It requires auditors to audit the 
books of a company to verify the correctness and accuracy of the 
balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. The Government has 
been preparing the various laws following the ratification of the 
Constitution in 1997. The Commercial Code was one of the first laws 
to have been completed, but has not yet been enacted by the National 
Assembly. There is no Code for Corporate Governance and Principles 
in Eritrea at present. 
3.4.3 Taxation 2 
Like many other countries, the main reason for the government's 
interest in financial reporting in Eritrea is taxation. The government 
imposes different types of taxes. To facilitate the collection of income 
2 The information is obtained from Tsehaye Ghebrezgiabher (June 2003). The method of 
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tax, tax payers are classified into three categories. Category 'A' 
includes any incorporated company based on shares with limited 
liability and any person having an annual gross income exceeding 
Nakfa3 350,000. Category 'B' includes any person having an annual 
gross income greater than Nakfa 100,000 but less than Nakfa 350,000 
and any person engaged in a professional or vocational occupation 
whose annual gross income is greater than Nakfa 18,000. Category 'C' 
includes any person having a gross income up to Nakfa 100,000, and 
any person engaged in a professional or vocational occupation whose 
annual gross income is up to Nakfa 18,000. The tax law requires that 
all companies classified in category 'A' and 'B' must keep books of 
account and records in such a way as to be able to submit to the 
Inland Revenue Department (IRD), at the end of the year, a balance 
sheet and profit and loss statement with necessary disclosure and 
specifications within four months from the end of the annual 
accounting period for which the tax is due. Persons under category 'C' 
are not required to maintain accounting records. A presumptive tax 
system, where tax payers pay a specified amount of tax for a specific 
period of time based on assessment made by the tax inspection unit, 
is used to determine the amount of tax to be paid. 
The following paragraphs set out the accounting methods, with 
respect to inventory valuation and depreciation, which are used for 
tax purposes by the IRD: 
1. FIFO and Moving Average cost methods are allowed by IRD as 
inventory valuation methods. 
2. The IRD allows the straight-line method of depreciation. There are 
four rates currently applied to calculate depreciation expenses: 
Income tax collection in Eritrea. 
3 Local currency in Eritrea 
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Buildings 5%, Machinery- for the first year 16% and 12% 
thereafter, Furniture 10% and motor vehicles and computers 20%. 
In Eritrea, financial statements are prepared based on IFAC 
standards. Most companies use the above two accounting methods, 
which are allowed also under IFAC standards, in financial reporting as 
it saves them the cost of preparing two separate sets of financial 
statements for tax and financial reporting purposes. Moreover, it 
simplifies the accounting reporting process as there is no need to 
provide for deferred taxation, especially in respect of depreciation. To 
determine the tax liability for companies, the appropriate rate should 
be applied to taxable income, which is Gross income less exempted 
income and all allowable tax deductions set out in the income tax law 
of Eritrea. The income tax rate for incorporated bodies is imposed at a 
flat rate of 30%. According to the Inland Revenue Department (2002) 
this rate is an internationally accepted rate. Over-all, it can be 
concluded that taxation influences the financial reporting system in 
Eritrea. 
3.4.4 Accountancy Profession in Eritrea 
In 1997 a committee was set up with the objective of preparing draft 
documents for the formation of a professional institute to manage the 
accounting profession and to develop accounting, auditing and 
financial reporting standards in Eritrea. The drafts were circulated 
and comments were obtained from individuals/organizations deemed 
to be interested and capable of presenting constructive comments. 
These drafts include the public accountants proclamation, bylaws of 
the Eritrean Institute of Certified Accountants and a list of adopted 
International standards of codes of ethics, accounting standards and 
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auditing standards. But the laws have not yet been enacted by the 
National Assembly. 
Eritrea has adopted International Accounting Standards. However, 
some standards are not applicable in Eritrea at present due to 
differences in legislation related to the standards. For example, the 
existing Eritrean tax law does not accommodate deferral of taxes and, 
as a result, accounting for taxes on income (lAS 12) is not applicable 
in Eritrea. 
3.4.4.1 Financial reporting and financing system in Eritrea 
In Eritrea there has been no tradition of financial reporting to the 
public as all business enterprises were owned by the government 
before its independence from Ethiopia. After independence, the 
government privatized the majority of business enterprises, and some 
companies are offering their shares to the public in order to raise 
capital. The commercial code of Eritrea requires financial statements 
to give a true and fair view of the financial position, performance and 
cash flows. Financial statements are produced once a year and consist 
of a Balance sheet, Income statement, Cash flow statement and 
Statement of changes in owner's equity. Companies are not required 
to prepare interim financial statements. The users of financial 
statements are, among others, investors, creditors (mainly bankers), 
government, and non-profit organizations. 
In Eritrea there is no stock exchange market at present and it will 
take some time before the advantages of putting savings into shares 
and stocks will be fully realized. Most companies depend on banks, 
financial institutions and the state as a source of finance. 
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The participation of local investors in corporate business is limited to 
a small percentage of the total population. Most of the shares in 
companies are owned by the Eritrean Democracy Front (EDF), which 
is the ruling party in Eritrea at present and, in most cases, 
responsible managerial positions are held by ex-fighters, who do not 
have a good background in finance. Under such conditions the 
managers tend to believe that they need minimal accounting 
information. Therefore, during the past ten years there has been little 
incentive for the development of a system of extensive financial 
reporting. However, the recent failure of some companies to pay their 
debts to banks and their subsequent insolvency (e.g. Falcon Co., 
2003) has lead to a change in the perception of the public with respect 
to the importance of extensive financial reporting and the need for an 
audit. 
It can be concluded that at present the adequacy of financial 
information provided by existing accounting systems for any useful 
purpose is very much in doubt. But, with the emergence of many 
public companies, which are local and international companies, and 
the increasing public awareness of the benefit of investing in shares, it 
is expected that companies will publish their financial statements to 
the public and that financial reporting in Eritrea will improve over 
time. 
3.4.4.2 History and development of auditing in Eritrea4 
Before independence 
Although there is no information on how the auditing profession was 
operating before the association of Ethiopia with Eritrea, Eritrea's 
4 
The information is obtained from previous researches in auditing related topics in Eritrea and Ato 
Birhane Habtematriam, the Auditor General of Eritrea at present (2003). 
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supreme audit institution was established during the Italian 
colonization in 1930's. The profession developed after the British 
drove out the Italians and occupied Eritrea in 1941. 
In the 1960's when Ethiopia forcefully annexed Eritrea, there were few 
audit firms (4) operating in Ethiopia. According to Birhane 
Habtemariam (Auditor General of Eritrea) two international firms, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Manjudd, dominated the market and 
there were also only two local firms which competed with them. There 
was no separate law that governed the profession at that time. 
An association known as the Ethiopian Professional Association of 
Accountants and Auditors was formed in 1972 and still exists, but it 
was not given any power or authority to regulate the profession and it 
did not play any major role in the profession. The Commercial Code of 
1960 (Ethiopia) has provisions for companies to be audited. The same 
Code also has provisions on the appointment, nomination, term of 
appointment, remuneration, duties and powers ... etc of company 
auditors. 
When the military regime of Ethiopia, the Dergue, came to power it 
nationalized practically the whole economy and the international audit 
firms had to close their Eritrean offices sometime in 1977/78. The 
government established the Audit Services Corporation (ASC) to audit 
all nationalized public enterprises. At the same time it issued a 
proclamation (legal document) that mandated the Office of the Auditor 
General of Ethiopia to issue certificates of competence to those who 
want to practice as auditors and provide accounting services, 
thus providing for some regulation of the profession. In addition to the 
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ASC, some local audit firms continued to audit. These firms audited 
small business organizations. 
After Independence 
After the liberation of Eritrea in 1991 from Ethiopia, the government 
of Eritrea decided to sell and privatize so called "Public enterprises", 
which had been nationalized and weakened by Ethiopia, in order to 
salvage whatever value remained and make them viable. 
Legal Notice No. 15/1993 Regulations to Issue Certificates of 
Professional Competence to Private Auditors and Accountants was 
issued in November 1993. With this legal document, the Office of the 
Auditor General was mandated to issue such Certificates of 
Professional Competence, thus regulating the practise of accountants. 
A committee accountable to the office of Auditor General was 
established to make recommendations, after having made due 
verification, on the issuance of certificates of competence to those who 
apply to practise as private auditors and accountants, as well as on 
the renewal, suspension and cancellation of such certificates. Since 
then, five local audit firms have been established and are providing 
services to the public. There is also the Audit Services Corporation 
(Eritrea) which is government owned and which audits government 
owned enterprises. It was inherited from the Ethiopians. 
In Eritrea, practising auditors are advised by the auditor general, 
which is the regulatory authority at present, to follow International 
Standards in Auditing (lAS) issued by the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC), as applicable to the situation. The researcher 
supports the adoption of IFAC standards as they are high quality 
global standards and recognize the need for a global harmonized 
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framework to meet the increasing international demands that are 
placed on the accountancy profession. 
3.5 Auditor's duties 
As previously discussed in chapter one, the maIn objective of this 
research project is to investigate the audit expectation gap in Eritrea, 
with the main focus on the auditor's duties and responsibilities (see 
chapter one _ 1.2 Statement of Problem p.2, and chapter two 
Literature review). Therefore, it is important to identify the existing 
duties of an auditor in Eritrea and the other duties of an auditor, 
suggested by researchers and professional bodies, which will be 
included in this study. The selection was made based on the factors 
related to the problem of the audit expectation gap in Eritrea (see 
chapter one - 1.2 Statement of Problem), and on the factors which 
contributed to the expectation gap in other studies (see chapter two 
2.3 Summary of Previous Researches pAl). With respect to the 
existing duties of an auditor in Eritrea, the source and the studies in 
which the duties were included are presented in table 3.3 for purposes 
of comparison. With regard to the suggested duties of an auditor, the 
sources of the duties are presented below (see also table 304 p.83). 
These duties are discussed in detail in the next two chapters. 
3.5.1 Existing duties 
Eleven existing duties of an auditor in Eritrea were identified from the 
provisional commercial code of Eritrea (legal requirements) and IFAC 
standards. These are presented in table 3.3 (including the studies in 
which they are included). 
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3.5.1.1 Legal requirements 
The auditor's duties as stipulated in the Commercial Code of Eritrea5 
(1960) and other Eritrean auditing acts were used to identify the legal 
requirements of auditors in Eritrea. Table 3.3 shows (under the 
Eritrean code column) the primary duties of an auditor, according to 
the Commercial Code of Eritrea (English version), which are relevant 
for the purpose of this study. 
3.5.1.2 Generally Accepted Auditing Practice - IFAC standards 
Eritrea adopts International auditing standards issued by the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). Therefore, IFAC 
standards were used to identify the existing duties of an auditor in 
Eritrea. Certain of the existing duties were investigated in the Viitanen 
and Troberg study (1999), as Finland adopts IFAC standards, and also 
by Porter (1993) and Humphrey et al. (1993). Table 3.3 shows the 
existing duties of an auditor according to IFAC standards (under the 
IF AC standard column), which are related to the factors which 
contribute to the audit expectation gap that will be examined in this 
research project. 
5 The Commercial Code of Ethiopia (1960), which is adopted by Eritrea as the provisional code 
of Eritrea. 
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Table 3.3 Existing duties of an auditor in Eritrea (the source of the duty and/or the 









Existing duties of an auditor -legal requirements 
Report all material departures from Generally 
Accepted Accounting practice in preparing and 
presenting financial statements to give a true and 
fair view (Commercial Act 1984-1985). 
Audit the accounts of the company to verify the 
correctness and accuracy of the balance sheets 
and profit and loss accounts (Commercial Code: 
Art. 373). 
Submit to the annual general meeting a written 
report on the manner in which they have carried 
out their duties and their comments on the report to 
the board 
of directors (Commercial Code: Art. 375 a). 
Recommend approval of the accounts and make 
such comments thereon as they think fit or refuse 
to recommend approval giving reasons for referring 
the matter back to the directors (Commercial Code: 
Art. 375:b). 
Where the auditors find breaches of legal or 
statutory requirements, they shall inform the 
directors and, where grave irregularities or 
breaches have occurred, they shall inform the 
general meeting (Commercial Code: Art. 376). 
Existing duties oran auditor -!FAC standards 
2. Examine and report whether the company's 
continued existence is in doubt (ISA 570). 
18. Examine and report whether the nonfinancial 
information presented in the financial statements 
is correct (reliable) (ISA 1010). 
19. Acquaint himself/ herself with other information 
included In the annual report, such as 
management discussion and analysis, in order to 
determine whether material errors (inconsistencies) 
exist which need to be amended or reported on in 
the auditor's report (ISA 720). 
14. Examine whether the audited company has a 
satisfactory system of internal control (ISA 401). 
4. Examine and report whether the audited financial 
statements contain any material errors or 
distortions (ISA 240). 
20a. The auditor should examine and report on the 
conduct of the company with regard to 








et al. (1993) 
1 The number assigned to the duties is based on the order in which they are set out.in the 
questionnaire. 
2 -,j = the source of the duty and/or the studies in which it is also included. 
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3.5.2 Suggested duties 
In this section, different issues that always have been heavily debated 
in auditing are included. Most of the enquiries set by various 
researchers, including: Porter (1993), Humphrey et. al (1993), and 
Viitanen and Troberg (1999), were used. Table 3.4 shows the 
suggested auditors' duties which are examined In this study, 
including the source of the suggested duties. 






NO.1 DutiesJquestion~ __ ~ ______ .... _____ ~_ ..... __ _ 
Suggested duties oran auditor 














Report breaches of tax laws to the Inland 
Revenue Department. 
Report to an appropriate authority fraud 
committed in the audited company. 
Report to regulatory authority deliberate 
distortion of financial information. 
Report to an appropriate authority theft or 
misappropriation of corporate 
assets by company: 
a) Directors/ senior management 
b) Non-managerial employees 
Examine and report on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the company's 
management. 
Prepare the auditee company's financial 
statements. 
Verify every transaction of the audited 
company. 
Guarantee the audited financial statements 
are accurate. 
Report on the future prospects of the company. 
The auditors should examine and report on the 
conduct of the company with regard to societal 
matters. 
Take responsibility for planning the internal 
control system of the company. 
Detect illegal acts by the company officials 
which don't directly affect the company's 
accounts. 
1 The number assigned to the duties is based on the order in which they are set out in the 
questionnaire. 
2 ,,= the studies in which it is included. 
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The reason for using similar enquiries in this research is that most of 
the empirical investigations undertaken by researchers in developing 
countries and/ or countries which adopt ISA, such as South Africa, 
Finland and Singapore, used the questions developed by Porter 
(1993), Humphrey et. al (1993) and Viitanen and Troberg (1999). This 
helps, as previously stated, to guarantee the comparison of the results 
of the empirical investigation in Eritrea with the results of other 
developing and/ or countries which adopt ISA's standards. 
3.6 Summary 
Accounting and auditing are influenced by varied factors which 
generally could be said to emanate from political and economic 
conditions, environmental and social issues, and accounting theories. 
Eritrea, a new nation in the horn of Africa, is a low-income country, 
with a small open economy. The government is currently engaged in 
creating a modern, technologically advanced and internationally 
competitive economy in which the private enterprises are the driving 
economic force. The main environmental concern is related to the 
degradation of its land, forest and water resources. Moreover, social 
problems such as high unemployment and lack of educational 
facilities exist in Eritrea. 
Within any social/political environment, accounting has a unique role 
to play. This depends largely on the ability of an accountant to cope 
with changing circumstances. According to Perera (1980), in the 
absence of extensive financial reporting, such as countries like 
Eritrea, the ability to adapt to a changing environment depends 
largely on the education and training given to accountants. However, 
the existing accounting education and training in Eritrea is not 
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adequate. Moreover, financial reporting is highly influenced by the 
socialist economic system (see 3.4.4.1 financial reporting in Eritrea 
p.76), which is characterized by less disclosure. But now, due to a 
move to an open market economy, it is expected that the financial 
reporting system will improve over time. Most companies in Eritrea 
depend on banks and/ or the state to raise capital. At present there is 
no stock exchange. 
After the liberation of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1991, new private audit 
firms have been established and are providing services to the pUblic. 
Eritrea adopts International Accounting and Auditing Standards. The 
Commercial Code of Eritrea requires auditors to audit the books of the 
company to verify the correctness and accuracy of the balance sheets 
and profit and loss accounts. 
The auditing function is the ultimate manifestation of accounting and 
provides an extremely important service to society. That is, it is 
considered that management can not report on itself without being 
biased intentionally or unintentionally. Credibility of the financial 
information will therefore be enhanced and use of the financial 
information will be amenable when the information is attested by an 
independent party, one who is not only independent as a matter of 
fact, but also one who should appear to be independent (Draft of the 
accounting profession 1997) . Therefore, there is a need to study 
whether there is an expectation gap in Eritrea and, if so, to determine 
the factors contributing to the gap (see 1.2 Statement of Problem in 
chapter one) in order to minimize the difference between what the 
public and the auditor perceive to be the role of the auditing function. 
The minimization of the expectation gap between these two views 
increases the credibility and the confidence which the public will have 
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in the aUditing and accounting profession - an assured way to assist 
proper functioning of a market economy which depends heavily on 
financial reporting prepared or authenticated by the professional 
accountant. In the following three chapters the audit expectation gap 
in Eritrea will be examined. The next chapter will focus on the 
methodology of the research, which will be used to analyse the audit 
expectation gap in Eritrea. 
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Chapter four - Research project 
4.1 Research objective 
As already discussed in chapter one, the objective of this research 
project is to investigate the existence of the audit expectation gap in 
Eritrea, to analyze its constituent parts and identify the factors which 
contribute to the gap, to compare the findings to the research findings 
of various countries and finally to recommend possible solutions to 
narrow the gap in Eritrea (see research objective and methods - Figure 
4.1 p.94). 
4.2 Research methodology, data collection and analysis 
4.2.1 Survey questions 
The enquiry (questionnaire) set up by Porter (1993) and Humphrey et. 
al (1993) served as a model for similar enquires in other countries. 
The researchers who opted for a similar approach, among others, 
include: Garcia-Benua et. al (1993) in Spain, Gloeck and De Jager 
(1993) in South Africa, Beelde et al (1997) in Belgium, Best et. al 
(1996) in Singapore and Troberg and Viitanen (1999) in Finland. The 
Porter (1993) and Humphrey et al (1993) studies also served as the 
basis of a U.S. study by Gramling et. al (1996). Therefore, this 
research project follows similar procedures, although some of these 
had to be adapted to the Eritrean situation due to differences in 
business practices and company law, to assist in providing a reliable 
assessment of the audit expectation gap in Eritrea and to permit 
comparison with the results of other countries (see chapter three - 3 
Auditor's duties). Moreover, recent developments in International 
Auditing Standards were considered. 
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The questions were developed based on the IF AC (International 
Federation of Accountants) standards, existing legal requirements for 
auditors in Eritrea, and previous research by Porter (1993), Humphrey 
et. al (1993) and Viitanen and Troberg (1999). A total of 34 questions 
were developed. Of these, 25 relate to auditors' duties (see chapter 
three - 3.5), and 9 relate to the provision of non-audit services (audit 
independence), auditors-client relationship, audit quality, audit 
regulations, audit communication and decision usefulness of an audit 
report (see part two of the questionnaire - Appendix 6 p.191). As 
discussed in chapter three, the questions were selected based on the 
factors which are related to the problem of the audit expectation gap 
in Eritrea (see chapter one - 1.2 Statement of problem), and on the 
factors which contributed to the expectation gap in other studies (see 
chapter two - 2.6.7 Summary of previous researches). The survey of 
the audit expectation gap in Eritrea, as shown in the questionnaire 
(Appendix 6) has two parts. These are discussed below. 
Part I 
Part I of the questionnaire is related to the auditor's duties. It 
consists of 11 existing and 14 suggested auditors' duties (see tables 
3.3 and 3.5 in chapter three). This method is consistent with prior 
researches (see Porter (1993) and Vittanen and Troberg (1999) ). These 
duties are discussed in detail in the next chapter. Each question 
(duty) has three sections: 
Section 1- Is the duty an existing duty of auditors? For the purposes of 
this test the options 'yes' (+ 1), 'no' (-1) and 'unaware' (0) were 
provided. 
Section 2 - If the duty is an existing duty of auditors, how well is it 
performed? This tends to involve a range rather than a point 
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measurement, hence, the categorical rating was from 'poorly' (1) to 
excellently (5). 
Section 3- Should the duty be performed by auditors? For the purpose 
of this test the options 'yes' (+1), 'no' (-1) and 'not certain (0) were 
provided. 
Part II 
In part two of the questionnaire (see Appendix 6), 9 statements 
regarding the provision of non-audit services (audit independence), 
auditors-client relationship, audit quality, audit regulations, audit 
communication and decision usefulness of an audit report are 
presented. The questions were identified based on the new IFAC 
independence standard, the professional code of ethics in Eritrea, and 
the enquires set by other researchers for the reasons stated earlier 
(The questions are related to the problems identified in chapter one -
1 :2). Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or 
disagreement with each statement on a seven-point scale. 
In prepanng for an interview, a preliminary questionnaire was first 
pilot tested with 3 auditors (2 audit partners and 1 senior auditor), an 
auditor general, 2 finance and administration heads familiar with 
audit work, 1 tax auditor, 1 credit officer and 1 shareholder before a 
final version was developed. On the basis of the comment received, the 
questionnaire was revised. 
4.2.2 Interviews and sampling 
Eritrea has a small economy (refer to chapter three) and the size of the 
popUlation is small as compared with other countries in which the 
audit expectation gap was studied. As a result, the size of the sample 
is also small. Researchers acknowledge that interviewing is time 
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consummg and costly but produces rich data when the SIze of the 
sample is small and homogeneous (Breakwel, 1990). According to 
Breakwell (1990), generalizations based upon a small sample in such 
cases are likely to be well-founded. Therefore, an interview was the 
most appropriate instrument for this research project. Qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies were considered as the topic is more 
debatable from an analytical point of view. Structured interviews were 
used as these provide information which is easily quantified and 
ensures comparability of questions across respondents and among 
different countries. In addition, unstructured interviews were also 
used as these allowed the interviewer and interviewee the flexibility to 
probe for details and discuss issues. 
A convemence sampling method (non-probability sampling), which 
involves choosing the nearest individuals (the most readily available 
subject) to serve as respondents and continuing the process until the 
required sample has been obtained (see Fower 1984), was used to 
select the sample from the population . 
4.2.3 Respondents 
This research paper has been prepared for financially knowledgeable 
persons. Therefore, non-financially knowledgeable persons were 
excluded for the purpose of this study. The population was categorised 
in three groups due to the limited number of users of financial 
statements and the nature of companies in Eritrea, as discussed in 
chapter 3. These were: 
1. Auditors. This includes: 
-Audit Partners 
-Non-Partner Audit staff 
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Auditors are included in the survey because the aIm IS to find out 
whether there are differences between the views of the public group 
and the auditors themselves. 
2. Management (Auditee). This includes: 
-Directors 
-Managers 
-Financial and administration heads 
-Accountants (mainly chief accountants) 
-Internal auditors 
The financial statements can be regarded as a form of account given 
by management to shareholders or owners of the company with regard 
to its financial position and performance. The role of the auditor can 
be regarded as an additional guarantee regarding the reliability of the 
data provided. Consequently, it is important to know the auditees' 
perceptions regarding the role of an auditor. 
3. Users of financial statements. This includes: 
-Bank loan officers 
-Tax inspectors of the Inland Revenue Department 
-Shareholders 
As the financial statements are an important source of information to 
users, it is necessary to establish their perceptions regarding auditing. 
4. Others 
- Auditor general of Eritrea. 
The office of the auditor general of Eritrea is a regulatory body at 
present. Hence, it is important to interview the auditor general to 
obtain information about the regulation system in Eritrea and the 
existing auditor's duties in Eritrea. 
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Table 4.1: response rate 
In terest group I Total 
I respondents 
uditors I 40 A 
M 
U =:~~~~_31 
- Bankloan 15 
officers 
- Tax auditors 10 
- Shareholders 5 
+--~-
thers 
- Auditor general 1 
otal 102 
--------r!------1 Struc~ured Unst~ctured 
IntervIews. ' IntervIew . ..-J 







All the audit firms in Eritrea, except one, were included in the survey. 
Of these surveyed, the audit partners and the majority of the senior 
auditors in the audit firms were included. The second target group 
was the management (auditee), which includes the directors, 
managers, finance and administration heads, chief accountants and 
internal auditors. The survey focused on the large companies which 
are required to be audited annually by the Commercial Code of 
Eritrea. The third target group were: commercial bank of Eritrea, the 
Inland Revenue Department and shareholders. The majority of the 
credit officers and tax auditors in Asmara (the commercial capital city 
of Eritrea), were included in the survey. With respect to shareholders, 
as shown in table 4.1, the response rate was very low. One of the main 
reasons is that most of the financially knowledgeable shareholders 
reside in diaspora (outside Eritrea). Therefore, to get more information 
from less financially knowledgeable shareholders, only unstructured 
interviews were conducted, with the focus on specific core questions. 
The auditor general of Eritrea was also interviewed. 
As discussed earlier, the sample size was small because of the small 
size of the population in Eritrea. Overall, generalization of the 
questionnaire responses to the total population can be made as the 
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majority of the population were included in the survey with the 
exception of shareholders due to the low response rate as discussed 
above. 
4.2.4 Framework 
This research is concerned with the full extent of the audit expectation 
gap in order to analyse the problem in Eritrea. Thus far no 
comprehensive research has been conducted in Eritrea. Porter (1993) 
argued that considering the full extent of the audit expectations gap 
could only be done by comparing society's expectations of auditors 
against the perceived performance of auditors. Therefore, the objective 
of this research project is consistent with the Porter (1993) view of the 
audit expectation-performance gap and, in analyzing the gap into its 
constituent parts, the Porter framework was used. That is, the three 
constituent parts of the audit expectation-performance gap that were 
analyzed are, the "reasonableness gap" (unreasonable expectation) 
and "performance gap", which IS sub-divided into "deficient 
performance" and "deficient standards". Hence, part I of the 
questionnaire, which is related to auditor's duties, was analyzed using 
the Porter framework. The Porter framework is discussed in detail in 
chapter 2 (2.1 Definition and structure of audit expectations gap). 
There are many factors, which contribute to the audit expectation gap, 
as already mentioned in chapter two (Literature review). Although 
Porter's framework (1993) has provided new insights into the 
structure, composition and extent of the audit expectation-
performance gap, recent issues such as the provision of non-audit 
services to client companies were not considered. Moreover, factors 
which are related to specific problems in Eritrea (see chapter one) will 
be considered in this section. Therefore, in part II of the questionnaire, 
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a series of questions, designed to elicit opinions, similar to those used 
in opinion surveys in other environments, such as South Africa, the 
UK, Singapore, US, Belgium and Singapore (which are related to 
specific problems in Eritrea) will be used to enable analysis of the 
issues which fall outside the Porter framework. Figure 4.1 illustrates 
the research objective and the tools used to achieve each of them. 
Figure 4.1: Research objectives and methods 
Chapter four, five and six 
- Research Methods 
- Mainly structured interviews (quantitative 
analysis) 
- Unstructured Interview (qualitative analysis) 
-Statistical tools and their justifications, data 
analysis criteria and interpretations. 
- Porter Framework 
a) All duties identified by 25% or more of the 
public group (or mean response positive) as 
a duty an auditor should perform are 
worthy of further consideration to see if 
they are cost beneficial for auditors to 
perform and, if so, whether they are 
existing duties of auditors and, if so, 
whether the duties are performed to a 
satisfactory standard (in the opinion of the 
public group); 
b) All duties identified in (al that meet the 
cost-benefit criteria (cost beneficial for 
auditors or paid for by a third party such 
as government) qualify as duties 
reasonably expected of an auditor. Those 
that fail to meet the criteria contribute to 
the reasonableness gap; 
c) Duties that are not existing duties of 
auditors but are reasonably ex pected by 
the public group contribute to the 
deficient standards gap. 
d) All duties that are exisiting duties of 
audiors that 25% or more of the public 
group (mean response less than 2.9) signify 
that the duty performed poorly contribute 
to the deficient performance gap. 
- Other factors related to the specific problems in 
Eritrea, which can not fit into the Porter 
framework (1993), will be analysed using 
perception differences among the intrest 
Chapter four - Research Project 
: 
Research objectives 
a) To investigate the existence of the 
audit expectation gap in Eritrea 
b) To identify the factors which 
contribute to the audit expectation 
gap in Eritrea; and to analyse the 
components of the audit 
expectation-performance gap. 
c) To compare the results with other 
similar studies. 
dl. To recommend possible solutions to 





Present the definition and structure 
of the Audit Expectation Gap. 
-Identify the factors contributing to the 
Audit Expectation Gap. 
- Review previous research. 
Identify approaches (recommendations) 
to narrow the gap. 
Chapter three 
- Review of the Eritrean situation with 












The Audit Expectation Gap in Eritrea 
4.2.5 Data Analysis, criteria and interpretation 
The research instruments (methods) used to analyse the data for part I 
and Part II of the questionnaire together with their interpretation are 
presen ted below: 
4.2.5.1 Data analysis, criteria and interpretation (Part I) - Porter 
framework 
As discussed earlier, part one of the questionnaire is related to the 
auditor's duties (see Appendix 6 p.188). Each question (duty) consists 
of three sections (see 4.2.1 Survey questions p.87). With respect to 
sections one (is a duty) and three (should be a duty), the options 'yes' 
(+1), 'no' (-1) and 'unaware' (0) were provided. Where the mean of the 
responses is positive, the group signifies that the particular duty is or 
should be a duty of an auditor. The opposite applies where the mean 
of the response is negative. This is supported by an additional test, 
namely 25 % or more, used to identify duties which are considered by 
the interest group to be the duties of an auditor. That is, an 
expectation gap was considered to exist, if at least 25% of an interest 
group considered a duty that, according to existing regulation, is not a 
duty of the auditor, to be a duty or that it should be a duty of the 
auditor. This is discussed in the next page. 
With respect to section two, auditor's performance of a duty, 
respondents were asked to select the appropriate response from 
'poorly' (below 3), 'adequate' (3), 'excellently' (above 3), and 'can't 
judge' (0) in an ordinal scale of 1-5. If the mean is less than 3 it was 
considered as inadequate performance. Therefore, a mean of 2.9 was 
adopted as a point of differentiation. This is also supported by an 
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additional test that if 25% of an interest group rated the performance 
of an auditor as poor (below 3), this signifies that a particular duty is 
performed poorly. 
According to Porter (1993), the mean responses of the interest group 
provide a useful indicator of the assessment of the auditor's 
performance of duties. However, for purposes of deciding what action 
is required to remedy perceived deficient performance, an important 
measure is the proportion of respondents signifying that auditors 
perform their duties poorly. Porter in her 1993 study selected a cut-off 
of 20%; whereas Troberg and Viitanen (1999) selected a cut-off of 
25%. Troberg and Viitanen (1999:67) argued that if the cut-off point is 
low it could lead to some duties being unnecessarily classified as 
contributing to the expectation gap. They added that whilst 
acknowledging the arbitrary nature of defining what constitutes a 
"significant portion" of a group, 25% was regarded as constituting a 
qualified minority, as dissatisfaction on the behalf of a sufficiently 
large minority may cause the auditor harm. For the same reasons, 
this researcher regarded 25% as a significant portion. 
In analysing the data, statistical tools were used. These are: Binomial 
test, Kruskal Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks (KWA) and 
the Mann-Whitney test. These statistical tests are discussed below. 
A Binomial test was used to determine whether the majority of an 
interest group consider a particular duty to be a duty of an auditor 
while it is not currently an existing duty; and whether the majority of 
the interest group signify that the duty is performed poorly by an 
auditor. That is, in order for a question (duty) to be considered to 
contribute to the expectation gap, a statistically significant (p:s;.05) 










The Audit Expectation Gap in Eritrea 
majority of an interest group, based on the binomial test, has to regard 
the duty in question to be a duty of the auditor, or, that the duty 
under consideration should be a duty of the auditor when, in fact, it 
currently is not one according to the existing regulations. For the 
purpose of this test, affirmative answers (yes) were considered as + 1 
and negative (no) as -1. The category "unaware" is considered as 0 and 
is not included in the test. With respect to auditors' performance, if a 
duty is an existing duty of an auditor according to prevailing 
regulation, and respondents considered it to be a duty of an auditor, 
based on a binomial test, a statistically significant (p$.05) majority of 
the group had to rate the performance of the auditor as poor (that is 1 
or 2 on ordinal scale 1-5) in order to contribute to the audit 
expectation gap. 
In order to establish whether differences of opinion evident in the 
responses of the different interest groups were statistically significant, 
Kruskal Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks (KWA) test was 
used, with a significance level of .05. Where significant differences 
were found among the three groups, the Mann-Whitney test was run 
to determine the source of the differences. The Mann-Whitney test was 
chosen because it tests the differences in the means of two samples 
(These tests are discussed in detail hereafter). 
4.2.5.2 Data analysis and interpretation (Part II) 
With respect to part II of the questionnaire, interest groups were asked 
to indicate their agreement or disagreement, on a seven-point scale, 
with each of the nine statements regarding the provision of non-audit 
servIces (audit independence), auditor-client relationship, audit 
quality, audit regulations, and the audit report Uudging from the 
questions) (see Appendix 6 - part II of the questionnaire p.191). 
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To test for normality of the distribution, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
(using Lilliefors probabilities) and Shapiro-Wilks W test were used. 
These tests indicated that, in the majority of cases, the data were 
significantly non-normal. In addition, the data were ordinal as 
opposed to continuous. Therefore, a non-parametric test was used, 
namely the Kruskal Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks 
(KWA) with significance level of 5%, to determine the mean differences 
across respondents. According to Siegel and Castellan (1988:206), this 
test is regarded as particularly powerful for analyzing non-parametric 
data, which are ordinal as opposed to continuous. Where significant 
differences were found among the three groups, it may be claimed that 
an audit expectation gap exists with respect to the statement In 
question (the reason for including the opinion of an auditor is 
discussed in chapter SIX, 6.1). For those statements, which were 
significant using Kruskal Wallis analysis, the Mann-Whitney test was 
run to determine the source of the differences. The Mann-Whitney test 
was chosen because it tests the differences in the means of two 
samples. Therefore, the differences between auditors and 
management, and auditors and users were tested. Where significant 
differences were found between auditors and management and/or 
auditors and users, it may be claimed that an expectation gap exists. 
In the next two chapters the results will be presented. The next 
chapter deals with the results of part I of the questionnaire, which is 
related to auditor's duties and was analyzed using the Porter 
framework. That is, the above duties were classified into three 
categories, namely 'deficient performance', 'deficient standards' and 
'reasonableness gap'. This is discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
The results of part II of the questionnaire are presented in chapter six. 
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Chapter five - Results 
5.1 Expectations with regard to auditor's duties 
5.1.1 Structure of analysis (Part I) - Porter framework 
The research results with respect to auditor's duties are presented in 
terms of audit expectation-performance gap analysis using the Porter 
framework. That is, in analyzing the expectation gap, mainly the 
Porter (1993) classification was used. According to Troberg and 
Viitanen (1999), the classification used by Porter (1993) is not an 
exact science as there are arguments in favour of and against the 
classification of some duties into one category or the other. The 
reasons for classifying a particular duty into one of the three 
categories are presented and discussed under each category later in 
this chapter. As discussed in chapter three, 11 existing duties and 14 
suggested duties of an auditor were identified. The audit expectation-
performance gap was broken down into three categories. These are 
"deficient performance" "deficient standards" (reasonable 
expectations), and "reasonableness gap" (unreasonable expectations) .. 
5.1.2 Analysis of results 
As discussed in detail in chapter four, mainly two measures were used 
to identify the duties which contributed to the audit expectation-
performance gap. These were: the mean of the interest group 
response; and "25% or more criterion" (see chapter four, 4.2.5.1). In 
Appendix 1 the means of the interest group responses are presented. 
In Appendix 2 the proportion of the interest group responses 
signifying the auditor should perform the duty are presented. In 
Appendix 3 the mean of the interest groups' responses and the 
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proportion of the interest groups, signifying that the duty was 
performed poorly, are presented. 
In analyzing the results, statistical tools were used, namely the 
binomial test, the Kruskal Wallis one-way analysis of variance by 
ranks and the Mann-Whitney test (see 4.2.5 _ Chapter four for their 
interpretations) . 
From the analysis of Appendices 1, 2 and 3, 19 duties out of 25 
existing and suggested duties of an auditor were found to contribute 
to the audit expectation-performance gap (this is discussed below). 
These duties (19 duties) were classified into one of the three 
components of the audit expectations gap. 6 duties were classified as 
contributing to "deficient performance gap", 5 duties as contributing 
to "deficient standards gap", and 8 duties as contributing to 
"reasonableness gap". The reasons for the classification of each duty 
into one of the three categories are discussed under each category of 
the audit expectation gap. The duties (6 duties) which did not 
contribute to the gap were classified as "no expectation gap" and are 
discussed later in this chapter. 
Detailed analyses of the duties which contributed to the expectation 
gap and those which did not, are presented and discussed under each 
category of the audit expectation-performance gap below. 
5.1.3 Deficient performance gap 
"Deficient performance gap" as defined by Porter (1993) is the gap 
between the expected and perceived standards of performance of 
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auditors' existing duties, as expected and perceived by society (see 
chapter two 2.1 Definition and structure of the audit expectation-
performance gap). 11 duties were identified as existing duties of an 
auditor in Eritrea from the Commercial Code of Eritrea and IFAC 
standards (lAS) (refer to chapter three). Two measures were used to 
identify the duties which contribute to "deficient performance gap". 
These were: the mean of the interest group responses regarding the 
performance of an auditor's existing duties (if it is less than 2.9); and 
25% or more of an interest group signifying that the duty is poorly 
performed. Based on these measures, from the analysis of Appendix 3, 
out of 11 existing duties, six duties (duties 4, 2, 18, 10, 14, 16) were 
identified as contributing to "deficient performance gap". With the 
exception of duty 18, all duties identified by mean of the interest 
group responses (whose mean less than 2.9), and by 25% or more of 
an interest group signifying that the duty was poorly performed by an 
auditor, are the same. With respect to duty 18, even though the mean 
of the responses is greater than 2.9, 25% of the users signify that the 
duty is performed poorly. Hence this duty is also recognized as an 
element of the "deficient performance gap". The six duties which 
contribute to the "deficient performance gap" are presented in table 
5.1. Table 5.1 shows the assessment of auditor's performance. 
The results of the KWA and Mann-Whitney tests, as shown in table 
5.1, indicated that there is an opinion difference between auditors and 
the public group with respect to the auditor's performance. As 
expected, auditors rated their performance more highly than do the 
other groups, as their mean responses are higher than the other 
groups. Appendix 3 and table 5.1 show that the management group is 
more satisfied with the performance of an auditor's duties than the 
users group. The mean of their responses to the 11 existing duties of 
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an auditor is more than 2.9, except for duty 2. By way of contrast, the 
means of users' responses for duties 4, 2, 10, 14, 16 are less than 2.9. 
Therefore, it can be concluded overall that the most dissatisfied group 
were users. In table 5.2, the proportion of the users group (bank loan 
officers and tax auditors) signifying that the duty was performed 
poorly by an auditor are presented. 
The six duties which contribute to "deficient performance gap", as 
shown in table 5.1 , are discussed below in order of their contribution 
(duty with the highest contribution first): 
The auditor should examine and report whether the audited financial 
statements contain any material errors or distortions (duty 4). Table 5.1 
shows that auditors and management are satisfied (p=.000-.02), but 
43% of the users (credit officers 63% and tax auditors 17% - see table 
5.2 below) were dissatisfied. Table 5.1 also reveals that the mean 
response for users is less than 2.9. Therefore, an expectation gap 
exists with respect to users, especially with bank loan officers as 
indicated in table 5.2. The dissatisfaction among the bank loan 
officers can be due to the recent failure of some companies to pay 
their debt and which later proved to be insolvent (e.g. Falcon 
Company). This duty (duty 4) is the largest (:=::23%) contributor to the 
"deficient performance gap" as shown in table 5.3. This is an estimate 
of the relative contribution of each duty to the "deficient performance 
gap". This has been estimated by reference to the level of unfulfilled 
expectations attaching to the duty. That is, as shown in the right of 
table 5.1, it is reflected in the proportion of the public group which 
signified that an auditor performed the duty poorly and whose 
expectations with respect to the duty are, therefore, not being fulfilled. 
According to Porter (1993), even though the mean of responses 
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provides a useful indicator of their overall assessment, for purpose of 
deciding whether and what action is required to remedy perceived 
"deficient performance gap", a pertinent measure is the proportion of 
respondents signifying that, in their opinion, auditors perform their 
duty poorly. 
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Table 5.1 Duties contributing to deficient performance gap - Assessment of auditors' performance based on the mean of the 
interest group responses and the proportion of interest groups signifying auditor's duties are poorly performed. 
r~~ ~ -~ ,-~~ ~-~ 
Mean Frequency (%) 
f------~ I-------~ 
Section 2 Section 2 
(auditor's perfonnance) 1 Poorly (1-2) 
~-~ ~-~~- ~ ~-~ ~ ,------~ ~ ~ - ~ 
No The auditor should A2 M2 U2 A3 M3 u3 MU4 
~~--=--- ~-~ ~-~ ~-~~- ~-~ ~-~ -~~~-~~-
4. Examine and report whether the audited financial 
_ ist£l.tements contain any material errors or distortions. *4.50 *4.20** *2.80** 3.1 f------13 . 3 42.9 32.0 
~-~ ~-
~~~ ~steIJ.ce is in doubt. *4.70 *2.70** *2.80** 0.0 28.6 25.0 30.0 
18. Examine and report whether the non-financial information 
presented in the financial statements (annual accounts) is 
correct (reliable). *3.90 *4.10 *3.00** 8.0 12.5 25.0 




: 14. Examine whether the audited company has a satisfactory I svstem of internal control. *4.50 *3.80** *2.60** 3.3 5.9 27.3 19.0 
10. Submit to the annual general meeting a written report on 
the manner in which they have carried out their duties and 
l-'~eir comments on the report to the board of directors. *4.60 *4.70 *2.80** 0.0 0.0 36.4 16.7 
16. Recommend approval of the accounts and make such 
comments thereon as they think fit or refuse to recommend 
approval giving reasons for referring the matter back to the 
5.31 directors. *4.30 *4.40 *2.40** 0.0 30.0 14.3 
~~~--~~ ~ ~ ~~--~ 
pertonnance on 1-!:J ordmal scale (4.Y nas been adopted as pomt 01 d1l1erentIatlon between satlstactory 
unsatisfactory performance). 
2 = A = Auditors, M = Management, U= users (refer chapter 4 for number of responses) 
3 Proportion of the interest group signifying that the duty is performed poorly by an auditor. 
4 Proportions of the identified Public group (excluding auditors) signifying that auditors perform the duty poorly. Quantitative analysis is only 
made for structured interviews. The responses 'can't judge' was not considered in calculating the proportions. 
* Kruskal Wallis one way analysis of variance by ranks significant at p < .05 
** Mann-Whitney significantly differ from auditors at p < .05 
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Table 5.2: The Proportion of the users group - Bank loan officers and Tax Auditors signifying that the duty performed 
poorly by an auditor (section 2). 
,-~~~ 
~~~- ------
Duty The auditor should2 
-~ ~ ~ ~~-~~~ ~ ~ ~~~ ,~ ~~~-~~~ 
2 Examine and report going concern. 
4 Examine and reEort - material errors or distortions 
5 Report material departures from Generally Accepted Accounting Practice 
9 Audit the accounts to verify the correctness and accuracy of the balance 
sheets and profit and loss accounts. 
10 Report to the general meeting the manner in which they have carried out 
I their duties and their comments on the report to the board of directors. 
r-~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~-~ ~ -~::~~-~~ 
Examine the internal control system. 14 
16 Recommend approval of the accounts 
18 
----
Examine and report non-financial information 
19 Acquaint himself/herself with other information included in the annual 
r~ort. 
L~a_~ Examine and report on Environmental matters .~~~. ~~-~~ Inform the directors and the general meeting breach of legal or statutory 
requirement. 
1 Proportion of the interest group signifying that auditors perform the duty poorly. The results 
are presented only for existing duties of an auditor. 
2 The duties are abbreviated from their expression in the questionnaires. 
3 BLO - Bank loan officers, TA - Tax auditors (refer chapter four for number of respondents). 
(Shareholders were not included in quantitative analysis as the response rate was very law, 
and only unstructured interviews were used). 
Chapter five Results 105 
Section 2 
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Table 5.3 Deficient performance gap 
Duty No. . Response (%) 1 Contribution (%)2 
4 32.0 23.09 
2 30.0 21.64 
18 26.6 19.19 
14 19.0 13.71 
10 16.7 12.05 
16 14.3 10.32 
Total 138.6 100.00 
1 Proportion of the public groups whose expectations with respect to the duty are not 
being fulfilled (refer to table 5. 1). 
2 Relative contributions of duties to "deficient performance gap". 
- N.B. It is important to note that the sample size is small, and the ranking of the 
duties is based on the proportion of respondents signifying that the duty 
performed poorly by an auditor. 
The auditor should examine and report whether the company}s 
continued existence is in doubt (duty 2). As shown in table 5.1, only 
auditors were clearly satisfied (p=.OOO) as a group, at a .05 
significance level, whereas 28% of management and 25% of users 
(33% tax auditors see table 5.2) were dissatisfied. The two groups 
clearly exceed the 25% threshold criterion of dissatisfaction. Moreover, 
as shown in table 5.1, the mean of the public group responses is less 
than 2.9. Thus there exists a "deficient performance gap" with regard 
to management and users. Calculated in the same way as the above 
duty (duty 4), table 5.3 shows that this duty is the second largest 
contributor (:::::21.64%) to the "deficient performance gap". The reason 
for the high dissatisfaction among users is likely to be similar to that 
in the previous duty (duty 4). 
Examine and report whether the non-financial information presented in 
the financial statements (annual accounts) is correct (reliable) (duty 18). 
In asking this question neither specifications nor guidelines were 
provided to the respondents as to the nature and extent of non-
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financial information. With respect to auditor's performance, table 5.1 
shows that auditors and management were satisfied. Among users 
25% were dissatisfied, but the mean of the interest group responses is 
greater than 2.9. Therefore, on the basis of the 25% or more criterion, 
there is some expectation gap with respect to users and auditor's 
performance. 
The auditor should examine whether the audited company has a 
satisfactory system of internal control (duty 14). With respect to the 
auditor's performance, table 5.1 reveals that based on the mean 
responses, auditors and management were clearly satisfied as their 
mean is greater than 2.9. On the basis of the 25% threshold test, 
users (27%) were dissatisfied (their mean responses is also less than 
2.9). Among users, as it may be seen from table 5.2, the tax auditors 
were the most dissatisfied group (50%). Thus an expectation gap 
exists between the expectations of tax auditors and auditor's 
performance regarding this duty. This dissatisfaction can be related to 
the audit of small companies. Research undertaken on the problems 
of small companies in Eritrea indicates that small companies in 
Eritrea have very poor internal control systems, which are 
characterized by an absence of source documents and lack of proper 
accounting records. For some of the small companies their financial 
statements, only for tax purposes, are prepared by the authorized 
accountants and/or auditors (Zeweldi, 2001). Based on the interviews 
conducted, the majority of the tax auditors have a view that some 
auditors in Eritrea prepare audited financial statements without 
proper source documents and accept audit engagements for 
companies (small and medium) for an audit in an unreasonably short 
time. Therefore, the dissatisfaction of the tax auditors with regard to 
this duty can be related to that. However, according to Kibrom (2001), 
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the lack of satisfactory internal control in small companies in Eritrea 
presents difficulties to auditors and it is one of the major audit 
problems in small and medium enterprises in Eritrea. 
The auditors should submit to the annual general meeting a written 
report on the manner in which they have carried out their duties and 
their comments on the report to the board of directors (duty 10). With 
respect to auditor's performance, as shown in table 5.1, auditors and 
management (p=.OOO) were satisfied at a .05 significant leveL 
However, users (37%) were dissatisfied (33% of tax auditors and 40% 
of bank loan officers - see table 5.2). On the basis of the 25% 
threshold test, an expectation gap exists with respect to users and 
auditor's performance regarding this duty (their mean responses are 
also less than 2.9). On the other hand, an interview conducted with 
shareholders indicated that they were satisfied with regards to the 
performance of this duty by auditors. This may be partly because 
shareholders depend mainly on auditors for an explanation of the 
audit report at the annual general meeting, and are well aware of this 
duty as an existing duty of an auditor. 
The auditors should recommend approval of the accounts and make 
such comments thereon as they think fit or refuse to recommend 
approval, giving reasons for referring the matter back to the directors 
(duty 16). As shown in table 5.1, auditors and management (p=.OOO) 
were satisfied at a .05 significant leveL However, users (30%) were 
dissatisfied (their mean response is also less than 2.9). As shown in 
table 5.2, the most dissatisfied group among users was bank loan 
officers (42%). On the basis of the 25% threshold test and the mean of 
the interest group response, an expectation gap exists with respect to 
users and auditor's performance regarding this duty. 
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5.1.3.1 Summary 
As shown in table 5.3, the duties which contribute most to the 
"deficient performance gap" are duties 4, 2, 18 and 14. These are: «the 
auditor should examine and report whether the audited financial 
statements contain any material errors or distortions", «the auditor 
should examine and report whether the company's continued existence 
is in doubt", ((the auditor should examine and report whether the non-
financial information presented in the financial statements (annual 
accounts) is correct (reliable)", ((examine whether the audited company 
has a satisfactory system of internal control". Their total contribution 
to the "deficient performance gap" is ;:::78% (sum of duties 4, 2, 18, and 
14). 
Opinion differences also exist among the interest groups and, as 
expected, the auditors rated their performance higher than 
management and users' groups. Users were the most dissatisfied 
group with respect to the performance of the above duties. 
With regard to the first duty concerning the report of material error or 
distortion, there is some dissatisfaction with respect to users. This 
may reflect that many users (mainly owners, shareholders and bank 
loan officers) expect auditors to do better than what they are doing 
currently, in detecting material errors or distortions in the financial 
statements. The second duty concerns going concern reporting. It is 
the second largest contributor to the "deficient performance gap". The 
dissatisfaction of the interest groups with regard to this, indicate that 
auditors are not doing enough in giving early warning signals 
regarding failure of a company when substantial doubt about the 
company's continued existence exists. This can be due to the recent 
failure of some companies in Eritrea. The response to the third duty 
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concernmg the reVIew of non-financial information shows that the 
interest groups perhaps are of the opinion that some of the non-
financial information may not be consistent with the reported figures 
in the financial statements. Only a few companies in Eritrea report 
non-financial information in their annual report and accounts. 
With respect to the last duty, "to examine the internal control system 
of a company", the dissatisfaction of the users is related mainly to the 
audit of small and medium companies. This dissatisfaction reflects 
that many of the users expect an auditor to examine properly the 
internal control system of the company and, if the auditor has 
difficulty in relaying on the internal control of the company, he/she 
should perform more extensive substantive test. Moreover, the user 
group (especially the tax inspectors) is of the opinion that the auditors 
accept audit engagements for small and medium sized companies for 
an audit in an unreasonably short time. Therefore, the auditor should 
disregard the demand for an audit if there is not sufficient time to do 
the work. 
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5.1.4 Deficient standards gap 
The "Deficient standards gap" as defined by Porter (1993) is the gap 
between the duties which can reasonably be expected of auditors and 
auditors existing duties as defined by the law and professional 
promulgation. Out of 14 suggested duties (refer to chapter three 
3.5.2), five duties (duties 1, 6, 8a, 7, and 3) were identified as duties 
which could reasonably be expected of auditors. The reason for this is 
discussed below. But generally, for duties to be reasonably expected of 
an auditor, these must be cost-beneficial for auditors or paid for by a 
third party (for example the Government). In the absence of cost 
benefit analysis, if a duty is identified by the interest groups as a duty 
the auditor should perform, it will be considered as a duty reasonably 
expected of auditors. 
According to Porter (1993), if even one group of non-auditor interest 
groups expects auditors to perform a duty and they fail to do so, it 
leaves unfulfilled expectations which contribute to the audit 
expectations gap. Based on the mean responses as shown In 
Appendix 1 and table 5.4 and 25% or more criterion as shown In 
Appendix 2 and table 5.5, all the duties, which were identified as 
duties reasonably expected of auditors, contribute to the "deficient 
standards gap". That is, the mean response of at least one of the 
interest groups is positive for the five duties shown in table 5.4. 
Moreover, from table 5.5 it may be seen that all (5 duties) the duties 
were identified by 25% or more of at least one interest group as duties 
an auditor should perform. It is interesting to note that the duties 
identified as contributing to a "deficient standards gap" from the mean 
of the interest groups, and those identified by 25% or more, are 
generally the same. The five duties which contribute to a "deficient 
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earlier. This is also supported by the interest group responses 
signifying that the duty should be performed by an auditor in Eritrea. 
This is reflected in tables 5.4 and 5.5. 
Table 5.4: Duties contributing to deficient standards gap Duties 
interest groups consider auditors should perform 




a duty)1 I 
No. The auditor should A M U . 
O.7':l 1. Detect material fraud committed in the audited company. 0.56 0.76 
6. Report to an appropriate authority fraud 
I committed in the audited com}2any. 0.86 0.88 ! 0.63 
8a. Report to an appropriate authority theft or 
misappropriation of corporate assets by 
company directors. 0.79 1.00 029** . --
7. Report to regulatory authority deliberate i i 
0.86~ 
I 3. 
distortion of financial information. __ -+_ OA-=.3_-t--_0-,,-.. 20 
Report breaches of tax laws to the Inland 
Revenue Department. 0.07 0.53 
lMean of interest group responses signifying that the duty should be a duty of an 
auditor. 
2 A = Auditors, M = Management, U= users (for number of respondents refer chapter 
4). 
* Kruskal Wallis one way analysis of variance by ranks significant at p < .05 
** Mann-Whitney significantly differ from auditors at p < .05 
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standards gap" are discussed hereafter in order of their contribution 
(duty with the highest contribution first): 
The auditor should detect material fraud committed in the audited 
company (duty 1). Based on the proportion of the public group (non-
auditor groups) signifying that the auditor should perform the duty, as 
shown on the right of table 5.5, this duty is the largest contributor to 
the "deficient standards gap". The contribution of this duty to the 
"deficient standards gap", as shown in table 5.6, is ~22.5. This is an 
estimate of the relative contribution of each duty to the "deficient 
standards gap". It is derived from the proportion of the public group 
who signified that the duty in question should be performed by the 
auditor. This duty is not an existing duty of an auditor according to 
the International Standards on Auditing (see ISA 240). Moreover, there 
is no legal requirement in Eritrea which requires the auditor to detect 
fraud. The question is whether to classify this duty as a "deficient 
standards gap" or a "reasonableness gap". The major argument may 
relate to the cost-benefit issue as, by including fraud detection as the 
auditor's responsibility, the costs of the audit are likely to increase. As 
Viitanen and Troberg (1999:81) point out, the question related to that 
is: who is actually paying for the costs and who is/are the 
beneficiaries? The EU's Green Paper states that "as far as the needs 
and expectations of users are concerned, they can be considered 
reasonable if there are stakeholders who are willing to pay for the 
service." (EU Green Paper, 1996:9 - as cited by Viitanen and Troberg 
1999). Porter (1993) and Viitanen and Troberg (1999) include this 
duty in their study as a "reasonable expectation" based on the 
preceding arguments. The duty is classified in this research as a 
"reasonable expectation" on the basis of the argument presented 
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Table 5.5 : Duties contributing to deficient standards gap - Proportion 
of interest group signifying that an auditor should perform 





No. The auditor should A M U 
l. ! Detect material fraud committed in 
i the audited company. 78.1* 88.2* 87.5* 
6. Report to an appropriate authority 
fraud committed in the audited 81.3* 
compan~. 93.1* 93.8* 
8a. • Report to an appropriate authority 
theft or misappropriation of 
corporate assets by company 
• directors. 89.7* 100* 64.3 
7. Report to regulatory authority 
deliberate distortion of financial 
information. 71.4* 60.0 92.9* 
3. Report breaches of tax laws to the 
~i_ Inland Revenue Department. 53.3 76.5* i 38.5 
1 Proportion of interest group signifying that auditors should perform the duty. 
2 A= Auditors, M = Management, U= users (for number of respondents refer chapter 
4). 
3 Proportions of the identified public group (excluding auditors) signifying that an 
auditor should perform the duty 
* Binomial test significant at p< .05 


















The Audit Expectation Gap in Eritrea 
Table 5.6: Deficient standards gap 











15.36 ----------------- -------Total 390,6 100.00 
1 Proportion of the public groups whose expectations with respect to the duty are not 
being fulfilled (refer to table 5.6) 
2 Relative contributions of duties to "deficient standards gap" 
Table 5.5 shows that the duty "to detect fraud committed in the 
audited company" was identified by more than 25% of all the interest 
groups as a duty an auditor should perform (as shown in table 5.4 the 
mean responses are also positive for all groups). If section three 
(should be the duty) is analyzed, all interest groups (p=. 001-.002) 
think that fraud detection should be the duty of an auditor. Overall it 
can be concluded that, as can be seen from the analysis, the 
majorities of all interest groups in Eritrea think that fraud detection 
should be the duty of the auditor. Hence, an expectation gap exists 
with respect to this duty. 
The auditor should report to an appropriate authority fraud committed 
in the audited company (duty 6). This duty is not an existing duty of an 
auditor according to the International Auditing Standards. Moreover, 
there is no legal requirement in Eritrea which requires auditors to 
report to the regulatory authority fraud committed in the audited 
company. As shown in chapter three (table 3.3), this duty is included 
in the Porter (1993) and Viitanen and Troberg (1999) studies. In both 
studies it is classified as a reasonable expectation. According to Porter 
(1993:64) this duty can be extended fairly easily at little cost. She 
adds that an appropriate authority needs to be identified and legal 
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protection should be provided for the auditors against possible claims 
of breach of confidentiality. There are some arguments in favor of 
classifying this duty as a 'reasonableness gap'. Viitanen and Troberg 
(1999:85) point out that the contracting party is the client and not the 
governmental authority. Moreover, the questions which need to be 
answered are which authority is the appropriate one to report to and 
what legal protection can be provided to auditors? In this research, 
the duty is classified in the same way as Porter (1993) and Viitanen 
and Troberg (1999). 
Table 5.5 shows that the responsibility "to report to an appropriate 
authority fraud committed in the audited company" was identified by 
25% or more of the non-auditor groups as a duty the auditor should 
perform (the mean of responses is also positive for the pubic group 
see table 5.4). At a .05 significance level all interest groups identified 
this duty as a duty the auditor should perform (p=.OOO-.Ol). Moreover, 
based on the mean of the responses, the difference in opinion of the 
interest groups is statistically significant. with respect to this duty. 
The source of opinion difference is between the perception of the users 
and auditors as indicated by the Mann-Whitney test in table 5.4. Thus 
a major "deficient standard gap" exists with respect to this duty in 
Eritrea. As shown in table 5.6, based on the proportion of the public 
group (non-auditor groups) signifying that the auditor should perform 
the duty, this duty is the second largest contributor to the total 
"deficient standards gap" (::::22,4%). 
The auditor should report to an appropriate authority theft or 
misappropriation of corporate assets by company directors (duty Sa). 
Table 5.5 shows that this duty (duty 8a) was identified by more than 
25% of the non-auditor groups as a duty the auditor should perform 
(although the mean of responses is negative for the users' group - see 
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table 5.4). Based on the binomial test, at a .05 significance level, the 
result of the study shows that both auditors and management (p=.OOO 
for both groups) identified the duty as one the auditor should perform. 
The Mann-Whitney test, as shown in table 5.4, also indicates that 
there is a significant difference between the opinion of users and 
auditors with respect to this duty. Thus an expectation gap exists in 
respect of this duty and it contributes to "deficient standards gap". 
Porter (1993), and Troberg and Viitanen (1999) classified the duty "to 
report to an appropriate authority theft or misappropriation of 
corporate assets by company director" as being part of deficient 
standards on the argument that, if the company directors are 
dishonest, the risk for possible distortion of financial statements 
increases and, thus, this constitutes a reasonable demand. This 
researcher also classified the duty as reasonable expectation for the 
same reason. 
The auditor should report to the regulatory authority deliberate 
distortion of financial information (duty 7). According to Viitanen and 
Troberg (1999:83) "the major difference from the duty to report "fraud" 
to the authorities is the emphasis laid on the intent ("deliberate") of 
misrepresentation of financial information". Table 5.5 shows that this 
duty was identified by more than 25% of all the interest groups as a 
duty the auditor should perform (mean responses are also positive for 
all groups see table 5.4). Based on the binomial test, at a .05 
significance level, table 5.5 also shows that both auditors and users 
(p= .000 and .0 17 respectively) identified the duty as a duty the 
auditor should perform. Compared with the duty "to report fraud to 
authorities" the strong emphasis on intent with the wording 
"deliberate" seems to have some effect. As it may be seen from table 
5.4, based on the mean of the responses, the opinion of interest 
groups differ in both cases, but the difference was only statistically 
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significant, as indicated by KWT, with respect to their opinion on 
reporting fraud committed to regulatory authority. Generally, it can be 
concluded that the interest group signifies the duties (duties 6 and 7) 
as duties the auditor should perform and the affect of the strong 
emphasis on intent with the wording "deliberate" is not very 
significan t. 
The auditor should report breaches of tax laws to the Inland Revenue 
Department (duty 3). In Eritrea there is no statutory requirement for 
an auditor to do so. The tax computation for companies in Eritrea (see 
chapter three - 3.4.3) is not complex and it falls within the expertise of 
a financial accountant and an auditor. It can be said that its 
performance involves almost no additional audit cost. Table 5.5 also 
shows that this duty (duty 3) was identified by more than 25% of the 
non-auditor groups as a duty the auditor should perform. Therefore, 
this duty is reasonably expected by the public and is classified as 
contributing to the 'deficient standards gap'. The costs of performing 
this duty lie, according Porter (1993:63), in the negative attitudes 
towards auditors which would be likely to result and this may affect 
the other auditing tasks as it affect the client-auditor relations. Porter 
(1993) classified this duty as contributing to the "reasonableness gap", 
whereas Viitanen and Troberg (1999:89) classified the duty as partly 
contributing to the "deficient standards gap", and partly to the 
"reasonableness gap". 
As Shown in table 5.5, all responses of the interest groups exceed the 
25% threshold. Therefore, it can be concluded that an expectation gap 
exists with respect to duty 3. 
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5.1.4.1 Summary 
It can be concluded that the duties which contribute extensively to 
the "deficient standards gap" in Eritrea are detecting and reporting to 
regulatory authorities' fraud and fraud related issues (including 
breach of tax laws) (see table 5.6 - duties 1, 6, 8a, 7 and 3). 
As discussed in chapter one, Eritrea was a socialist country before its 
independence and auditors were perceived as government watchdogs 
during that time. The results of this research show that the perception 
of the public in Eritrea as to the role and responsibility of an auditor 
has not changed, despite the fact that, since liberation (1991), Eritrea 
has shifted from a command economy to a market economy. 
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S.l.S Reasonableness gap 
The "Reasonableness gap" as defined by Porter (1993) is a gap 
between what the public expects auditors to achieve and what they 
can reasonably be expected to accomplish. Out of 14 suggested 
auditor's duties (refer to chapter three 3.5.2 - table 3.4), 9 duties 
(duties Bb, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 20b, 21, 22) were identified as duties 
which are not reasonably expected of auditors. Generally, these duties 
are not cost-beneficial for auditors to perform (these duties are 
discussed under each duty). The same measures were used as in the 
previous section to identity duties contributing to the "reasonableness 
gap". These were: mean of interest group responses (if positive); and if 
25% or more of the interest group signify that the auditor should 
perform the duty. 
According to Porter (1993:62) "the mean of responses from an interest 
group reflects the overall opinion on the group as to whether a dury 
should or should not be performed by auditor. However, it does not 
provide a useful indicator of the group's expectations of auditors in 
the context of the audit expectation-performance gap". Therefore, the 
best indicator is the proportion of the interest group signifying that 
the auditor should perform the duty. That is, if a significant portion of 
an interest group expects auditors to perform the duty, according to 
Porter (1993), their failure to do so may result in widespread criticism 
which could be very damaging to the profession's reputation. As 
discussed earlier, a significant portion is considered as 25% or more 
for purposes of this research. Based on mean responses and the 25% 
or more criterions, B duties (duties Bb, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 20b, 21,) 
were identified as duties contributing to the "reasonableness gap" 
(unreasonable expectation). This are presented in tables 5.7 and 5.B. 
The duties identified as contributing to the "reasonableness gap" from 
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the mean of interest group responses (see table 5.7) and those 
identified by 25% or more of the interest group as duties the auditor 
should perform (see table 5.8) are the same. These duties are 
discussed below in order of their contribution (duty with the highest 
contribution first): 
The auditor should examine and report on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the company's management (duty 11). Porter (1993) 
regarded performance of this duty by the auditors as non cost-
effective and classified it as contributing to the "reasonableness gap" 
(unreasonable expectation). The same classification is used in the 
Viitanen and Troberg (1999) study. Viitanen and Troberg (1999:93) 
state that introducing a duty that raises the auditor to a position 
where he/she would be a supreme judge regarding how well a 
company is run may be extremely questionable and there is no 
foundation for such a duty in economic theory. This duty is also 
classified the same way in this study. King II (2002: 133) states that 
auditors have an important impact on the quality of the internal 
control system and may recommend improving the internal controls. 
This may include the financial and other general controls. However, 
this study does not include analysis of the duties of an auditor in 
relation to Corporate Governance (see chapter one - 1.3 research 
limitations) 
Table 5.8 shows that considerable support for the duty to be a duty of 
an auditor, is found among the auditors (63%),management (87%) and 
users (64%). Moreover, based on the interview conducted with 
shareholders, the majority of them consider the duty to be a duty of 
an auditor, even though there is no corresponding regulation in 
Eritrea. From table 5.7 it may be seen that, even though there is 
difference in opinion, based on the mean of the interest group 
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responses, as to whether the duty should or should not be performed 
by auditors, the KW A test indicates that none of this difference is 
statistically significant. Overall, it can be concluded that, an 
expectation gap exists with respect to duty 11 since the proportion in 
each interest group exceeds the 25% threshold. The mean of interest 
group responses as to the duty the auditor should perform is also 
positive. As shown in table 5.9, this duty (duty 11) is the largest 
(;;::17.8%) contributor to the total "reasonableness gap" based on the 
proportion of the public group signifying that the auditor should 
perform the duty. 
The auditor should prepare the auditee CompanyJs financial statements 
(duty 12). Porter (1993), and Viitanen and Troberg (1999) included this 
duty in their study as a test of awareness of the interest groups in 
relation to this issue. For the same reason it was included in this 
study. As it may be seen from table 5.8, surprisingly, the majority of 
the management (59%) and users (69%) identified this duty as duty 
the auditor should perform. But only 38% of the auditors identified 
the duty as the duty the auditor should perform. However, all the 
interest groups exceed the 25% threshold level. Table 5.7 also shows 
that the mean responses of the public group to this duty are positive. 
Moreover, the Mann-Whitney test indicates that there is opinion 
difference between auditors and users which IS statistically 
significant. Thus, an expectation gap exists with respect to this duty. 
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Table Duties contributing to the "reasonableness gap" - Duties interest groups consider auditors should 
perform ( indicated by Mean of Interest group responses) 
No. The auditor should 
11 
17 
] 3 I Verify every transaction of the audited t"nrnr\o 
Guarantee the audited financial statements are accurate. 
Examine and report on the conduct of the company with 
rel!ard to societal matters. 















lMean of interest group responses signifying the duty should be a duty of an auditor. 
2A Auditors, M Management, U= users (for number of respondents refer chapter 4). 
* Kruskal Wallis one way-analysis of variance by ranks significant at p < .05 
** Mann-Whitney significantly differ from auditors at p < .05 
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Table 5.8: Duties contributing to the "reasonableness gap" - Proportion of interest group signifying that auditor 







No. The auditor should A2 M2 U2 MU3 
---------
11 Examine and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
company's management. 62.5 86.7 64.3 75.9 
12 Prepare the auditee Company's financial statements. 37.5 58.8 68.8 63.6 
--------- ~~~~~~~ 
8b Report to an appropriate authority theft or misappropriation of 
corporate assets by non-managerial employees 56.5 78.6 30.8 55.6 
~~~- --------
17 Report on the future prospects of the company. 53.1 46.7 60.0 53.3 
13 Verify every transaction of the audited company. 28.1 58.8 46.7 53.1 
15 Guarantee the audited financial statements are accurate. 35.5 52.9 43.8 48.5 
2Gb Examine and report on the conduct of the company with regard to 
societal matters. 58.1 20.0 53.8 35.7 
21 Take responsibility for planning the internal control system of the 
company. 6.7 31.3 57.1 43.3 
Proportion of interest group signifying that auditors should perform the duty. 
2 A= Auditors, M Management, U= users (for number of respondents refer chapter 
3Proportions of the identified public group (excluding auditors) signifying that auditor should perform the duty 
* Binomial test significant at p< .05 
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1 Proportion of the public groups whose expectations with respect to the duty are not 
being fulfilled (refer to table 5.9) 
:2 Relative contributions of duties to the "reasonableness gap" 
Auditors in Eritrea are not allowed to perform accounting and aUditing 
services for the same client. That is, the existing regulation in Eritrea 
does not allow auditors to perform both services to one audit client. 
However in practice, some audit firms do provide those services to the 
same client (mainly for small companies), although they contend that 
both services are performed by different persons within the firm. 
However, this assumption may lead to the perception that the duty 
"auditors should prepare companies financial statements" is a duty of 
an auditor. Moreover, this indicates that there is lack of adequate 
regulation over auditors in Eritrea (see later in this chapter). This 
duty, referring to table 5.9, is the second largest (~15%) contributor to 
the total "reasonableness gap" based on the proportion of the public 
group signifying that the auditor should perform the duty. 
The auditor should report to an appropriate authority theft or 
misappropriation of corporate assets by non-managerial employees 
(duty 8b). Table 5.8 shows that considerable support for this duty to 
be performed by an auditor is found among auditors (57%) and 
management (79%). 31% of the users identified the duty as the duty 
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an auditor should perform, thus exceeding the 25% threshold (the 
mean of interest group responses is positive). From an analysis of 
table 5.7, the KWA test shows that there is a significant difference in 
opinion among the interest groups. Therefore, one can conclude that 
there is clear expectation gap with respect to auditors and 
management, and some expectation gap exists with respect to users. 
The auditor should report on the future prospects of the company (duty 
17). Viitanen and Troberg (1999) consider such an expectation as 
unreasonable. According to them, considering the duty as a duty of an 
auditor can be regarded as leading to speculation on behalf of the 
auditor to have him/her to report on the future prospects of the 
company. Therefore, it is the duty of the company directors to provide 
this information and not that of the auditor. The researcher supports 
the argument and classified the duty as a "reasonableness gap". 
Table 5.8 indicates that majority of the auditors (53%) and users 
(60%) identified this duty as duty the auditor should perform. But 
only 47% of the management identified the duty as the duty the 
auditor should perform. However, all the interest groups exceed the 
25% threshold level (the mean of interest group responses to this duty 
is also positive - see table 5.7), it can be concluded that an 
expectation gap exists. 
The auditor should verify every transaction of the audited company 
(duty 13). It is not cost-efficient or possible for an auditor to verify 
every transaction of the auditee company. Therefore, the duty is 
classified as contributing to the 'reasonableness gap' in this study. 
Porter (1993) and Viitanen and Troberg (1999) also classified the duty 
as contributing to the "reasonableness gap" for the same reason. The 
majority of the interest groups do not consider the duty to "verify every 
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transaction of the audited company" to be a duty of an auditor. As 
shown in table 5.8, among auditors only 28% consider this duty 
should be a duty of an auditor. But considerable support is found 
from management (59%) and users (47%). On the basis of the 25% 
threshold, all the interest groups exceed the cut off point (mean of the 
management and auditors groups responses is also positive see 
table 5.7). Therefore, an expectation gap exists. One of the most likely 
reasons for the existence of this expectation gap is the lack of 
knowledge of the actual work carried out by auditors in Eritrea. 
The auditor should guarantee the audited financial statements are 
accurate (duty 15). As discussed in chapter two, the auditor's opinion 
helps to establish the credibility of financial information but not to 
guarantee its accuracy (Viitanen and Troberg, 1999). Porter (1993) 
considered this duty to be beyond what auditors can reasonably be 
expected to accomplish. Consequently, it is classified as contributing 
to the "reasonableness gap". The duty is classified the same way in 
this study. As shown in table 5.8, the majority of the auditors and 
users did not consider the described duty as a duty the auditor should 
perform. However, 53% of the management identified the duty as a 
duty the auditor should perform. %). On the basis of the 25% 
threshold, all the interest groups exceed the cut off point. Moreover, 
the mean of the interest group responses, as shown in table 5.7, is 
also positive for this duty. Overall, it can be concluded that an 
expectation gap exists with respect to this duty (duty 15). This gap 
exists most likely due to the lack of understanding of the audit 
function and it can be argued that such an expectation is 
unreasonable. 
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The auditor should examine and report on the conduct of the company 
with regard to societal matters (2Gb). There has been a demand by the 
public for companies to be subject to an audit of their social 
behaviour. Further, it is argued that an auditor's responsibility will 
tend to increase with increasing public expectation (EU Green paper 
1996 - as cited in Viitanen and Troberg, 1999:87). However the 
question is whether the statutory auditor has the appropriate 
qualifications and expertise to carry out this work. Therefore, this 
duty is classified as contributing to the "reasonableness gap". 
In Eritrea, employee health, safety and education (training), and 
economic opportunities for women can be seen as important 
components of social reporting (see chapter three - 3.2.3). At present, 
there is no statutory requirement for an auditor in Eritrea to report on 
the conduct of the company with regard to societal matters, hence 
companies do not report on social issues. Table 5.7 shows that 
management does not consider this duty to be the duty of an auditor 
as their mean response is negative. However, table 5.8 shows that 
auditors and users (more than 25%) identified this duty as a duty an 
auditor should perform (their mean response is also positive for this 
group - see table 5.7). But the smaller absolute value of the mean 
responses of users indicates that they were less agreed in their 
opinion than were the auditors. Therefore, it contributes to 
'reasonableness gap'. 
Based on the mean of the responses, table 5.7 reveals that, the 
difference in opinion of the interest groups is statistically significant 
with respect to this duty. The source of opinion difference is between 
the perception of the auditors and management (auditee) groups as 
indicated by the Mann-Whitney test. 
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The auditor should take responsibility for planning the internal control 
system of the company (duty 21). Viitanen and Troberg (1999) state 
that in a free market economy, it is the directors of the company who 
decide upon what system of internal control is needed, not the 
auditors. Therefore, they classified the duty as contributing to the 
"reasonableness gap". The same classification is used in this study. 
Table 5.8 reveals that all interest groups, except users (57%), do not 
consider the duty "to take responsibility for planning the internal 
control system of a company" should be a duty of an auditor. There is 
a minority of 31 % among management who think that it should be a 
duty of the auditor. The auditors clearly (p=.OOO) do not identify the 
duty as a duty the auditor should perform, at a .05 significance level. 
Therefore, one can conclude that the 25% threshold is exceeded and 
thus an expectation gap exists with respect to management and users 
(mean of the users group responses is also positive - see table 5.7). 
Moreover, the result of the KWA test indicates that there is significant 
difference in opinion of the interest groups with regard to this duty as 
shown in table 5.7. The most likely reason for an expectation gap to 
exist in this regard is the perception of the public that an auditor has 
the expertise and qualification to plan a good system of internal 
control for companies. 
5.1.5.1 Summary 
The duties contributing most to the "reasonableness gap" are 
(referring to tables 5.8 and 5.9): "the auditor should examine and 
report on the efficiency and effectiveness of the company's 
management", «the auditor should prepare the auditee Company's 
financial statements") «the auditor should report to an appropriate 
authority theft or misappropriation of corporate assets by non-
managerial employees", «the auditor should report on the future 
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prospects of the company". Their total contribution to the 
"reasonableness gap" was ::::58% (the sum of duties 11, 12, 8b and 17 
- see table 5.9). 
The response to the duties concerning evaluation of how efficient and 
effective a company has been run, who prepare company's financial 
statements and reporting on the future prospects of a company indicate 
that users in Eritrea are not well aware of the duties and 
responsibilities of auditors and management. It may not be reasonable 
to expect auditors to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of a 
company as management are involved in the day to day activities of 
the company and possess more knowledge about the company than 
auditors. With respect to the duty to "prepare financial statements of a 
company", the independence of an auditor may be impaired if an 
auditor performs accounting services for an audit client (see chapter 
two). Several rules and standards have been issued to prohibit 
auditors from performing accounting services for the audit client (see 
also SEC, 2003 and IFAC, 2001). However some audit firms provide 
accounting and audit services for their audit clients in Eritrea. 
Therefore the regulatory authority in Eritrea should consider the 
impact of this on the auditor's independence (see chapter 6). To 
conclude, it is clearly the responsibility of management to prepare the 
financial statements of a company and to report on its future 
prospects. 
The gap regarding the reporting of the misappropriation by non-
managerial employees of assets to regulatory authorities, indicate that 
the public expect auditors to report illegal acts, including those 
committed by non-managerial employees, to regulatory authorities 
regardless of their effects on the financial statements. The duty "to 
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examine and report societal matters" also contributes to the 
"reasonableness gap", although its contribution is low (:.:::8%) as shown 
in table 5.9. However it should be noted that there is an expectation 
towards the auditing of social behavior. 
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5.1.6 No expectation gap 
According to Porter (1993), and Viitanen and Troberg (1999) duties are 
classified as "no expectation gap" if: a) there were no unfulfilled 
expectations regarding how well the auditors perform the existing 
duties of an auditor or, b) the duties were are not the duties of an 
auditor (suggested duties) and were not considered to be the duties of 
the auditor by the interest groups. From the analysis of Appendices 1, 
2, and 3, six duties (duties 5, 9, 19, 20a, 22, 23) were identified as 
duties which did not contribute to the audit expectation-performance 
gap. These duties are presented in tables 10, and 5.11. As table 5.11 
shows, the mean of the interest groups response for duties 5, 9, 19, 
and 23 (existing duties of an auditor) are greater than 2.9. Moreover, 
less than 25% of the interest groups signify that the duty is performed 
poorly by an auditor. With respect to duty 22 (suggested duty of an 
auditor), table 5.10 shows that less than 25% of the interest groups 
signify that the auditor should perform the duty (the mean of the 
interest groups response is also negative as shown in table 5.10). 
Moreover, with respect to duty 20a the response rate was very low and 
statistically unreliable and is recognized as not contributing to the 
expectation gap. The six duties are discussed in detail below: 
The auditor should examIne and report all material departures from 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice in preparing and presenting 
financial statements (duty 5). For the large part, as shown in table 
5.11, all interest groups considered that the duty is performed well, as 
less than 25% signify that the duty is poorly performed (mean 
responses is also greater than 2.9). Therefore, no expectation gap 
exists with respect to this duty (duty 5). 
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The auditor should audit the accounts of the company to verify the 
correctness and accuracy of the balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts (duty 9). This is the primary duty of an auditor according to 
the Commercial Code of Eritrea (Art. 373). Table 5.11 shows that 20% 
of the users have some dissatisfaction with the auditor's performance, 
but the threshold level of 25% was not exceeded. From table 5.11 it 
may also seen that, based on mean responses, all the interest groups 
are satisfied with the performance of an auditor with respect to this 
duty, as the mean of the responses to this duty is greater than 2.9. 
The auditor should acquaint himself/ herself with other information 
included in the annual report, such as management discussion and 
analysis} in order to determine whether material errors (inconsistencies) 
exist which need to be amended or reported on in the auditor}s report 
(duty 19). With regard to auditor's performance, as shown in table 
5.11, all interest groups were satisfied (p=.001-.035) as less than 25% 
of the interest groups signify that the duty is performed poorly by 
auditors. The mean of the interest group responses is also greater 
than 2.9. 
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Table 5.10: No Expectation gap - The Proportion of the interest group signifying that 
auditor should perform the duty (% responding yes) and mean of interest 




The auditor shoull d 
Detect illegal acts b 
company officials whi 















22 company's accounts. -0.48 I -1.00** I -0.29 23.8 0.0 I 24.7 
--------
1 Mean of interest group responses signifying that the duty should be performed by an auditor 
2 a Auditors, M = Management, U= users (refer chapter four for number of respondents). 
3 Proportion of interest group signifying that auditors should perform the duty 
* Binomial test significant at p<.OS 
** Mann-Whitney significantly differ from auditors at p < .05 
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Table 11: - No expectation gap Assessment of auditors' performance of the existing duties based on the mean of the 
interest group responses and the proportion of interest groups signifying auditor's duties are poorly 
performed. 
-~~ --------
Mean Frequencies (%) 
----
Section 2 Section 2 
(auditor's performance) 1 Poorly (1-2)2 
-~ 
The auditor should A3 M3 U3 No 
----- -r-----
5 Report all material departures from Generally Accepted 
A M U 
Accounting practice in preparing and presenting financial 
statements to give a true and fair view. *4.8 *4.1 ** *3.8 ** 0.0 0.0 20.0 
~ ~~ -~~ ~--- ~~ ~~~~~ ---- ----- ------
9 Audit the accounts of the company to verify the correctness and 
accuracy of the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. *4.9 *4.6 *3.6 ** 0.0 0.0 20.0 
--~~~-~~~ ---~~ 
19 Acquaint himself/herself with other information included in the 
annual report, such as management discussion and analysis, in 
order to determine whether material errors (inconsistencies) exist 
which need to be amended or reported on in thc auditor's report 
(ISA 720). 4.1 4.3 3.1 
~~ ~~----~~ ~ ~~~~ e~ ~ ~ -----~ ~ ~~- -----
20a The auditor should examine and report on the conduct of the 
I company with regard to environmental matters. 3.9 3.5 3.5 
23 Where the auditors find breaches of legal 
,-------~ ~ ~ -~~ ~ ~--~~ 
or statutory 
requirements, they shall inform the directors and, where grave 
irregularities or breaches have occurred, they shall inform the 
general meeting. *4.4 *4.0 *3.5 ** 
-------- ~~~~- -------
:::t---~~:~ I_l~:: i 
3.7 1 11.1 1_ oJ 
1 Mean of auditor's performance on 1-5 ordinal scale (2.9 has been adopted as point of differentiation between satisfactory and 
unsatisfactory performance). 
2 Proportion of the interest group signifying that the duty performed poorly by an auditor. 
3 = A Auditors, M = Management, U= users (refer chapter 4 for number of responses) 
* Kruskal Wallis one way analysis of variance by ranks significant at p < .05 
** Mann-Whitney significantly differ from auditors at p < .05 
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The auditor should examine and report on the conduct of the company 
with regard to environmental matters (duty 20a). Even though this duty 
was classified by Porter (1993), and Viitanen and Troberg (1999) as a 
suggested duty, it was classified in this study as an existing duty of an 
auditor due to the new International Auditing Standard on 
environmental matters (ISA 1010). In Eritrea there is no statutory 
requirement for auditors to audit environmental matters. Moreover, 
based on the review of the annual reports of the companies surveyed, 
almost all companies do not disclose environmental issues. 
With regard to the auditor's performance, as shown in table 5.11, 
there seems to be some dissatisfaction among management. However, 
the response rate was very low and statistically unreliable. And the 
other groups do not seem to be dissatisfied with regard to this duty. 
Therefore, the result is inconclusive and the duty is classified as not 
contributing to the expectation gap. 
The auditor should detect illegal acts by the company officials which do 
not directly affect the company's accounts (duty 22). According to 
Porter (1993:63), performing this duty is not cost effective. Moreover, 
she is of the opinion that the duty is rather remote from the auditor's 
traditional accounting expertise. Viitanen and Troberg (1999) concur 
with this view. The researcher also tends to agree with their view and 
classified the duty in the same way, as possibly contributing to the 
"reasonableness gap". Table 5.10 shows that, at a .05 significance 
level, all interest groups (p=.000-.006) did not identify the described 
duty as a duty the auditor should perform. That is, all interest groups 
did not exceed the 25% threshold level of considering the duty in 
question should be a duty of the auditor. Moreover, as shown in table 
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5.10 the mean of the interest group responses is negative. Thus, this 
duty did not contribute to the expectation gap. 
Where the auditors find breaches of legal or statutory requirements, 
they shall inform the directors and, where grave irregularities or 
breaches have occurred, they shall inform the general meeting (duty 
23). With regard to the auditor's performance, table 5.11 shows that, 
for the large part, the interest groups consider that this duty is well 
performed (p=.000-.019) at a .05 significance level. The mean of the 
interest group responses is more than 2.9 for all the groups. Thus, all 
groups are clearly satisfied with the performance of an auditor with 
respect to this duty (duty 23) and it does not contribute to the 
expectation gap. 
5.1.6.1 Summary 
Five of the existing duties of an auditor (duties 5,9, 19, 20a, and 23), 
and one suggested duty (duty 22) did not contribute to the expectation 
gap (see tables 5.11, 5.12, and 5.13). The interest groups seem to be 
satisfied with the performance of the four existing duties (duties 5, 9, 
19, 23). However with regards to the duty (duty 20a) to "examine and 
report the conduct of the company on environmental matters", the 
interest groups are not sufficiently aware of the duty, and the 
response rate with regard to the auditor's performance was low. 
Therefore, it was classified as not contributing to the expectation gap. 
With respect to the suggested duty (duty 22), "duty to detect illegal 
acts by the company officials which do not directly affect the company's 
accounts", all interest groups did not consider the described duty to be 
the duty of the auditor. The researcher also agrees with the view that 
it is not cost effective for this duty to be performed by an auditor. 
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5.1.7 Know/edge of auditors' existing and suggested duties 
The knowledge of the interest groups about auditors existing duties 
can be analyzed from section 1 (is a duty) as shown in Appendix 1 and 
2. From the analysis of eleven existing duties of an auditor (duties 2, 
4, 5, 9, 10, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20a, 23), auditors recognized all their 
existing duties (their mean responses for all existing duties were 
positive) (see Appendix 1). However, management and users failed to 
recognize one duty (duty 20a, relating to examining and reporting on 
environmental matters) as the mean of their responses is negative. 
With respect to suggested duties, auditors incorrectly identified 7 
duties as the duties of an auditor (duties 1, 6, 7, 8a, 8b, 11, 17). Five 
of these duties are related to fruad detection and reporting and the 
rest two are: reporting on the future prospects of the company, and 
exammmg and reporting the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
company's management. This shows that auditors do not know 
exactly what their duties are. The regulatory body, the auditor general, 
should take in to account the effect of the lack of knowledge of the 
auditors on the audit quality and should encourage auditors to 
implement the recomendations set out m chapter eight. The 
management incorrectly identified 9 duties as duties of an auditor 
(duties 1, 3, 6, 7, 8a, 8b, 11, 12, 17), and users also incorrectly 
identified 6 duties as duties of an auditor (duties 1, 6, 7, 12, 15, 17). 
The means of the interest group's responses for these duties were 
positive (see Appendix 1 and 2). In general, many of the duties, which 
are incorrectly identified as the duties of an auditors, are related to 
fraud detection and reporting. This shows that the perception of the 
public and the auditors as to the role and the responsibilties of an 
auditors has not changed, despite the fact that Eritrea has shifted 
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from a command economy to a market economy since its liberation, 
1991 (see statement of the problem, 2.1). 
According to Porter (1993) the average knowledge gap per duty, as 
shown in appendix 5, is measured by dividing the total 'knowledge 
gap' (the total of the proportion of respondents selecting either 
'unaware' or 'yes' for duties which are not duty of an auditor, and 'no' 
for those which are) to the total number of duties under study (25 
duties). As can be seen from Appendix 5, auditors seem to be more 
knowledgeable about their existing duties than the public group, 
although 40% of them are 'unaware' or identified an incorrect option. 
The management group appears to have similar knowledge about the 
auditor's duties. However, almost half of the users group (49%) appear 
to have limited knowledge about auditor's duties. Similar to Porter 
(1993) study, the "knowledge gap" has a serious implication for the 
'reasonableness gap' component of the audit expectation gap in 
Eritrea. 
5.1.8 Analysis of the overall audit expectation-performance 
gap (using Porter framework) 
Figure 1 shows an estimate of the relative contribution of each duty 
to its respective component of the audit expectation-performance gap 
(see also tables 5.3, 5.6 and 5.9). If this is added, a measure of the 
public's unfulfilled expectations attaching to the component is 
obtained. From this, the relative contribution of each component to 
the overall gap between the public's expectations of auditors and 
auditor's perceived performance may be calculated. Figure 5.1 shows 
the rough picture of the actual situation since all factors which 
contribute to the expectation gap were not included in this study, and 
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as already discussed in chapter one (1.3 research limitation), there 
exists an argument, both in favor of and against, classification of some 
duties in to one or other components of the audit expectation-
performance gap. 
As can be seen from figure 5.1, the "Deficient performance gap" 
contributes only z 14% to the overall gap between public expectation of 
auditors and auditors' perceived performance, which is the lowest of 
the three components. The "deficient standards gap" contribution 
(z41 %) to the total gap is higher than "deficient performance" (::::: 14%) 
but lower than the "reasonableness gap" (:::::45%). 
Figure 5.1 also shows that the "reasonableness gap" contributes :::::46 
to the total expectation-performance gap, which is the largest of all 
the three categories of the audit expectation gap. The main reason for 
the high "reasonableness gap" (unreasonable expectations) is lack of 
awareness of the nature and limitations of the audit function (see 
5.1.7 - knowledge of auditor's existing and suggested duties). 
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Figure 5.1: The Audit Expectation - Performance Gap in Eritrea 
Auditors' .. Audit expectation performance gap 
Perceived 
... publics' expectation 
of Auditors I 
Pe formance2 j. Reasonableness Gap Performance Gap 
Auditors Existing Duties Duties reaso ably expected of 
Auditors 




Duty Response Contribution Duty Response Contribution Duty Response Contribution 
No. 0/03 % 4 No. % 3 % 4 No. %3 %4 
4 32 23.09 1 87.9 22.50 11 75.9 17.77 
2 30 21.64 6 87.5 22.40 12 63.6 14.89 
18 26.6 19.19 8a 82.8 21.20 8b 55.6 13.01 
14 19 13.71 7 72.4 18.54 17 53.3 12.48 
10 16.7 12.05 3 60 15.36 13 51.3 12.01 
16 14.3 10.32 390.60 100 % 15 48.5 11.35 
138.6 100.00% 21 43.3 10.14 
20b 35.7 8.35 
427.2 100% 
ID ties expected of auditors bv 25% or more of the public (interest groups excluding auditors). 
2 DutIes perceIved by the pUblIC to be pertormed poorly by 
3 Proportion of the public groups whose expectations with respect to the duty are not being fulfilled (refer to tables 5.1, 5.7 and 5. 
4 Relative contributions of duties to component (see tables 5.5, 5.8, 5.11). 
5 Relative contributions of each component to the overall gap. 
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Chapter six - Results 
6.1 Analysis of results (Part II) 
As discussed in chapter four and shown in Appendix 6 , part II of the 
questionnaire incorporates 9 statements regarding the provision of 
non-audit services (audit independence), auditor-client relationships, 
audit quality, audit regulations, audit communication and decision 
usefulness of the audited financial statements. As discussed m 
chapter four, these factors are related to the specific problems m 
Eritrea. The aim was to establish whether there is an expectation gap 
with regard to these factors. The definition of the audit expectation -
gap provided in this research (see chapter two, 2.1) deals with the 
existing and suggeted duties of an auditor and does not include the 
opinion of the auditor group. However, the factors mentioned above 
are not related to the duties of an auditor and can not fit into Porter 
(1993) framework. Hence, a separte analysis was made regarding 
those factors. That is, to determine the extent of the audit expectation 
gap, perception difference between the public group and auditors was 
examined. 
The interest groups were asked to indicate their agreement or 
disagreement, on a seven-point scale, with each of the nine 
statements. The statistical tests used were the Kruskal-Wallis one-way 
variance analysis by ranks (KWA) to test for perception difference 
among auditors, management and users; and the Mann-Whitney test 
to test for perception difference between auditors and management, 
and auditors and users (this is discussed in detail in chapter four 
4.2.5.2). The nine statements are categorized and discussed under 
one of the following three headings for presentation purposes. These 
are: 










The Audit Expectation Gap in Eritrea 
6.1.1 Expectations with respect to provision of non-audit 
services 
The interest groups were asked to give their view on four statements 
with respect to provision of non-audit services in order to examine 
how the provision of non -audit services influences public perceptions 
of auditor independence. Table 6.1 shows the details of the results of 
the means of the interest group's responses with respect to the 
provision of non-audit services and the results are discussed 
hereafter: 




I Mean res -o-n-s-e-s---"~ 
I Auditor I Manage Users IC hi2! 
1 
Statements . ment I 
The auditor can provide tax related I 
I services to his client without impairing 
. audit independence. 2.34 2.88 2.44 1.08 
The auditor can provide bookkeeping 
services related to audit client's 
i accounting records or financial statement 
~ of the audit client without impairing 
r---_--t_a_u_d_i_t independence. 4.66 4.29 5.00 I 0.43 
3. The auditor can provide management-
consulting services to his client without I· 
r--_--+_im-=...;..a.:..:.i.c-r.ig~dit ind~ep,,-e=-=nc::.;d::.ce:ccn:::..;c:c...::e..:... ____ --r_4,.22 . 1:82 ** 
4. The auditor can provide management 
decision-making functions to an audit 
client without impairing audit 
3.63 110.45' 
inde endence. 5.09 4.24 I · 3.94 ** i 10.52 * 1 
Note: The mean figures are based on a seven points scale: 1 = strongly agree, 
4=neutral, and 7=strongly disagree (refer to chapter four for number of 
respondents) 
*: Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks significant at p <.05 
**: Mann-Whitney significantly different from auditors at p< .05 
The auditor can provide tax related services to his client without 
impairing audit independence. Table 6.1 shows that the majority of the 
interest groups agreed with this statement (mean response is less 
than 4). That is, the majority of the auditors (72%), management 
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(65%) and users (69%) agreed with this statement (see Appendix 6). 
Their difference is not statistically significant as indicated by KWA test 
in table 6.1. Therefore, it seems that the provision of tax related 
services is accepted by the interest groups as appropriate services that 
do not impair audit independence. 
The auditor can provide bookkeeping services related to audit client's 
accounting records or financial statements of the audit client without 
impairing audit independence. The majority of the interest groups 
disagreed with this statement (mean response is greater than 4), but 
their difference is not statistically significant as indicated in table 6.1 
by KWA test. However, it should be noted that there is a negative 
reaction towards provision of accounting related services to audit 
clients by all interest groups indicating that the provision of 
accounting services to audit clients may impair auditor independence. 
This response is not surprising given the IFAC prohibition of the 
provision of bookkeeping or other services related to the audit client's 
accounting records or financial statements (see chapter two). 
Moreover, the provision of this service to an audit client is prohibited 
under the Code of Professional Ethics of Eritrea (2.1.1.4). As 
previously discussed, some audit firms in Eritrea provide accounting 
related services to small and medium sized companies. This can either 
be due to the small companies lacking a capacity to hire full time 
accountants or due to their not possessing the necessary knowledge to 
prepare reliable financial statements. However, this highlights a 
perception of a major independence problem. 
The auditor can provide management-consulting services to his client 
without impairing audit independence. The provision of these services 
is permissible under the Eritrean and IFAC Code. Table 6.1 indicates 
that (based on KWA) the largest difference among the interest groups, 
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with regard to provision of non-audit services, exists with respect to 
"provision of management consulting services to audit clients". The 
difference among the interest group's responses is statistically 
significant (p=.00S4), at S% significance level. Based on the Mann 
Whitney test, the source of difference IS between auditors and 
management (p=.012), at .OS significance level. The majority of 
management (88%) agree that the provision of management consulting 
services to audit clients by the auditors did not impair independence, 
but SO% of auditors and 44% of users do not agree with this 
statement (see Appendix 6). Referring to table 6.1, auditors and users 
appear indecisive about this issue as their response was close to the 
mid-point of the scale. The results also show that the mean responses 
of management and users are significantly different, in that 
management regarded the provision of management consulting 
services as appropriate servIces, which do not impair audit 
independence. Therefore, auditors and users have some concern with 
regard to the provision of management consulting services and it is an 
issue contributing to the expectation gap. 
The auditor can provide management decision-making functions to an 
audit client without impairing audit independence. The IFAC revised 
independence standard (see IFAC, 2001) and the Code of Professional 
Ethics of Eritrea (2. 1. 1.S) prohibit auditors from performing 
management decision-making functions to audit clients. From table 
6.1 it may be seen that there is a significant difference in perception 
among the interest groups; hence an expectation gap exists with 
respect to this statement. As shown in Appendix 6, 6S% of the 
auditors disagreed with this statement, whereas, management and 
users are indecisive about this issue as the proportion of agreement 
and disagreement is almost equal. 
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6.1.1.1 Summary 
It may be noted that in two out of the four statements, with regard to 
the provision of non-audit services, there is a significant difference in 
perception among the interest groups (see table 6.1). Hence, an 
expectation gap exists with respect to the two statements. These are: 
"the auditor can provide management-consulting services to his client 
without impairing audit independence}} and «The auditor can provide 
management decision-making junctions to an audit client without 
impairing audit independence". With regard to the level of agreement, 
the user group seems to be indecisive regarding both non-audit 
services. A materially significant difference was found with respect to 
provision of management consulting services among auditors and 
management groups, and among users and management groups, in 
that the management group clearly expect auditors to perform 
management consulting services. Therefore, some interest groups 
have stronger concerns regarding auditor independence than other 
groups. 
The results of the study also show that there is a negative reaction 
towards "the provision of accounting related services to audit clients" by 
the majority of the interest groups. This may indicate that the 
provision of accounting related services to audit clients may impair 
audit independence. This result is not surprising given the prohibition 
on the provision of these services by both IFAC and the Eritrean Code. 
With respect to the provision of tax related services, auditors, 
management and users have rather positive views regarding the 
offering of these services. The provision of tax related services is 
permissible under IFAC revised independence standards. 
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6.1.2 Expectations with regard to the auditor-client relationship, 
audit quality and audit regulations 
Interest groups were asked to give their opinion with respect to three 
statements regarding the auditor-client relationship, audit quality and 
audit regulation in Eritrea. Table 6.2 provides details of the mean 
responses of the interest groups regarding these statements and the 
results are discussed below. 
The quality of audit work is adequately regulated by the auditing 
profession. Table 6.2 shows that (based on KWA) there were significant 
differences in perceptions among the interest groups with respect to 
this statement (p=.005), hence an expectation gap exists with regard 
to this statement. Even though there is a difference in the level of 
response among the interest groups, overall, the majority of the 
interest groups disagree with this statement (mean responses more 
than 3.5). That is, as shown in Appendix 6, 76% of the auditors, 67% 
of management and 55% of users disagreed with the statement that 
the quality of audit work is adequately regulated by the auditing 
profession in Eritrea. 
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Table 6.2: statements regarding the auditors, audit quality and audit 
regulations 
R- ---- i Auditor I Management 
)... I Statements 
Users Chi2 
I ~~. The quality of audit work is adequately I ! I 
regulated by the auditing profession. . .~ 5.92 \: .. _4.~.1_0 __ -t-_3~.5.6 ** I •• 1O.2( 
6. i In the last few years the quality of the I .;:-r 
r
·· I external audit has improved. ·~:r·T·84 I 5.00** .,; 4.13" II. 12.30 
9. To what extent would you agree with the 
statement that "auditors are heavily 
influenced by management of the company 
L 
i they are auditing because they are paid by I • 
I the company". I 6.75 4.00~**: 3.06** i 23.84 
Note: - The mean figures are based on a seven points scale: 1 =strongly agree, 
4=neutral, and 7=strongly disagree 
*: Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks significant at p <.05 
**: Mann-Whitney significantly different from auditors at p< .05 
The office of the auditor general is responsible for regulating the audit 
firms in Eritrea, but currently its task is limited to issuance of 
regulations to issue certificates of professional competence to private 
auditors and accountants, issuance of codes of professional ethics 
and standards to be followed in conducting an audit, as well as, in 
preparing financial statements (ISA standards to be adopted), and the 
distribution of pro forma financial statements to audit firms as 
guidance to prepare audited financial statements in accordance with 
the International Standards. According to the interviews conducted 
with members of the interest groups and the auditor general of 
Eritrea, the majority are of the opinion that no steps have been taken 
to date (since liberation - 1991) to follow up on whether or not the 
regulations issued by the regulatory body have been followed by the 
audit firms. Moreover, interviews with all the audit firms and the 
auditor general indicate that a review of the quality control systems of 
the audit firms has not been undertaken (since liberation - 1991). The 
main reason for this problem, according to the auditor general, IS a 
shortage of qualified staff in the office of the auditor general. The 
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researcher is of the OpinIOn that the auditor general needs to solve 
this problem as soon as possible to assure the public that audit firms 
provide clients with quality services in accordance with professional 
standards. 
In the last few years the quality of external audit has improved. As may 
be seen from table 6.2, there was a significant difference in 
perceptions among the interest groups with respect to this statement 
(p=.002). The majority of the auditors (88%) agreed with this 
statement, but only 41 % of management and 44% of users agreed 
with this statement (see Appendix 6). Table 6.2 also reveals that the 
mean responses for the public group are greater than four indicating 
that management and users consider that the quality of audits in 
Eritrea has not improved during the last few years. Some of the 
possible reasons, obtained through unstructured interviews with the 
interest groups and the auditor general of Eritrea, are discussed 
below: 
Fee 10w-balling6: All shareholders interviewed have expressed their 
concern about the cost driven appointment of auditors in Eritrea. 
According to the Code of Professional Ethics in Eritrea, fees should be 
charged based on the value of the services to the client, and should 
reflect the time necessarily spent on the work. Some companies in 
Eritrea at present appoint auditors based on the lowest fee. This has 
resulted in increased competition among audit firms. Therefore, the 
audit quality and independence may be compromised if auditors are 
appointed where 'low-balling' is applied. 
Shortage of staff: The number of auditors in Eritrea has been 
decreasing since the border war broke out between Eritrea and 
6 "Lowballing means 'quoting' fee which is significantly lower than other members would charge for 
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Ethiopia in 1998. All audit firms interviewed (5 audit firms) stated that 
their firms are suffering from a shortage of auditors as many of audit 
staff are now in national service serving, the defence force in Eritrea. 
Further, they expressed their concerns about the affect of the shortage 
of audit staff on audit quality. 
Non-compliance with regulations: refer to the statement "the quality of 
audit work is adequately regulated" for discussion (see above). 
Inadequate training: Attempts have been made in recent years to 
encourage all audit staff to take ACCA examinations, but these were 
not fruitfuL Audit staff receive training only while on the job and no 
additional training is given to them. As a result, most are not familiar 
with recent issues in aUditing and accounting. Many students are 
now studying accounting, majoring in different fields, such as 
aUditing, financial accounting, financial management and taxation in 
South Africa and it is expected that the quality of audits will improve 
over time. 
To what extent would you agree with the statement that «auditors are 
heavily influenced by management of the company they are aUditing 
because they are paid by the company". Table 6.2 shows that there 
are significant differences in opinion among the interest groups (based 
on KWA) with regard to this statement (p=.OOO). This statement relates 
to the audit independence issue. Auditors clearly disagreed (as 
indicated by their mean response) with the statement that auditors 
are influenced by the management of the company because they are 
paid by the company. Management were indifferent, as their response 
was in the mid-point of the scale. However, as shown in Appendix 6, 
62% of the users agreed with the statement that auditors are 
the same services in an attempt to obtain or retain work" (Jackson and Stent, 2001). 
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influenced by company management SInce they are paid by the 
company. Hence, this indicates an independence perception problem 
and is an issue contributing to the expectation gap. 
6.1.2.1 Summary 
The results of the study show that, with respect to the three 
statements, regarding the auditors' client relationship, audit quality 
and audit regulations, there were significant differences in perceptions 
among the answers given by the interest groups. These statements 
were: "the quality of audit work is adequately regulated by the auditing 
profession", ((in the last few years the quality of external audit has 
improved ", and "to what extent would you agree with the statement 
that ((auditors are heavily influenced by management of the company 
they are auditing because they are paid by the company". Hence, an 
expectation gap exists with respect to all three statements. 
The majority of the interest groups disagreed with the statement that 
the quality of audit work is adequately regulated by the auditing 
profession. The main reason was a shortage of qualified staff in the 
office of the auditor general. With respect to the quality of an audit, 
management and users were of the opinion that the quality of audit 
has been deteriorating over the last few years. The reasons for this, 
among others, were: shortage of audit staff, low-balling, non-
compliance with regulations and inadequate training. Finally, with 
regards to the statement that auditors are heavily influenced by 
management since they are paid by the company, users have the 
strongest concern regarding auditor independence in comparison with 
the other groups. 










The Audit Expectation Gap in Eritrea 
6.1.3 Statements regarding the decision usefulness and audit 
communication 
Interest groups were asked to glve their opinion with respect to two 
statements regarding the audit report, focusing on two dimensions -
the communication of the purpose of the audit, and the decision 
usefulness of the audited financial statements with regard to financial 
viablility. Table 6.3 provides details of the mean responses of the 
interest groups regarding these statements, which are discussed 
below: 
The audit report is useful in the process of assessing whether or not the 
company is financially viable. Table 6.3 shows that (based on KWA) 
there are significant differences among the interest groups with regard 
to this statement (p=.OOl). Moreover, there are significant differences 
between auditors and management, and between auditors and users 
as shown by the Mann-Whitney test in table 6.3. This indicates that 
there is an expectation gap with respect to this statement. Even 
though there is difference in the level of responses among the interest 
groups, the majority agreed with the statement that the audit report is 
useful in the process of assessing whether or not the company is 
financially viable. 
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Table 6.3: Statements regarding audit communication and decision 
usefulness of audited financial statements 
I Mean resEonses 
I 
Auditor Manage • Users 
Statements ment 
No. 
8. The purpose of audit is clearly 
communicated in the aw:iit report 1.42 1.88 2.20 ** 
7. The audit report is useful in the process 
of assessing whether or not the company 
is financially viable. 1.22 2.81 ** 1.94** 
Note: - The mean figures are based on a seven points scale: 1 = strongly agree, 
4=neutral, and 7=strongly disagree 
* Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks significant at p <.05 
**Mann-Whitney significantly different from auditors at p< . 05 
I 
The purpose of audit is clearly communicated in the audit report. As 
indicated in table 6.3, there are significant differences of opinion 
among the interest groups with regard to this statement (p=.035). 
Although there was a difference in the level of their responses, the 
majority of the interest groups agreed with this statement. The result 
of the Mann-Whitney test shows that the source of difference is 
between auditors and users (p=.024), which is significant at .05 
significance level. Hence, an expectation gap exists with respect to this 
statement. This reflects that there IS some problem with 
understanding of the audit report in Eritrea. English is the business 
language in Eritrea and all financial statements are prepared in 
English. The problem probably lies with users, mainly shareholders, 
who are financial, as well as English language, illiterates. They depend 
on explanation during the auditor's presentation of the audited 
financial statements at the annual general meeting. Three out of the 
eight audit partners and audit managers interviewed suggested that 
the translation of the audit report to "Tigrinya", the national language 
of Eritrea, would assist towards better understanding of the audit 
report by the majority of shareholders. To meet the demands of the 
public, one audit firm has already translated the audit report from 
English to Tigrinya (see Appendix 10 - audit report in Tigrinya). 
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6.1.3.1 Summary 
The results of this study show that, in regard to both statements 
regarding decision usefulness and audit communication, there were 
significant differences in perceptions among the answers given by the 
interest groups. These statements were: "the audit report is useful in 
the process of assessing whether or not the company is financially 
viable" and «the purpose of audit is clearly communicated in the audit 
report". The majority of interest groups agreed that the audit report is 
useful in assessing whether a company is financially viable. However, 
the research shows that financial and/ or English language illiterate 
users have some problems in understanding the audit report. Some 
interest groups have suggested that the translation of the audit report 
from English (business language in Eritrea) to "Tigrinya", the national 
language of Eritrea, would assist better understanding of the audit 
report by shareholders. 
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Chapter seven - Comparison of results to other studies 
7.1 Comparison of results to Porter (1993), Viitanen and 
Troberg (1999), and Gloeck and De Jager (1993) 
The comparison of this study with those of Porter (1993) and Viitanen 
and Troberg (1999) with respect to the three component parts of the 
audit expectation-performance gap is presented in table 7.1. The 
results may not be directly comparable since (a) the groups surveyed 
are different (b) due to differences in sample size, and (c) this research 
is based on interviews rather than the use of mail survey. However, as 
this study relied heavily on those studies in defining the research, an 
attempt has been made to compare the results. As can be seen from 
table 7.1, there is difference in the relative contribution of each 
component to the overall gap between the three studies. 
Table 7.1: The relative contribution of each component to the audit expectation 
performance gap in different studies. 
Authors, year and , Deficient , Deficient Reasona bleness 
country performance gap 
l 
Standards gap gap (%) 
I Porter (1993)-
(%) (%) 
16% 50% 34% 
: Newzealand 
I Viitanen and Troberg 30% 31% i 40% 
~ .. (1999) - Finland I 
I This s~ud~ritrea 14% 41% 45% 
N.B. Gloeck and De Jager (1993) study is not included in table 7.1 as the method of analysis 
used was different from the studies shown in the above table. Therefore, the comparison 
is presented later in the chapter. 
With respect to the performance of an auditor, as can be seen from 
table 7.1, the public in Eritrea rated the performance of an auditor 
higher than the other two studies since the "deficient performance 
gap" is the lowest (14%) as compared to the Porter study (16%) and 
the Viitanen and Troberg study (30%). However, with regards to the 
"deficient standards gap", the results fall between the two studies. 
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Table 7.1 also shows that, in this study the "reasonableness gap" 
(unreasonable expectation gap) was the largest contributor to the 
expectation gap (45%). It is also the largest when compared to the 
Porter study (34%) and the Viitanen and Troberg study (40%). This 
indicates the lack of awareness of the audit function among interest 
groups in Eritrea. It may also indicate that the public group in Eritrea 
expect auditors to assume more responsibility than they currently 
accept. However, given the fact that these expectations are 
unreasonable, it indicates the existence of the highest "knowledge 
gap" from the three studies. As shown in Appendix 5, In Eritrea, 40% 
of auditors, 41 % of the management and 49% if the users appeared to 
have limited knowledge of the auditor's duties, as opposed to 22%, 
31 % and 30% respectively in New Zealand (Porter, 1993). This finding 
indicates that interest groups in countries with a developed economy 
and/or established capital markets (such as Finland and New 
Zealand) are more aware of the auditor's responsibility than countries 
with a developing economy and without capital markets (such as 
Eritrea). 
There are many reasons for the differences in the three studies. Part of 
the differences can be explained by differences in the legal 
requirements regarding auditors in these countries, differences in 
opinion between interest groups' responses, and the elapse of time 
(this may include, among other factors: changes in socio-political 
economy during the last 5-10 years, globalisation and the collapse of 
giant companies such as Enron). In addition, the number of duties 
included in this study (25) was less than in the other two studies, in 
that the Porter study included 30 duties and, in the Viitanen and 
Troberg study, 33 duties were included. This may affect slightly 
(increase) the proportional contributions of the duties to the overall 
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gap. 5 duties in Porter study, 8 duties in the Viitanen and Troberg 
study, and 6 duties in this study did not contribute to the gap. 
Moreover, some duties were classified in this research, differently to 
the other two studies, due to recent developments in auditing 
standards and differences in legal requirements regarding auditors. 
These aspects are discussed below. 
With regard to the duties the auditor should "report a breach of tax 
laws to Inland Revenue Department" and ((examine and report on the 
conduct of a company with regard to societal matters", Porter (1993) 
included the duties as contributing to the "reasonableness gap" 
because of the argument that the social and economic cost may well 
outweigh the benefits. But in the Viitanen and Troberg (1999) study, 
these duties were classified as contributing partly to the 
"reasonableness gap" and partly to the "deficient standards gap" 
because of the arguments, both in favor and against, classifying the 
duties in either of the two categories. In this study, 'to report a breach 
of tax laws to Inland revenue Department' was classified as 
contributing to the "deficient standard gap" and 'to examine and 
report on the conduct of a company with regard to societal matters' 
was classified as contributing to the "reasonableness gap". In the 
Porter (1993) study, the duty to examine and report on societal 
matters did not contribute to the gap. But, in this study and the 
Viitanen and Troberg (1999) study this duty was found to have 
contributed to the gap. The duty to ((report on the conduct of the 
company with regard to environmental matters" was classified in the 
Porter study under the "reasonableness gap" whilst in the Viitanen 
and Troberg study it was equally split between the "reasonableness 
gap" and the "deficient standards gap". In this study it was categorized 
as an existing duty of an auditor because of the new IF AC standard 
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"consideration of environmental matters in audit of financial 
statements (lAS 1010). This duty only contributed to the gap in the 
Viitanen and Troberg study. The duty to "detect and report theft or 
misappropriation of corporate assets by non-managerial employee" was 
categorized under the "reasonableness gap" (unreasonable 
expectation) in this study and in the Viitanen and Troberg study since 
there is no legal requirement for auditors in Eritrea and in Finland to 
carry out such a duty. However Porter classified the duty as an 
existing duty because of legal requirements affecting auditors in New 
Zealand. 
Table 7.2 shows the duties which contributed most to the components 
of the audit expectation-performance gap (including their percentage 
of contribution). With regard to the "deficient performance gap", there 
was considerable dissatisfaction in the three studies with respect to 
going concern issues, and reporting errors or material distortions of 
the financial statements in the audit report. Regarding the "deficient 
standards gap", in all the studies fraud detection and reporting to 
regulatory authorities contributed extensively to the gap. With respect 
to the "reasonableness gap", the duties which contributed most and 
which are common to the three studies, as shown in table 7.2, were: 
reporting and detecting theft/ misappropriation of corporate assets by 
non-managerial employees, and examining and reporting on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the company's management. 
The comparIson of this study with those of Viitanen and Troberg 
(1999) also shows that many of the interest groups indicated an 
independence problem with respect to consulting services in both 
studies. However, the provision of tax related services, especially in 
small and medium sized firms, was found to be common and expected 
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by the interest groups in both studies. The results of the two studies 
support the IFAC allowance of tax related services. 
Finally, a comparison of the results of this study with those of the 
Gloeck and De jager (1993) study in South Africa shows that fraud 
detection responsibility, the going concern problem, and reporting to 
regulatory authority in certain circumstances are major contributors 
to the audit expectation gap in these studies. Moreover, the auditor's 
independence was an issue which contributed to the gap in the two 
studies, in that the interest groups see an independence problem with 
respect to the provlslOn of non-audit servIces, influence by 
management and the means by which auditor's fees are determined. 
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Deficient performance gap 
Express doubt in the audit report about the 
company's continued existence (21%). 
Disclose in the audit report deliberate distortion of 
Deficient standards gap 
fmancial information (16%). control (14%). 
Reasonableness gap 
Disclose in the audit report misappropriation of 1 Repori-toUregulatory authority misappropriation of 1 G 
company assets by company directors/senior I company assets by company directors/senior 
management (14%). management (14%) 
should detect and report illegal acts by I _. 
company employees which do directly affect the 
~--~~----~~--------~~~----~~ Ine auditor should detect and report material 
fraud committed in the audited company (34%). 
when necessary correct the 
fmandal statements 
The auditor should examine and report 
the company is managed 
effectively and efficiently (14%). 
The auditor should examine and report whether I The auditor should report to an appropriate I The auditor should report on the future 
the company's continued existence is in doubt I authority fraud committed in the audited company I prospects of company (14%). 
(10%). 
Examine and report whether the audited fmandal 
statements contain any material errors or 
distortions 
Examine and report whether the non-financial 
information presented in the fmandal statements 
lannual accounts) is correct (reliable) (22%). . . ~ - -. . 
satisfactory system of internal control (14%). 
(16%). 
Detect material fraud committed in the audited Examine and report on the efficiency and 
company (21%). effectiveness of the company's management 
(16%), 
Company's financial 
N.B. The shaded areas show the similarity among the three studies. 
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Chapter eight - Summaries of results, conclusions and 
Recommendations 
The main aims of this study were to investigate the existence of the 
audit expectation gap in Eritrea with respect to external auditors, to 
compare the findings to the research findings of related studies m 
various countries and, finally, to recommend possible solutions to 
narrow the gap in Eritrea. 
8.1. Summaries of the results 
First the expectations regarding the auditor's duties, which were 
analyzed using the Porter (1993) framework, are presented (part I). 
This section analyses the duties which contributed most to the audit 
expectation-performance gap and its three constituent parts 
("deficient performance gap", "deficient standards gap" and 
"reasonableness gap"). Then, an overview of the perceptions of the 
interest groups (part II), concerning are specific issues related to 
Eritrea (see chapter one - 1.2 statement of problem) with respect to 
audit independence, audit regulation, audit quality, and the audit 
report, are presented and discussed. 
8.1.1 Auditors' duties (Porter framework) 
With respect to auditors' duties, 25 existing and suggested auditor's 
duties were analyzed using the Porter framework. Out of the 25 
duties, 19 duties were found to contribute to the audit expectation-
performance gap, whereas 6 duties did not contribute to the gap (see 
figure 5.1). Out of the six duties, which did not contribute to the gap, 
one duty (duty 22), namely "to detect illegal acts by company officials 
which do not directly affect the company's accounts" was a suggested 
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duty of an auditor and was found not to be a duty expected by the 
interest groups. The remaining five duties (duties 5, 9, 19, 20a, 23) 
were existing duties of an auditor which were found to be well 
performed by auditors (see table 5.11). Out of the 19 duties which 
contributed to the gap, six were found to contribute to the "deficient 
performance gap", five to the "deficient standards gap" and eight to 
"reasonableness gap" (unreasonable expectations)(see figure 5.1). The 
relative contribution of each component to the overall audit 
expectations-performance gap between the public's expectations of 
auditors and auditors perceived performance is shown in figure 5.1. 
Almost half (45%) of the gap results from the "reasonableness gap" 
(unreasonable expectations), 41% from the "deficient standards gap" 
and 14% from "deficient performance gap". 
The duties which contribute most to the three constituent parts are 
presented and discussed below. 
8.1.1.1 Deficient performance gap 
The Duties contributing most to the "deficient performance gap" 
concerned the auditor's responsibility to examine and report whether: 
- the audited financial statements contain any material errors or 
distortions; 
- the company's continued existence is in doubt; 
- the non-financial information presented in the financial 
statements (annual accounts) is correct (reliable); and 
- to examine whether the audited company has a satisfactory 
system of internal control. 
With regard to the first duty, concerning the reporting of material 
error or distortion, there is some dissatisfaction on the part of users. 
This may reflect that many users expect auditors to do better than 
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what they are currently doing to inform the public about unfavorable 
conditions which may occur in the auditee company. The second duty 
concerns going concern reporting. The dissatisfaction of the interest 
groups with regard to this indicates that auditors are not doing 
enough in giving early warning signals regarding failure of a company 
when substantial doubt about the company's continued existence 
exists. This can be due to the recent failure of some companies in 
Eritrea (see chapter three - 3.4.4.1 Financial reporting in Eritrea 
p.76). The answer to the third duty concerning the review of non-
financial information shows that the interest groups may be of the 
opinion that some of the non-financial information may not be 
consistent with the reported figures in the financial statements. The 
dissatisfaction of the users with respect to the examining of the 
internal control system of a company reflects that many users expect 
the auditor to examine the internal control system of the company 
properly, especially for small and medium sized companies with poor 
internal control systems. The users group (especially tax auditors) is 
of the opinion that auditors accept audit engagements for small and 
medium companies for audits in an unreasonably short time. 
As expected, auditors rated their performance more highly than did 
the other groups. The management group is more satisfied with the 
performance of an auditor's duties than the users group. Therefore, 
overall, it can be concluded that the most dissatisfied group was the 
users. This can be partly due to the dissatisfaction of tax auditors 
with respect to the audit of small and medium sized companies with 
poor internal control systems (especially those which do not keep 
receipts and have no proper accounting recording system), and due 
to recent failures of some companies in Eritrea (e.g. Falcon Co.). 
Moreover, as the analysis of the "knowledge gap" indicated, there 
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seems to also exist a lack of knowledge among users and management 
about the nature and limitations of the audit function. 
8.1.1.2 Deficient standards gap 
The duties which contributed extensively to the "deficient standards 
gap" in Eritrea were detecting and reporting fraud and fraud related 
issues to regulatory authorities. As discussed in chapter one, Eritrea 
was a socialist country before its independence and auditors were 
perceived as government watchdogs during that time. The results of 
this research show that the perception of the public in Eritrea as to 
the role and responsibility of an auditor has not changed, despite the 
fact that Eritrea has shifted from a command economy to a market 
economy since independence (1991). 
Corporate Governance (King II, 2002) has shifted focus from solely 
profit driven reporting to integrated sustainability reporting, and to 
the achievement of balanced and integrated economic, social and 
environmental performance. In Eritrea there IS no statutory 
requirement for auditors to audit social and environmental issues. 
Moreover, most companies do not disclose environmental and social 
issues. The majority of the interest groups do not consider these 
duties to be duties of an auditor, but substantial minorities do so. 
Due to the growing trend internationally towards environmental 
auditing, IFAC has issued a standard, "consideration of 
environmental matters in audit of financial statements" (ISA, 1010). 
Environmental matters may have an impact on the financial 
statements. For example: pollution prevention systems, the costs 
which may have to be accrued for remediation costs; liabilities 
relating to transportation of, or contamination by, hazardous waste. 
Therefore, auditors in Eritrea should become familiar with this 
standard and other guidelines on environmental matters. Moreover, 
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the regulatory body in Eritrea need to be conscIOUS of the 
consequence of pollution etc. to the environment and should set 
regulations for environmental issues. 
8.1.1.3 Reasonableness gap 
The duties contributing most to the "reasonableness gap" concerned 
the auditors' responsibility to: 
-examine and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
company's management; 
-prepare the auditee company's financial statements; 
-report to an appropriate authority theft or misappropriation of 
corporate assets by non-managerial employees. 
The responses regarding duties concernmg the evaluation of how 
efficiently and effectively a company has been run, and who prepares 
the company's financial statements, indicate that users in Eritrea 
may not be well aware of the duties and responsibilities of auditors 
and management. It may not be reasonable to expect auditors to 
evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of a company as management 
are involved in the day to day activities of the company and possess 
more knowledge about the company than auditors. It is also clearly 
management's responsibility to prepare the financial statements of a 
company. Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect the auditor to 
perform those duties. The gap regarding the reporting of 
misappropriation of assets by non-managerial employees to regulatory 
authorities, indicate that the public expect auditors to report illegal 
acts to the regulatory authorities regardless of their affects on the 
financial statements. This includes misappropriations committed by 
non-managerial employees, which can be reported to management, 
who in the absence of collusion, are in a position to address the issue. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the main reason for the high 
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((reasonableness gap" (unreasonable expectations) is due to the lack of 
awareness of the nature and limitations of the audit function. This is 
supported by the analysis of the "knowledge gap", as shown in 
Appendix 5, that many of the suggested duties of auditors were 
incorrectly identified as duties of an auditor by the interest groups. 
8.1.2 Other factors related to specific problems in Eritrea 
8.1.2.1 Provision of non- audit services (audit independence) 
With respect to interest groups' perceptions of the influence of non-
audit services on auditors' independence, significant differences were 
found among the interest groups regarding the provision of 
management consulting services and management decision making 
functions to audit clients among the interest groups. With regard to 
the level of agreement, users seem to be indecisive, but auditors and 
management have shown some disagreement. Therefore, some 
interest groups have stronger concerns regarding auditor 
independence than other groups in regard to the two non-audit 
services. A negative reaction towards the provision of accounting 
related services to audit clients was held by the majority of the 
interest groups. This may indicate that the provision of accounting 
related services to audit clients may impair audit independence. This 
result is not surprising given the prohibition on the provision of these 
services by both IFAC and the SEC. With respect to the provision of 
tax related services, auditors, management and users have rather a 
positive view regarding the offering of these services. This result 
supports the IFAC allowance of tax related services. 
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8.1.2.2 Expectations with regard to audit quality, audit regulations, and 
auditor-client relationship 
The results of the study also show that, for all three statements 
regarding audit quality, audit regulation and auditor client 
relationships, there were significant differences in perceptions among 
the answers given by the interest groups. The majority of the interest 
groups disagreed with the statement that the quality of audit work is 
adequately regulated by the auditing profession. The main reason was 
due to a shortage of qualified staff in the office of the auditor general. 
With respect to the quality of an audit, management and users were 
of the opinion that the quality of the audit has not been improved over 
the last few years. The reasons for this, among others, were: shortage 
of audit staff, lowballing, non-compliance with regulations and 
inadequate training. Finally, with regard to the statement that 
auditors are heavily influenced by management since they are paid by 
the company, users have the strongest concern regarding the affect on 
auditor independence in relation to the other groups. Hence an 
expectation gap exists with respect to these three statements. 
8.1.2.3 Expectations with regard to decision usefulness and audit 
communication 
With regard to the decision usefulness of the audit report and audit 
communication, there were significant differences in perception 
among the answers given by the interest groups. The majority of the 
interest groups agreed that the audit report is useful in assessing 
whether a company is financially viable. However, the research shows 
that financial and/or English language illiterate users (especially 
shareholders) have some problems in understanding the audit report 
as the business language in Eritrea is English and the audit report is 
prepared in English. 
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8.2 Conclusion 
Overall, the findings of this research suggest that a wide audit 
expectation gap was found on issues concernmg auditors' 
responsibility for fraud detection, reporting of fraud and other illegal 
acts to authorities, going concern problems, and for examining the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the company's management. To a lesser 
extent, an audit expectation gap was found concerning auditors 
responsibility for examining the soundness of internal control systems 
and for preparing the auditee company's financial statements. 
Auditors' independence was also an important point of concern. Three 
factors which have the greatest negative influence on auditors' 
independence were identified by the interest groups. These were: the 
provision of non-audit services, the danger of lowballing (which leads 
to competition among audit firms) and an established auditor client 
relationship. Moreover, inadequate regulation by the regulatory body 
with regard to audit quality was also found to be a factor which 
contributed to the gap. 
The comparison of this study with those of Porter (1993) and Viitanen 
and Troberg (1999), in regard to the three component parts of the 
audit expectation-performance gap, reveals a number of differences. 
Part of the differences may be explained by differences in legal 
requirements regarding auditors in these countries, differences m 
opinion between the interest groups' responses, and the elapse of 
time. In this study, the "reasonableness gap" (unreasonable 
expectation gap) was the largest contributor to the expectation gap. 
This indicates a lack of awareness of the audit function by the interest 
groups in Eritrea. This finding indicates that interest groups in 
countries with a developed economy and/or established capital 
markets (such as Finland and New Zealand) are more aware of the 
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auditor's responsibility than countries with a developing economy and 
without capital markets (such as Eritrea). Moreover, the comparison 
of this study with those of Porter (1993), Gloeck and De Jager (1993) 
and Viitanen and Troberg (1999), shows that fraud detection, going 
concern, audit independence and reporting to regulatory authorities, 
including fraud committed by non-managerial employees, are major 
contributors to the audit expectation gap in these studies. 
This research report has indicated evidence of the existence of the 
audit expectation gap in Eritrea. It has also provided a comprehensive 
approach towards narrowing the gap (see hereafter). Therefore, it is 
crucial that the regulatory body in Eritrea becomes conscious about 
the existence of an audit expectation gap in Eritrea and takes 
appropriate precautionary measures in order to restore public 
confidence in financial reporting. Moreover, as Eritrea adopts IFAC 
standards, the findings of this research can provide additional 
evidence of the existence of an audit expectation gap in Eritrea to the 
International Federation of Accountants. 
8.3 Recommendations to narrow the expectation gap in 
Eritrea 
The recommendations presented below aim to narrow the audit 
expectations gap in Eritrea. The focus of the recommendations is on 
the factors contributing to the audit expectation gap. Therefore, these 
recommendations should be read together with all the explanations 
presented in the entire research report. 
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1. Audit independence 
Audit independence is the auditor's most valuable attribute. Negative 
public perception of auditors' independence may harm the auditing 
profession's standing with the public. Therefore, to ensure auditor's 
independence in Eritrea, the following should be done: 
a) The regulatory body in Eritrea (auditor general at present) 
should monitor whether audit firms are adhering strictly to the 
audit regulations (such as Code of Professional Ethics). The 
prescribed disciplinary action should be taken if any audit firm 
violates the regulations set by the regulatory body. 
b) The regulatory body should make sure that none of the audit 
firms are providing non-audit services which is not permissible 
under the Professional Code of Ethics. This includes, among 
others, the provision of accounting and bookkeeping related 
services to audit clients. 
c) The appointment of auditors should not be made based on a 
quoted fee (lowballing). Research has shown that pressure on 
pricing influences the auditor's financial independence and 
audit quality (see Wooten 2003). It also results in competition 
between audit firms. Therefore, as is clearly indicated in the 
Code of Professional Ethics of Eritrea, fees should be a reflection 
of the value of the professional services to the client. According 
to the IFAC Code, the value of the services includes: the skill 
and knowledge required, the level of training and experience of 
the person, the time necessarily occupied by each person 
performing the service, and the degree of responsibility that 
performing those services entails. 










The Audit Expectation Gap in Eritrea 
2. Auditor's responsibility: 
a. The largest components of the audit expectations-performance 
gap in Eritrea are derived from unreasonable expectations. 
Hence, the best way to narrow the unreasonable expectations 
gap is to educate the public about the role and responsibility of 
an auditor. In order to increase pubic awareness of the nature 
and limitations of auditing in Eritrea, audit firms, m 
collaboration with the regulatory body, should organize and give 
seminars to appropriate bodies such as the Chamber of 
Commerce, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Inland Revenue 
Department and other users of financial statements. With 
respect to shareholders, auditors can address these issues 
during shareholders' meetings. Regarding auditors, the 
"knowledge gap" can be narrowed through training and 
organizing workshops. One of the reasons for the "knowledge 
gap" among auditors is a lack of the knowledge of auditors' legal 
responsibilities. This can be narrowed by teaching accounting 
students the legal requirements affecting an auditor according 
to the Commercial Code of Eritrea, as part of the auditing 
course in higher educational institutions (such as Asmara 
University). Moreover, auditors should be encouraged to take 
professional examinations to enable them to develop their 
professional competence. Finally, the financial knowledge of the 
pubic and auditors can be enhanced by encouraging companies 
to publish their annual accounts in different forms of 
communications media such as newspapers and the internet. 
b. With respect to auditors' responsibilities to detect and report 
fraud and illegal acts, several recommendations have been 
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provided by different researchers in different countries. These 
include, among others, to clarify and determine exactly the 
auditor's duties in relation to fraud detection and reporting to 
authorities (including to which authorities fraud is to be 
reported). Attention, however, has to be paid to the extent of 
responsibility that the auditor can assume in reality in this 
respect, and to the legal protection that can be offered to the 
auditor (see Porter, 1993 and Viitanen and Troberg, 1999). 
However, given the difference in the business practices and 
legal systems of those countries with those of Eritrea, the 
regulatory body in Eritrea needs first to investigate the 
application of these recommendations before adapting them to 
the Eritrean situation. Moreover, the role of an auditor with 
respect to these factors needs to be communicated to the 
public. 
c. The issue which requires attention with respect to the auditor's 
responsibility is also the going concern problem. Eritrea has 
recently adopted IFAC standards and auditors need to follow, as 
guidance, ISA 570 "the auditor's consideration of an entity's 
ability to continue as going concern" on their responsibility with 
regard to identifying and responding, when conducting an audit 
of financial statements, to events and conditions that may be 
indicative of significant doubt regarding an entity's ability to 
continue as a going concern. 
3. Quality of an audit: to improve the quality of an audit the following 
needs to be done: 
a. All audit firms should apply adequate quality control in 
compliance with applicable quality control standards (IFAC 
quality control standards). 
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b. The quality of an audit should be adequately regulated by the 
regulatory body. This can be achieved by establishing a quality 
review committee comprised of, among others, auditors, users 
and preparers of financial statements, the auditor general, 
academics, representatives from the Chamber of Commerce, 
Inland Revenue Department and other financial institutions. 
This committee will perform quality reviews of auditor activities 
and enforce compliance with applicable professional standards. 
The period in which the quality review is conducted may be 
decided by the quality review committee. 
c. Auditors should reject the demand for an audit in an 
unreasonably short time, especially for small and medium sized 
companies. 
4. Audit communication 
To improve audit communication through the audit report and 
to meet the demands of the public, one audit firm has already 
translated the audit report from English to Tigrinya. However, 
the researcher is of the opinion that, if all audit firms develop 
their own translation of the audit report into Tigrinya, this may 
result in different interpretations by different audit firms. 
Therefore, the translation of the audit report to "Tigrinya" 
should first be approved by the regulatory body, and then a 
standard audit report in "Tigrinya" should be developed by the 
regulatory body in collaboration with all audit firms. Moreover, 
in wording the standard audit report in "Tigrinya", careful 
assessment should be made in order to maintain consistency 
with the English version. 
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5) S elf- regulation Vs independent regulatory body 
The present independent regulatory body in Eritrea is the 
auditor general, but a shortage of staff and a lack of resources 
prevent it from regulating the audit firms. If the regulatory body 
lacks the resources and capacity to effect the above 
recommendations, self-regulation of the profession would be a 
partial and short-term solution. However, in the light of 
international developments in the wake of the collapse of major 
companies such as Enron, Tyco, Worldcom and Parmalat, 
independent regulatory bodies exist, or are in the process of 
being established (including in South Africa), in most countries 
to oversee the accounting profession. Therefore, in the long run, 
a move to an independent regulatory body will be unavoidable 
to ensure that there is confidence at national and international 
level in the regulation of the accounting profession. 
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Chapter nine - Suggestions for future research 
This research has provided evidence of the existence of an audit 
expectation gap in Eritrea. Future research will need to focus on how 
the expectation gap can be narrowed or reduced. Education has been 
suggested as one means of reducing the gap. Therefore, an 
appropriate form of education for both the public and auditors needs 
to be investigated. Moreover, to narrow the "knowledge gap" among 
auditors, the source of their attitudes needs first to be determined. 
This could be done by studying the perception differences between 
students and auditors. This would help to establish when auditors 
develop such perceptions; at university or through years of practice in 
auditing? 
Research should also address how to improve the quality of an audit 
and enhance auditors' independence in Eritrea so as to reduce the 
expectations gap. This can be partly done by investigating whether 
self-regulation, an independent regulatory body or both is needed to 
monitor audit quality and discipline auditors over audit failures. 
Future research should also consider examining whether audit 
communication can be improved by translating the audit report from 
the English language (the business language) to the Tigrinya language 
(the national language of Eritrea). Another potential area of interest 
centers around fraud detection and reporting to authorities. For 
further discussion, refer to recommendations on fraud detection and 
reporting to authorities. 
The results of this study were compared to studies made in Finland 
and New Zealand as similar survey instruments were employed in all 
three studies. The levels of the expectation gap are different in the 
three countries as discussed in chapter seven. This differences could 
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be partially explained due to differences in culture, legal system, 
institutional background, level of knowledge of the interest groups, 
differences in opinion and the elapse of time. Therefore, similar 
research in other African countries, such as South Africa, might 
improve understanding of what determines the image of the auditor 
and his role in society, as pointed out by Beelde et al. (1997: 16) . Even 
though, Gloeck and De Jager (1993), and Minter and Bourne (1995) 
(concerning the messages communicated by the standard audit report) 
have studied the audit expectation gap in South Africa, the deficient 
performance gap and the reasonableness gap (unreasonable 
expectations) were not considered in those studies. Therefore, future 
research will need to study the "deficient performance gap" to 
determine the perceptions of the public concerning the performance of 
auditors with respect to their existing duties. This would help to 
identify the "deficient performance gap". Moreover, the 
"reasonableness gap" (unreasonable expectations) also needs to be 
studied to determine the level of "knowledge gap" among auditors and 
public groups regarding the suggested duties of an auditor. 
With respect to provision of non-audit servIces, the Gloeck and De 
Jager (1993) study indicates that the provision of non-audit services 
had a negative effect on an auditor's independence, and they suggest a 
ban on the provision of other services to auditors' clients in South 
Africa. However, the ministerial panel for the review of the Draft 
Accounting Profession's bill (2003) in South Africa stated that it is not 
practical to statutorily limit non-audit services performed by the 
auditor to an entity. The researcher is of the opinion that various 
studies (including this study) and professional bodies have indicated 
that, even though the provision of the majority of non-audit services 
has a detrimental effect on auditor's independence, some non-audit 
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services were found to be widespread and expected by the public, for 
example the provision of tax related services to an audit client (see 
Viitanen and Troberg, 1999; Jenkins and Drawezyk, 1999; and IFAC, 
2001). Therefore, to continue the examination of auditor independence 
in South Africa, future research is needed to assess the influence of 
particular non-audit services on auditor independence. The result 
may help the auditing profession In South Africa in their 
deliberations. 
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Appendix 1 
The mean of interest group responses with respect to Auditors' existing and 
suggested duties (section 1 and section 3). 
Section 1 Section 3 
(Is a duty)l (should be 
a duty)2 
Duty The auditor should2 A3 M3 U3 A M 
1 Detect material fraud 
0.36 O. 0.76 
2 Examine and report going concern. 0.81 O. 
3 Report breaches of tax laws -0.13 0.53 -0.38 0.07 0.53 
4 Examine and report material errors or 
i distortions 1.00 0.76 0.88 1.00 0.88 
5 Report material departure from Generally 
Accepted Accounting Practice 1.00 0.63 0.88 1.00 0.88 
6 Report fraud to an appropriate authority. .86 0.75 0.13 0.86 0.88 
7 Report to regulatory authority deliberate distortion 
of financial information. 0.29 0.20 0.14 0,43 0.20 
8a Report to an appropriate authority theft or 
misappropriation of corporate assets by company 
directors/senior management 0.79 0.60 -0.08 0.79 1.00 
8b Report to an appropriate authority theft or 
misappropriation of corporate assets by non-
managerial employee. 0.13 0.50 -0.69 0.13 0,43 
9 Audit the accounts to verify the correctness and 
accuracy of the balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts. 0.73 1.00 0.88 0.73 1.00 
10 Report to the general meeting the manner in 
which they carried out their duty and their 
comments on the report to the board of directors. 0.10 0.63 0.33 0.10 0.63 
11 Examine and report on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the company's management. 0.19 0.33 -0.14 0.25 0.73 
12 Prepare the auditee Company's financial 
statements -0.25 0.18 0.38 -0.25 0.18 
13 Verify every transaction of the audited company. -0.56 -0.06 -0.07 O. 
14 Examine the internal control system. 1.00 1.00 0.57 1.00 1.00 
15 Guarantee the audited financial statements are 
accurate. -0.29 -0.18 0.38 -0.29 0.06 
16 Recommend approval of the accounts 0,41 0.83 0.43 0.48 0.83 
17 Report on the future prospects of the company. 0.41 0.83 0.43 0.48 0.83 
18 Examine and report non-financial information 0.56 0.07 0.60 0.56 0.33 
19 Acquaint himself/herself with other information 
included in the annual report. i " 0.2 0.39 0.69 0.33 
20a Examine and report on Environmental matters 0.29 -0.6 -0.85 0.10 -0.6 




Plan the internal control system of the company. -0.87 -0.5 0.00 -0.87 -0.38 
Detect illegal acts by the company officials which 
don't directly affect the company's accounts. -0.53 -1.00 -0.71 -0.48 -1.00 
Inform the directors and the general meeting 
breach of legal or statutory requirement. 0.81 0.54 0.17 0.81 0.85 
1 Mean of interest group responses signifying that the duty is an existing duty of an auditor. 
1 Mean of interest group responses signifying that the duty should be a duty of an auditor 
2 The duties are abbreviated from their expression in the questionnaires. 
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Appendix 2: 
The Proportion of the interest group signifying the auditor should perform the 
duty (section 1 and section 3) 
Frequencies (percentages) 
Section 1 
(Is a duty)! 
The auditor should3 A4 M4 U4 
Detect material fraud 
68.8 82.4 87.5 
Examine and report - going concern. 90.6 82.4 50.0 
Report breaches of tax laws 43.3 76.5 30.8 
Examine and report - material errors or 
distortions 100 88.2 93.8 
Report material departure from Generally 
Accepted Accounting Practice 100 81.3 93.8 
Report fraud to an appropriate authority. 93.1 87.5 56.3 
Report to regulatory authority deliberate distortion 
of financial information. 64.3 60.0 57.1 
Report to an appropriate authority theft or 
misappropriation of corporate assets by company 
directors / senior management 89.7 80.0 46.2 
Report to an appropriate authority theft or 
misappropriation of corporate assets by non-
managerial employee. 56.5 75.0 15.4 
Audit the accounts to verify the correctness and 
accuracy of the balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts. 86.7 100 93.8 
Report to the general meeting the manner in 
which they carried out their duty and their 
comments on the report to the board of directors. 54.8 81.3 73.3 
Examine and report on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the company's management. 59.4 66.7 42.9 
Prepare the auditee Company's financial 
statements 37.5 58.8 68.8 
Verify every transaction of the audited company. 21.9 47.1 46.7 
Examine the internal control system. 100 100 78.6 
Guarantee the audited financial statements are 
accurate. 35.5 41.2 31.3 
Recommend approval of the accounts 70.4 91.7 71.4 
Report on the future prospects of the company. 46.9 46.7 26.7 
Examine and report non-financial information 78.1 56.3 80 
Acquaint himself/herself with other information 
included in the annual report. 71.9 60.0 69.2 
Examine and report on Environmental matters 35.5 20.0 7.7 
Examine and report on societal matters 41.4 20.0 8.3 
Plan the internal control system of the company. 6.7 25.0 50.0 
Detect illegal acts by the company officials which 
don't directly affect the company's accounts. 22.6 0.0 14.3 
Inform the directors and the general meeting 
breach of legal or statutory requirement. 90.6 *76.9 58.3 
1 ProportIOn of mterest group slgmfymg that It IS an eXlstmg duty of an audItor 
2 Proportion of interest group signifying that auditors should perform the duty 
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Appendix 3 : Assessment of auditors' performance based on the mean of the interest 
group responses and the proportion of interest groups signifying 






Duty The auditor should3 A4 M4 U4 
2 Examine and report - going concern. 4.7 2.7 2.8 
4 Examine and report - material errors or distortions 
4.5 4.2 2.8 
5 Report material departure from Generally Accepted 
Accounting Practice 4.8 4.1 3.8 
9 Audit the accounts to verify the correctness and accuracy 
of the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. 4.9 4.6 3.6 
10 Report to the general meeting the manner in which they 
have carried out their duties and their comments on the 
report to the board of directors. 4.6 4.7 2.8 
14 Examineth~~internal control system. 4.5 3.8 2.6 
16 Recommend approval of the accounts 4.3 4.4 2.4 
18 Examine and report non-financial information 3.9 4.1 3.0 
19 Acquaint himself/herself with other information included 
in the annual report. 4.1 4.3 3.1 
20a Examine and report on Environmental matters 3.9 3.5 3.5 
23 Inform the directors and the general meeting breach of 




Poorly (1-2 2 
A M U 
0.0 28.6 25.0 
3.1 13.3 42.9 
0.0 0.0 20.0 
0.0 0.0 20.0 
0.0 0.0 36.4 
3.3 5.9 27.3 
5.3 0.0 30.0 , 
8.0 12.5 25.0 
• 8.7 11.1 12.5 
9.1 66.7 0.0 
11.1 0.0 
I Mean of auditor's performance on 1-5 ordinal scale where 1 denotes 'poorly', and 5 'excellently (2.9 has been adopted as point of differentiation 
between satisfactory and unsatisfactory performance). The results are presented only for existing duties of an auditors. 
2 Proportion of the interest group signifying that auditors perform the duty poorly. The results are presented for existing duties of an 
auditors. 
3 The duties arc abbreviated from their expression in the questionnaires. 











The Audit Expectation Gap in Eritrea 
Appendix 4: The Proportion of the users group - Bank loan officers and Tax 
Auditors signifying the auditor should perform the duty. 
Frequencies (percentages) 
Section 1 
(Is a duty)l 
Duty The auditor should3 BL04 TA4 
1 Detect material fraud 
80.0 100.0 
2 Examine and report - going concern. 50.0 50.0 
3 Report breaches of tax laws 40.0 0.0 
4 




Report material departure from Generally 
Accepted Accounting Practice 
90.0 100.0 
6 Report fraud to an appropriate authority. ~ 33.3 
7 Report to regulatory authority deliberate 
of financial information. 33.3 
8a Report to an appropriate authority theft or 
misappropriation of corporate assets by company 
directors/senior management 62.5 20.0 
8b Report to an appropriate authority theft or 
misappropriation of corporate assets by non-
managerial employee. 28.6 0.0 
9 Audit the accounts to verify the correctness and 
accuracy of the balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts. 90.0 100.0 
10 Report to the general meeting the manner in 
which they carried out their duty and their 
comments on the report to the board of directors. 55.6 100.0 
11 Examine and report on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the company's management. 50.0 33.3 
12 Prepare the auditee Company's financial 
statements 60.0 83.3 
13 Verify every transaction of the audited company. 33.3 66.7 
14 Examine the internal control system. 87.5 66.7 
15 Guarantee the audited financial statements are 
accurate. 30.0 33.3 
16 Recommend approval of the accounts 77.8 60.0 
17 Report on the future prospects of the company. 22.2 33.3 
18 Examine and report non-financial information 77.8 83.3 
19 Acquaint himself/herself with other information 
included in the annual report. 85.7 50.0 
20a Examine and report on Environmental matters 14.3 0.0 
20b Examine and report on societal matters 14.3 0.0 
21 Plan the internal control system of the company. 50.0 33.3 
22 Detect illegal acts by the company officials which 
don't directly affect the company's accounts. 12.5 16.7 
23 Inform the directors and the general meeting I 
breach of legal or statutory requirement. 
1 Proportion of interest group signifying that it is an existing duty of an auditor 
2 Proportion of interest group signifying that auditors should perform the duty 
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Appendix 5: The 'knowledge gap' of the Interest Groups 
Duty The auditor should3 A3 M3 U3 
I 
1 Detect material fraud 31.2 17.6 12.5 I 
2 Examine and report going concern. 9.4 17.6 50.0 ! 
3 Report breaches of tax laws 59.4 23.5 75.0 ! 
4 Examine and report material errors or distortions 0.0 11.8 6.2 I 
5 Report material departure from Generally Accepted 
• 
Accounting Practice 0.0 23.5 6.2 
6 Report fraud to an appropriate authority. 15.6 17.6 43.7 
7 Report to regulatory authority deliberate distortion of 
financial information. 43.7 47.1 50.0 
8a Report to an appropriate authority theft or 
misappropriation of corporate assets by company 
directors / senior management 18.7 29.4 32.3 
8b Report to an appropriate authority theft or 
misappropriation of corporate assets by non-managerial 
employee. 59.3 47.1 87.5 
9 Audit the accounts to verify the correctness and accuracy 
of the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. 18.7 0.0 6.2 
10 Report to the general meeting the manner in which they 
carried out their duty and their comments on the report to 
the board of directors. 46.9 23.5 31.3 
11 Examine and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the company's management. 40.6 41.2 62.5 
12 ~!'epare the auditee Company's financial statements 62.5 41.2 31.3 
13 Verify every transaction of the audited company. 78.1 52.9 56.3 
14 Examine the~l?:~ernal control system. 0.0 0.0 31.3 
15 Guarantee the audited financial statements are accurate. 65.6 58.8 68.7 
16 Recommend approval of the accounts 40.6 35.3 37.5 
17 Report on the future prospects of the company. 53.1 58.8 75.0 
18 Examine and report non-financial information 21.9 53.0 25.0 
19 ~herself with other information included 
ort. 28.1 43.7 
20a mine and report on Environmental matters 65.6 82.4 93.7 
20b Examine and report on societal matters 62.5 82.4 93.7 
21 Plan the internal control system of the company. 93.7 76.5 62.5 
22 Detect illegal acts by the company officials 
directly affect the company's accounts. 78.1 100.0 87.5 
23 Inform the directors and the general meeti 
~ 
legal or statutory requirement. 9.4 41.1 56.3 
~~~~":I:re of total knowledge gap 1002.7 1029.3 1225.9 I 
Measure of average 'knowlec:!g~gap' per duty 40.108 41.172 49.036 
1 Proportion of interest groups responses selecting either 'yes' for duties which are not duties of 
auditors, and 'no' for those which are (incorrect option) or 'not aware'. 
2 The duties are abbreviated from their expression in the questionnaires 
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Appendix 6: Perception of the interest groups with respect to audit Independence, auditors-client relationship, audit quality 
and audit communication (see part II of the questionnaire). 
Auditors Management Users 
No Statements' A2 N2 D2 A N D A N D 
1 Provision of tax related services to audit client 71.8 15.6 12.5 64.7 23.5 11.8 68.8 6.3 25.0 
2 Provision of bookkeeping or accounting related 28.1 18.8 53.1 47.1 5.9 47.1 25.0 12.5 62.5 
services to audit client 
3 Provision of management-consulting services to 40.6 9.4 50.0 88.2 11.8 0.0 50.0 6.3 43.8 
audit client 
4 Provision of management decision-making 31.3 3.1 65.6 47.1 11.8 41.2 37.5 25.0 37.5 
functions to an audit client 
5 The quality of audit work is adequately regulated 17.0 6.7 76.3 23.0 10.0 67.0 30.1 15.0 54.9 
the auditing profession. 
6 In the last few years the quality of external audit 87.5 9.4 3.13 41.2 11.8 47.1 43.8 18.8 37.5 
has improved. 
7 The audit report is useful in the process of 100.0 0.0 0.0 76.5 5.9 17.7 87.5 12.5 0.0 
assessing whether or not the company is 
.. 
financially viable. 
8 The purpose of audit is clearly communicated in 93.8 3.1 3.1 88.2 5.9 5.9 87.5 6.3 6.3 
the audit report 
9 Auditors are heavily influenced by management 0.0 0.0 100.0 58.8 5.88 35.3 62.5 18.8 18.8 
of the company they are auditing because they 
are paid by the company. 
1 The duties are abbreviated from their expression in the questionnaires. 



















The Audit Expectation Gap in Eritrea 
Appendix 7: Questionnaire 
1. Your Position 
2. Educational level --------------------------------------------
Part I - Views related to existing and suggested auditor's duties 
Please indicate the extent of your agreement in the appropriate box. 
~I~ it an Existing Duty of an If an existing duty, how well is it performed by Should the duty be 
auditor? the auditor? performed by the auditor? .. =-:---- ---
Yes No Unaware Nota Poorly Very Can't Yes No Unaware 
duty well judge 
._-- - ,..---- --
The auditor should +1 -1 0 N/A 1 2 3 4 5 0 +1 -1 0 
-- ---r------ ~- --------
Detect material fraud committed in the audited 
company. 
----~ .- -----1-------r----. --
Examine and report whether the company's 
continued existence is in doubt. ._---- I-- ---.- --- -- -r---- ----.-:---- ,---- ---
Report breaches of tax laws to thc Inland 
Revenue Department. 
------ ----- c--. -- ---.- ----- ----.-,--- --- I-- -------
Examine and report whether the audited 
financial statements contain any material errors -t or distortions .-~ --- -. Report all material departure from Generally I Accepted Accounting Practice in preparing and 
I 
presenting financial statements to give a true 
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Is it an Existing Duty of an If an existing duty, how well is it performed by Should the duty be I 
auditor? the auditor? performed by the auditor? 
r--~~: 
Unaware 
~-~ ~ ~ ~~ ~-~~ ~ 
Yes No Nota Poorly Very Can't Yes No Unaware 
duty well judge 
~~-~~~~-t-~ 
No. The auditor should +1 -1 0 N/A 1 2 3 4 5 0 +1 -1 0 
~~-
-~~ ~-~ ~~ ~~~~ ---- ~ .-~~ ~~- ~~-~ I-~~~ ~~-~ ,--~~ ~-~ -~~~~-~~ ~~-t-~ 
6. Report to an appropriate authority fraud 
committed in the audited company. 
r-~- r--~- ~-~ i--~~~~ ----
7. Report to regulatory authority deliberate 
distortion of financial information. 
~ r----~~ t-----~ ----
8. Report to an appropriate authority theft or 
misappropriation of corporate assets by 
company: 
a) Directors/senior management 
------ ~~- ------ ~-~ 
b) Non-managerial employees 
~~~~- t---~~ ~~~-
9. Audit the accounts of the company to verify the 
correctness and accuracy of the balance sheets 
r----
::md profit and loss accounts. 
10. Submit to the annual general meeting a written 
report on the manner in which they have 
carried out their duties and their comments on 
the report to the board of directors. 
~~- ~ ~~~- ~~ ------ ~~~-~~ ~~~ -~ ~ ~~-~~ ~~- ------
II. Examine and report on the efficiency and 
~2. 
effectiveness of the company's management. 
~ ~~~~~~ ~ ~~~ ~~~-~~ ~ ~~- ------ ~~- --- - t---~ ~ ~ ~~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~-~~ t---~ ~ ~~-~~ ----
Prepare the auditee Company's financial 
statements 
~~~- c--- -~~ ~~~-~~~ ----
13. Verify every transaction of the audited 
company. 
~~- ~~ I~~- ~~ ~~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~-~~ ~ ~~- ------- ~-~ 
14. Examine whether the audited company has a 
~~:-
_satisfactory system of internal control. 
~~-~~~ ~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~ ~ ~~- ------ ------ -~ ~~-~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~ t--~ ~ ~ ~~-~~ ----
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I i~ it an Existing Duty of an If an existing duty, how well is it performed by I Should the duty be 
auditor? the auditor? performed by the 
auditor? 
r--~-'-~ ~-~-
No Unaware Nota Poorly Very Can't Yes No Unaware 
duty well judge 
- ·1 ~~ ~- ~~ r-~ No. The auditor should ·1 0 N/A 1 2 3 4 5 0 +1 -1 0 
r-- ~--,~-~--~ ~--r~--~~- ~- ~-~ 
16. Recommend approval of the accounts and make such 
comments thereon as they think fit or refuse to 
recommend approval giving reasons for referring the 
matter back to the directors. 
I 17. Report on the future prospects of the company. =t 
-~~ r--
'18. Examine and report whether the non-financial 
-~-information presented in the financ1al statements is ---~~--I--correct (reliable). ~~~~ ~- - -~ 19. Acquaint himseltnbcrself with other information 
I ' included in the annual report, such as management I 
discussion and analysis, in order to determine whether 
material errors (inconsistencies) exist which need to be 
alI!ended or reported on in the auditor's report. 
~~~ ~- ~,~-~ ~-~, ~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~ ~~~ ~- ~-~ ~-
20 The auditor should examine and report on the conduct of 
the company with regard to 
a) Environmental matters 
~-r--'~ ~~-~--,~ r-~~- '- ~ -~ 
~-~-
b) Societal matters -.- ,~ ,~-,-~- ~- '- -- ~ --- r---~. 
21. '1;ak~ responsibility for planning the internal control 
system of the company. 
.~-~- r-- ~~ ~--r------~ I~~ 
22. Detect illegal acts by the company officials which don't 
r directly affect the company's accounts. '~- \ ~~~ Where the auditors find breaches of legal or statutory I requirements, they shall inform the directors and, where 
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Part II - Views about audit Independence, auditors, audit quality and audit communication 
Please indicate the extent of your agreement by ticking the relevant box. 
---------------
Strongly Neutral Strongly 
agree Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
----------
1. The auditor can provide tax related services to his client without impairing audit 
independence. 
2. The auditor can provide bookkeeping services related to audit client's aceounting 
records or financial statement of the audit client without impairing audit 
independence. 
3. The auditor can provide management-consulting services to his client without 
impairing audit independence. 
4. The auditor can provide management decision-making functions to an audit client 
without impairing audit independence. 
-----------
5. The quality of audit work is adequately regulated by the audit profession. 
6. In the last few years the quality of external audit has improved. 
7. The audit report is useful in the process of assessing whether or not the company is 
financially viable. 
8. The purpose of audit is clearly communicated in the audit report 
9. To what extent would you agree with the statement that "auditors are heavily 
influenced by management of the company they are auditing because they are paid 
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Existing and suggested duties of an auditors 
Prepare the auditeee company's financial statement 
Guarantee audited financial statements are accurate 
State whether financial statements fairly reflect the company's affair. 
Guarantee the audited company is solvent 
Report to a regulatory authority doubts about the company's continued 
existence 
Express doubts in the audited report about the company's continued existence 
Ensure compliance with companies' legislation 
Report breaches of tax laws to IRD 
Detect theft of corporate assets by non-managerial employees 
Detect theft of corporate assets by company directors/ senior management 
Detect deliberate distortion of financial information 
Report to regulatory authority theft of corporate assets by non managerial 
employees. 
Report to regulatory authority misappropriation of company assets by 
company directors/senior management 
Report to regulatory authority deliberate distortion of financial information 
Disclose in the audit report theft of corporate assets by non-managerial 
employee. 
Disclose in the audit report misappropriation of company assets by company 
directors/ senior management. 
Disclose in the audit report deliberate distortion of financial information 
Report to regulatory authority suspicions of fraud. 
Detect illegal acts by a company officials which directly affect the company's 
accounts 
Detect illegal acts by company officials which don't affect directly the 
company's account. 
Disclose in the audit report illegal acts which directly affect the company's 
accounts. 
Disclose in the audit report illegal acts which don't directly affect the 
company's accounts. 
Report to a regulatory authority illegal acts uncovered in the company 
Examine and report on the fairness of non-financial information 
Examine and report on the company's internal control 
Examine and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of the company's 
management. 
Audit published half-yearly company reports 
Examine and report on the fairness of financial forecasts 
Consider and report on the company's impact on its local community 
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Appendix 9: The Audit Expectation - Performance Gap in New Zealand (Porter 1993) 
Auditors' ... Audit expectation performance gap 
Perceived 
publics' expectation 
of Auditors l 
Performance2 
Performance Gap j. Reasonableness Gap • 
Auditors Existing Duties Duties reaso ably expected of 
Auditors 
f+- Deficient performance Deficient Standards ~... Unreasonable Expectations 
13%5 11"l1li 50%5 11"l1li 34%5 
Duty Response Contribution Duty Response Contribution Duty Response Contribution 
No. %3 0/04 No. %3 0/04 No. 
2.5b 37 21 2.10c 76 15 2.10a 
2.l1c 27 16 2.17 75 14 2.11a 
2.11b 25 14 2.10b 74 14 2.4 
2.14a 25 14 2.15 64 12 2.13b 
2.8b 21 12 2.20 63 12 2.14b 
2.13a 21 12 2.19 62 12 2.2 
2.8a 2.12 60 11 2.7 
175 100 2.5a 55 10 2.16 
2.18 
529 100 2.22 
IDuties expected of auditors by 20% or more of the public (interest groups excluding auditors). 












3 Proportion of the the non-auditor group whose expectations with respect to the duty are not being fulfilled 
4 Relative contributions of duties to component. 
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Appendix 10: Audit report and its translation in Tigriyna language (continuation on p. 198). 
P .. o~ Box :3446 
Tel. 121132.135 
AUDrroas" R:.F.:POR'J:' 
TO TFIE ~ERS OF 
NACFA <-~RPOR.A.T'ION 
SH.A.RE CO~ANY 




financial statements set QUt on pages 6 to 12 vvhich h.ave 'be,.en 
cC the accoun.ting ;politiC$-,$et. out: on page 9. 
RF..sPECTIVft RESPONSIBILITIES OF ·~NAGEME.NT ANn AUDrrORS 
'The tuanagcn"\e=ot is responsible fCor the p.:nparation ,of the financial st.at.e~t.s. It. is. our 
T¢sponsibility to f'01::Ul; an Ind.epeD.~t opinion. based oOn our aUdit,. on those sc.&nhtl1ents 
And toO report our optnion. to. you. 
BASIS OF OPJ:Nl'ON 
VVe CQo¢lucted our audit. in' accordance 'W"ith Intcrnat.ional SULndQrd on Auditing. 00.1" audit 
includcl\,. eXamination .. on a ~t basis of evidence n=levant t.00 tho ~ts and di.$clC)(IJ......-cs 
"in t:.be financial stalen::5CQ .... It "'$0 includes an &Bs'Cssrnent of' xhe aitpl.ific::ant. es.tinUlte$ a.n.d 
judgements rna.c;ic::" by f.he .rD.IIUUIIael'Deot in preparation of" the finaac.:ial $tate.nenbl:~ and 0.'1 
_bether the Accounting poUC1C!!$ are app..-op:ri&te to the cot'npany's ein;;uwnatancea: _d A.rIe 
cQnsistcntJy and ~ql.l.l!tte.l)' disclosed. 
We planned. our audit so as to oht.a.in all tho inforn::a..ation and c>tplanatic::tt;:t$ 
Vlfhich, 'oNe necessary in OI"der to provide u.s _ith sufficieQt .e.videz:tC.le to give 
reasonable assurance that me financial IIJu,ternents are 6::cc &00'1 J1'1.*-t<trilll J':bisst&tc.ruent 
vvhethCr ~.uscd by fraud or other irregularity or exror. J.n ronnina our opinion '\VC aJ.so 
ev.uuated the overall "de.quacy of the presentation of info~'L8.tion in the f\fi...."cial 








T"he nwnber Qr the board of" directors cQTnpany vv_ reduced frOUl 9 to 7 vvith the 
unani.n:.lous consent of" the s.b.are.holders _«ended :the annual general xneetina "Nhhou-t 
calling: an exu-a-ordinary gene-raJ meeting a.$ required by art.i.cle 423 or the CO.fl'H'nerci:llll 
Code o£t,he State QC"5riI'TC8-
The auditors .cor the year oC 2002 .. ",ere appoinbed by 'the board ~r""'~'"h''' 
'\/Villi 1.he wn-..n.d.ate gi.ven to thCn:l by the $han:holdc:n;. 'VVho 
meeting.. Aoecor<iin.g to artic:he 368 o£ the CC)lnrnerc:ial Code 
:$.1~ldcniO themselves __ en:: 5upposcd to appoint Q.uditut's_ 
the int"onnation given in the DirectOT"S" Report is. consisten~ v"tHh the 
as t.he inf"ormation relates therevvith~ 
~.2~-'-"'> 


















If'7f4. ftC?"&. a") 
ta.o '1.lr 6 Mil 1.lr 12 -tllCII.."- HI\- C;~' 'i'~"" f\c.r&."/I'') ," ' 
"2.!fi-iht"til. Sl"1lJ'I ou1ir'llli hltt-') hSl"lt-m-'} d,l\ctC;~ iht"til OU"l~"} 
(Financial Statements ) at fIil 1K- 9 -t1M til\- 'i' ~ iht"t1l "i<\ (Policy) 
Sl"ch-fl 1ISI""lQC -c"2.CC;~.. ' 
'I" ~<\m- C; ~ "'7.it) iht"tm 'l"f'Il'I ou1iMI'l M&-"} (Financial Statements) 'i' ~ 
'I"'I"th"lC, (Management) .,..I\ot:* h1im-') ,hI\- 'i'Ll'i' hSl" M-t&.+ .,..l\ot:H'i' )-f: 
1l:f ~(I iht"t1l -C"2.C'i' }<'11 c-r'Jm-H> 'I" J''l! C'AU SI"'111~n 
""~'i'''}t''t'l! -"lh~ 'i'~ 'i'7f"" f\c7'&'''/I''') 'r'J'C; 1I1lmAll:rn-~1I1l1l.1Mllil.} 
"7.'l,,} ),Jl. -r il'l"li:t'~ OUC"2.C'i'r-.. OUCOU&-'i' }<,il c-r'Jm-H MIf-r 'P&-~ H-tt>G ' 
H~fl){}. h"'ilt-m-"} )11.. th"lil ,}'I"~<\m- lI'1"SI"th"lC (Management) 1I-t.,...,0';-
'P"},lF:f"} 'i'J'.. 'l"SI"it'} h1uH 1l-t1i-t~9' 'i'~ ih1il "7.I\,,} Hm3PM Mt .. 
}<,il 'I"'I"C"'1C ""~'i',}1'l! OP"l~ c;~ c;7f"" flc7'&'''/I''} 00~1I OOCOO&-'i' 
'}l16-th'i' 1Ith"l'" ~,,~ .ItO&.:t';t-+'} QDCT,;t-+"} -thll,n- CTqm-H 'i' ~ ih<'l1l 
h)&-,:J"llV\,. lIHli'AhC; Ml\il'} "'1.i1,,} MI. ,i4~fl. .. M1I11., ~ lItat'J!"c;r- OUCQD&-
'I" J''l! c'A~+C; ,}SI"'1il ,'A "fi.~ 'A" h.~'i' '}ilMu ' 
1I1ldt. M<\T (ICJ!" tail 9 <;'11 7 }<'1I 'JQD:t''l! }<'11llilll-t~lin- (\il ilCh. -teD(\.'" 
}<,il "lil6 'l!'l.l\-n ~"fi.') 'A'I"/lC q1+.lr 423 c;~ ,,}"l-'1. ih1. 1..i:T&- hSl"1ImAIl 
ot:I\-~ >.111\ -t-~ 'l!Q. hm-f\"} 'I"-t1ili\" 
12002 tI1~ "II\- )'-'1.-t&-T M<\T f1C~ ilMI ilCh. il1f-t.,illl\-'I" .,..I\ot:"T -(\IT 
-t-II..JI'I"u ~"fi.1 'ASI"nc Q1+.lr 368 1"lJ!" th1. h.CT&- h'l"llm~ (It,>'lIt 
1-1lh, ll-tl1in- hSl"lI'" 'I"-t1l1ilu 
lIC'A~ 1Il!t} 'All'} >.il <\01\. -tm:e'f\,} lIi\'l' 'i' ~ O;l'fL:t'T, tho'Pfl-.lr tho""T "n-~ 
c; ~ iht"til ODlf"lllt -t:t'dt.tI'I". 'At +6n- 1I1\'- 'i' ~ 2002 ;Milm-'} CT'7o>-,,} 'i' fA: 
, Tt}~ ''In-'A ih111 t',}MC";f. 'AI'- h.~'i' ,,}.\SI",}II 
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